The European school of MCDA: Emergence,basic features and current works

Multiple-criteria decision analysis has evolved considerably since its birth during the 1960s. As part of this evolution, several schools of thought have developed emphasizing different techniques and, more generally, different attitudes as to the way of supporting or aiding decision making. One of these schools is now commonly referred to as the ‘European School’, its members being part of a European Working Group entitled ‘Multicriteria Aid for Decisions’. In the first part of this paper (Section 1) we follow a historical perspective in order to trace the emergence of the European School. Its distinctive features and main ideas are then outlined in Section 2. Finally we provide a general review of the current major research topics developed within this framework (Section 3).     

自孟庙修建看孟子地位的变迁——兼论孟子形象的多面性

孟庙是为奉祀孟子而建的人文景观,与孟子的命运息息相关。探讨孟子地位的变迁,不能不考察孟庙修建的情况。文章通过爬梳历代历次修庙碑记,考察宋以来孟子地位的变迁历程,认为孟子的地位宋以后经历一个曲折中上升的过程,其权威地位初步形成于宋,正式确立于元,至明清方彻底巩固下来;学者、皇帝、官吏、孟氏后裔和普通民众共同塑造了孟子的权威地位。孟子形象在不同时期、不同阶层中也是流变纷呈的。     

运动决策中的无意识思维研究

本研究以81名篮球专业的大学生为被试,通过决策篮球视频,考察运动决策中的无意识思维效应。实验1探讨了不同运动决策信息下的无意识思维决策差异,发现呈现直觉性决策信息时,无意识思维组的决策效果好于意识思维组。实验2在无意识思维阶段通过启动被试的加工方式,考察直觉性决策信息下,启动不同的加工方式对运动决策的无意识思维效应的影响,发现整体加工组的无意识思维决策效果最佳。研究结果表明,直觉性决策信息下,启动被试的整体加工方式,其无意识思维的决策效果会有所提升。     

Empathy and the Limits of Thought Experiments

This article criticizes what it calls perspectival thought experiments, which require subjects to mentally simulate a perspective before making judgments from within it. Examples include Judith Thomson's violinist analogy, Philippa Foot's trolley problem, and Bernard Williams's Jim case. The article argues that advances in the philosophical and psychological study of empathy suggest that the simulative capacities required by perspectival thought experiments are all but impossible. These thought experiments require agents to consciously simulate necessarily unconscious features of subjectivity. To complete these experiments subjects must deploy theory‐theoretical frameworks to predict what they think they would (or ought to) do. These outputs, however, systematically mislead subjects and are highly prone to error. They are of negligible probative value, and this bodes poorly for their continued use. The article ends with two suggestions. First, many thought experiments are not problematically perspectival. Second, it should be possible to carry out “in‐their‐shoes” perspectival thought experiments by off‐loading simulations onto virtual environments into which philosophers place subjects.     

DREAMING THE ANALYTIC SESSION: A CLINICAL ESSAY

This is a clinical paper in which the author describes analytic work in which he dreams the analytic session with three of his patients. He begins with a brief discussion of aspects of analytic theory that make up a good deal of the context for his clinical work. Central among these concepts are (1) the idea that the role of the analyst is to help the patient dream his previously “undreamt” and “interrupted” dreams; and (2) dreaming the analytic session involves engaging in the experience of dreaming the session with the patient and, at the same time, unconsciously (and at times consciously) understanding the dream. The author offers no “technique” for dreaming the analytic session. Each analyst must find his or her own way of dreaming each session with each patient. Dreaming the session is not something one works at; rather, one tries not to get in its way.     

Constructive Thought Strategies and Job Satisfaction: A Preliminary Examination

In order to examine the potential of constructive thought strategies for enhancing employee job satisfaction, an existing dispositional model of job satisfaction was expanded and tested. Structural equation modeling techniques indicated significant relationships among constructive thought strategies, dysfunctional thought processes, subjective well-being, and job satisfaction. In addition, two competing models were examined to test for the full or partial mediation of the effects of constructive thought strategies on job satisfaction. The implications of these findings for constructive thought strategy training interventions are discussed, along with directions for future research efforts.     

Thinking with,and about,patients too scared to think: Can non‐interpretive maneuvers stimulate refl ective thought?

