The schema provokes a disparity of false recollection between actions and objects in an everyday scene

We explored the effect of the schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects in an everyday scene. At first, participants watched slides of a man cooking in a kitchen. The man performed schema‐consistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects were left. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. We confirmed three main results. First, participants made more false recognitions for schema‐consistent distracters than for schema‐inconsistent distracters with more “remember” judgments accompanied by perceptual, thought, and contextual details, and with more “know” judgments. Second, participants made more false recognitions for schema‐consistent object distracters than for schema‐consistent action distracters. Third, participants more frequently recognized schema‐consistent action targets than schema‐consistent object targets with more “remember” judgments. Both action memory and object memory were reconstructed under the schema, provoking false recognitions for schema‐consistent distracters. However, the memories of schema‐consistent action targets were so recollective that they could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

The interplay between presentation material and decision mode for complex choice preferences

Recent research suggests that, when faced with a choice between several alternatives described with a large number of attributes, people make better choices if they do not consciously ponder over the alternatives but rather perform a distraction task assumed to elicit unconscious thought. Subsequent research attempting to replicate this finding, however, provided mitigated support for its existence. The research reported here contributes to this ongoing debate on two grounds. First, it highlights a methodological confound between qualitative and quantitative presentation material and proposes a novel procedure that can accommodate both. Second, it shows that, whereas conscious deliberation leads to better decisions when alternatives are characterised by quantitative information, the use of a qualitative format for presenting information cancels the advantage of conscious deliberation.     

The effects of schema on recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects

We examined how the schema affects recognition memories and subjective experiences for actions and objects. First, participants watched consecutive slides that described a man in the kitchen. In the slides, the man performed schema‐consistent actions and schema‐inconsistent actions, and schema‐consistent objects and schema‐inconsistent objects were left in the kitchen space. After watching the slides, participants completed a recognition test, a remember/know test, and a Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context questionnaire. For objects, the discrimination between targets and distracters was more accurate for schema‐inconsistent items than for schema‐consistent items, owing to perceptual, thought, and emotional recollections for schema‐inconsistent object targets. For actions, schema‐consistent targets were more frequently recognized than schema‐inconsistent targets, with more remember judgments based on perceptual and contextual recollections. While item‐specific information of schema‐inconsistent targets could be elaborated for objects, the perceptual details and the contextual relationship of schema‐consistent targets could be elaborated for actions. We also found less false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters than for schema‐consistent object distracters. The retrieval of the perceptual details of schema‐consistent action targets could prevent false recognitions for schema‐consistent action distracters.     

Political Violence in Northern Ireland

This study examined political violence, focusing on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland, particularly that of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). The study argued that the parameters of such behavior are similar in some important respects for all conflict-oriented groups, whether national armed forces or paramilitary organizations. The motivation, personal characteristics, and proximate situational influences involved in the violence in Northern Ireland are considered. The analysis draws on concepts and research from social psychology and attempts to construct a tentative psychological framework to facilitate an understanding of political violence in general.     

An Inventory of Affective Tolerance

The two dimensions of personality, extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N) as measured by the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI), were tested for their social desirability response set and their independence. Results from a collegiate sample (N = 282) show that E and N scales were susceptible to social desirability response bias for males and females, respectively. This bias could not be overcome by eliminating Ss who reported higher scores on the lie scale included in the EPI. The dimensionality of the two scales for the male Ss is questionable.     

The cognitive regulation of emotions: The role of success versus failure experience and coping dispositions

Attention deployment and generating specific types of cognitions are central cognitive mechanisms of emotion regulation. Two groups of hypotheses make contradicting predictions about the emotion-cognition relationship. The moodcongruency hypothesis expects the emergence of mood-congruent cognitions (i.e., negative mood leads to negative and positive mood to positive cognitions). Similarly, a substantial body of research suggests that negative mood induces selffocus, whereas positive mood elicits an external focus of attention. The moodrepair hypothesis, on the other hand, assumes that persons in a negative mood state summon thoughts incongruent with that state and divert attention away from the self. However, the temporal sequence of cognitions assessed as well as coping dispositions, such as vigilance and cognitive avoidance, may moderate these relationships. Positive and negative emotional states were elicited by exposing the participants to the experience of success or failure in a demanding cognitive task. Cognitions that were present after emotion induction were assessed by means of a thought-listing procedure. For the total sample, results clearly confirmed the moodcongruency hypothesis. Thought order was a critical factor only for changes in self-focus. Thought valence (positive, neutral, negative) as well as self-focus were substantially influenced by coping dispositions.     

The mental pain of the psychoanalyst: A personal view

Abstract

Mental pain is a common concern of psychoanalysts in their professional life. Combining her clinical experience with previous contributions by others, the author presents a personal overview of the patient-triggered mental pain of the analyst. Countertransference is considered to be the major source of the analyst's work-derived mental pain. This type of mental pain is not to be avoided or discarded by the analyst. Rather, the analyst will benefit from tolerating and even welcoming professional mental pain: in most cases, mental pain will bring with it rich clinical material that, upon interpretation, will help him or her to offer previously intolerable contents back to the patient in a transformed version that now becomes acceptable. The analyst's mental pain may emerge in his dreams; clinical examples of this phenomenon are presented. It is suggested that there is an increased chance of the analyst undergoing mental pain when treating patients suffering from severe psychopathology, and a clinical case is reported to illustrate this assertion. The author proposes that a lifelong effort is to be expected from analysts in terms of enhancing their threshold of tolerance to professional mental pain. In situations of mental pain, analysts must be particularly aware of the need to modulate their interpretations before transmitting them to the patient. The capacity of analysts to transform their mental pain (Ta, according to Bion) will depend on the plasticity of their container functions, the quality of their transformation abilities and, in particular, their threshold of tolerance to mental pain.     

“The primary process”: The vicissitude of a concept

Abstract

During the first twenty years that Freud spent creating his theory, he assumed that most of the functions responsible for creating mental-thought structures were organized according to two different forms or principles of thought. He called these forms “primary process” and “secondary process”. The “secondary process” is identified with rational thinking and the ego, and it is easy to follow the changes that this concept underwent in the works of Freud that followed. The concept of “primary process”, on the other hand, disappeared from his later works with no explanation. This article traces the changes that the “primary process” underwent in Freud's thinking and examines the connection between his analytical technique and his research method. A close study of the changes that the “primary process” underwent reveals that Freud's developmental thought process included concepts whose directional changes may be termed “regressive”.     

Merleau-Ponty’s Responses to Skepticism: A Critical Appraisal

Abstract

In this article, I reconstruct and evaluate Merleau-Ponty’s main responses to philosophical skepticism in the relevant parts of his work. To begin with, I introduce the skeptical argument that Merleau-Ponty most often tried to refute, namely, the dream argument. Secondly, I show how Merleau-Ponty, in his initial works, excludes the skeptical problem by appealing to a general contact with the world guaranteed by perception. Finally, I analyze how in his last texts Merleau-Ponty considers at least some uses of the skeptical arguments as tools to make our opaque contact with being explicit.