Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms

This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly distinguished in order to see whether Quine's argument against mentalism is cogent. The paper argues that Quine's naturalism supports only the weakest version of behaviorism, that is, the evidential one, but this version is compatible with mentalistic semantics. Quine's opposition to mentalism is an overreaction against the behaviorist camp. By contrast, Jerry Fodor's objection to José Luis Bermúdez is an overreaction from the opposite direction.     

HANSEL AND GRETEL: A TALE OF TERROR

In the analysis of a woman with multiple childhood traumas, the fairy tale “Hansel and Gretel” figured prominently. The author discusses the use of the fairy tale in this case at various levels. He suggests an interplay between a national myth, the fairy tale, and a personal myth—the patient's psychodynamics. The fairy tale can be used to illuminate personal meanings derived from it. In the experience of childhood trauma, the repeated reading of a fairy tale can help organize and defend against terrifying anxiety.     

Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (a) and (b) are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned.     

Theoretical trajectories: Dreams and dreaming from Freud to Bion

This paper aims at comparing Freud's and Bion's conceptual models on dreams and dreaming. Beyond both authors’ shared disposition vis‐à‐vis problems posed by knowledge, a critical gap opens regarding their differing clinical practices. It is hypothesized that their ideas do not belong to irreconcilable paradigms, but that there are continuities besides discontinuities more frequently highlighted between Freudian statements on psychic functioning – described in his theory on dreams – and Bion's findings in his development of both the original theory and the connections between dreaming and thinking. Firstly, Freud's and Bion's epistemological sources are examined as well as their creative use and historical environment. Then certain general theoretical and clinical issues are considered concerning their theories on dreams, the evolution of their ideas and corresponding clinical contexts. In a third section, their confluences and dissimilarities are dealt with, including clinical vignettes belonging to the authors to illustrate their interpretative modes of working. This is meant to show both an implicit theoretical–clinical complementarity and the fact that, though their routes bifurcate about the function of dreams, there remain connecting paths. Lastly, the final remarks review certain issues that have frequently been controversial between these lines of thought.     

Attempted suppression of social threat thoughts: Differential effects for social phobia and healthy controls?

Thought suppression research in the area of social phobia provides conflicting evidence regarding whether individuals demonstrate a general deficit or successful suppression. This paper reports the outcome of two studies using an online thought suppression paradigm measuring activation of target thoughts. Study 1 examined the effects of suppressing social threat stimuli with a healthy control group. Surprisingly, the results showed that participants demonstrated non-suppression of this stimuli class. Study 2 compared individuals with social phobia to a control group using the same stimuli as Study 1. Results revealed that following instructions to suppress social threat stimuli, individuals with social phobia demonstrated successful suppression, whilst the control group, as in Study 1, did not. The lack of suppression of social threat information by the control group may reflect functional impression-management of social threat stimuli. Whereas, successful suppression of these stimuli by individuals with social phobia, may contribute to diminished habituation to such information.     

Genders and sexualities in individuation: theoretical and clinical explorations

Abstract :  Gender assignment, as a key aspect of identity and cultural position, has existed throughout recorded time and across all cultures. An individual's biological sex and particular cultural milieu has a profound effect on their sense of themselves as a gendered being. Sexuality is a more recent marker in identity formation. In the last few decades there has emerged a great deal of interest in the psychology of gender formation, in the interplay of biological sex, culture, brain development, and attachment experiences in the formation of gender identities. Queer theory in its post-modern deconstructionist thinking has suggested that gender is a socially 'constructed' concept having no biological or psychological precursors or realities. Contemporary developmental psychoanalysis is bridging the gap between concepts of gender as purely biological and gender as non-existent. In this paper I explore the emergence of same-sex desire at mid-life, presenting two case histories with extensive dream material. The impact of sexual desire on gender identities is examined through the lenses of culture, dynamic systems theory, neuroscience, and depth psychology. The use of dream analysis as a window into the body/mind movement of gender emergence reflects my sense of gender as a fluidly shifting reality of mind, neither hardwired nor fictional.     

Selection of Decision Strategies After Conscious and Unconscious Thought

It is commonly assumed that the use of simple, non‐compensatory strategies is especially pronounced in memory‐based decisions, where information costs are high. At the same time, there is evidence that in memory‐based decisions, a compensatory processing of attributes is facilitated when the processing occurs unconsciously rather than consciously. We applied a strategy classification approach—developed in research on non‐compensatory heuristics—to test two key tenets of unconscious thought theory: the capacity principle and the weighting principle. Participants memorized attribute information about cars and were subsequently either directed to or diverted from thinking consciously about their preferences between the cars (conscious versus unconscious thought). Then, participants indicated in pair‐wise choices which car they would prefer and were classified (based on their choices) as using either one of two compensatory strategies (equal weight or weighted additive) or a non‐compensatory strategy (lexicographic heuristic). In line with the capacity principle, the number of participants best described by a compensatory strategy (the equal‐weight strategy) tended to be higher after unconscious thought than after conscious thought, whereas the number of participants best described by the lexicographic heuristic tended to be lower. Inconsistent with the weighting principle, participants in the unconscious thought condition were better described by the equal‐weight strategy than by the weighted‐additive strategy. In Experiment 2, in which participants were not instructed to form an impression while learning the attribute information, the use of the equal‐weight strategy was not more prevalent after unconscious thought. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.