Patients incapable of higher-order (symbolic) thinking can often not tolerate evidence of the analyst's separate existence, particularly when that 'otherness' becomes evident in the process of the analyst's refl ecting upon and interpreting how the patient experiences or represents the analyst. The patient's intolerance of the analyst's efforts to think (refl ect upon and interpret) renders the usual psychoanalytic maneuvers employed to stimulate refl ective thought ineffective with such patients. Such patients have to learn to tolerate multiple perspectives before they can allow the analyst, or themselves, to think in the other's presence. The author presents two clinical vignettes that illustrate how the analyst's efforts to think about the patient were experienced by the patient as both intolerably distancing and as rejecting of an aspect of the patient's subjective reality. Working psychoanalytically with such patients requires the analyst to forgo the use of narrow interpretations that elucidate unconscious meanings and motives in favor of alternate technical maneuvers capable of facilitating the development of symbolic thinking and refl ective thought (insightfulness). These maneuvers include a demonstration of the analyst's willingness and ability to withstand (rather than 'interpret away') how he is being psychically represented by the patient, without becoming destroyed by, or lost within, the patient's characterization of him. Beside modeling a tolerance of alternate perspectives of one's self, other non-interpretive maneuvers that help facilitate the development of self-refl ective thought include: stimulating the patient's curiosity about the workings of his own mind by identifying incompletely understood behaviors or reactions worthy of greater psychological understanding, and insinuating doubt about the adequacy of the patient's explanations of such phenomena.     

The case against neuropsychoanalysis: On fallacies underlying psychoanalysis' latest scientifi c trend and its negative impact on psychoanalytic discourse

The authors offer a critical examination of the claims of the proponents of the growing neuropsychoanalytic trend, that neuroscientifi c fi ndings are relevant and important for the development and justifi cation of psychoanalytic theory and practice. They bring to light some of the intuitions that have led to the popularity of the neuropsychoanalytic claims and the fallacies that underlie these claims and intuitions. They argue that it is crucial at this time to articulate the case against the neuropsychoanalytic trend because, underlying the debate over the relevance of neuroscience to psychoanalysis, there lies a struggle over the essential nature of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Relying on a biologistic perspective, whereby only what is biological is real, this new trend in effect offers a vision of psychoanalysis that limits the signifi cance of the unique psychoanalytic concern with the understanding of meanings and the role of discourse in discerning and justifying these meanings.     

Supervision, transference and countertransference

The author discusses supervision, transference and countertransference as seen in the context of the clinical case of a patient who had been first seen as a training analysis case and who later, in a fortuitous way, was treated by the supervisor of the training analysis. The supervisor, who in the first instance did not recognize the patient, discusses the reasons for this unusual experience in terms of the presence and absence of transference during the analysis of this patient as a training case and the problems inherent in the task of supervising. The patient's feelings towards the first and the second analyst and the vicissitudes of transference and countertransference during the supervision of the training analysis and its influence on the presentation of the analytical sessions by the student are also detailed and discussed. The question of recorded supervision presentations and their possible influence on the dynamics of supervision is raised.     

Evidentiality in language and cognition

What is the relation between language and thought? Specifically, how do linguistic and conceptual representations make contact during language learning? This paper addresses these questions by investigating the acquisition of evidentiality (the linguistic encoding of information source) and its relation to children's evidential reasoning. Previous studies have hypothesized that the acquisition of evidentiality is complicated by the subtleness and abstractness of the underlying concepts; other studies have suggested that learning a language which systematically (e.g. grammatically) marks evidential categories might serve as a pacesetter for early reasoning about sources of information. We conducted experimental studies with children learning Korean (a language with evidential morphology) and English (a language without grammaticalized evidentiality) in order to test these hypotheses. Our experiments compared 3- and 4-year-old Korean children's knowledge of the semantics and discourse functions of evidential morphemes to their (non-linguistic) ability to recognize and report different types of evidential sources. They also compared Korean children's source monitoring abilities to the source monitoring abilities of English-speaking children of the same age. We found that Korean-speaking children have considerable success in producing evidential morphology but their comprehension of such morphology is very fragile. Nevertheless, young Korean speakers are able to reason successfully about sources of information in non-linguistic tasks; furthermore, their performance in these tasks is similar to that of English-speaking peers. These results support the conclusion that the acquisition of evidential expressions poses considerable problems for learners; however, these problems are not (necessarily) conceptual in nature. Our data also suggest that, contrary to relativistic expectations, children's ability to reason about sources of information proceeds along similar lines in diverse language-learning populations and is not tied to the acquisition of the linguistic markers of evidentiality in the exposure language. We discuss implications of our findings for the relationship between linguistic and conceptual representations during development.