When causality shapes the experience of time: Evidence for temporal binding in young children

It is well established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time—the so‐called temporal binding effect. Here, we examined the developmental origins of temporal binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or preceded by a non‐causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate for the first time that children as young as 4 years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in causal knowledge. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQC_MqjxZQQ     

Events in Branching Time

The concept of event is one of the key notions of many theories dealing with causality or agency. In this paper we study different approaches to events that share the basic assumption that events can be analyzed fruitfully in branching-time structures. The terminological framework developed thereby may be helpful for further analyses in the fields of causality and agency and also in those fields of computational semantics, where similar concepts are considered.     

The Limits of Experience and Explanation: F. A. Lange and Ernst Mach on Things in Themselves

In the middle of the nineteenth century, advances in experimental psychology and the physiology of the sense organs inspired so-called ‘Back to Kant’ Neo-Kantians to articulate robustly psychologistic visions of Kantian epistemology. But their accounts of the thing in itself were fraught with deep tension: they wanted to conceive of things in themselves as the causes of our sensations, while their own accounts of causal inference ruled that claim out. This paper diagnoses the source of that problem in views of one Neo-Kantan, F. A. Lange, and argues that it is solved only by Ernst Mach. No less than Lange and other Neo-Kantians, Mach was inspired to develop a psychologistic account of the foundations of knowledge, but his account also includes a coherent denial of things in themselves’ existence. Finally, this paper uses this account of Lange and Mach on things in themselves to illuminate Mach's relation to a certain strain of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of his own time: his views constitute a more fully coherent version of the psychologistic theory of knowledge Back to Kant figures tried to articulate.     

The Role of Time in the Quest for Understanding Psychological Mechanisms

The lead-lag structure of multivariate time-ordered observations and the possibility to disentangle between-person (BP) from within-person (WP) sources of variance are major assets of longitudinal (panel) data. Hence, psychologists are making increasing use of such data, often with the intent to delineate the dynamic properties of psychological mechanisms, understood as a sequence of causal effects that govern psychological functioning. However, even with longitudinal data, psychological mechanisms are not easily identified. In this article, we show how an adequate representation of time may enhance the tenability of causal interpretations in the context of multivariate longitudinal data analysis. We anchor our considerations with an example that illustrates some of the main problems and questions faced by applied researchers and practitioners. We distinguish between static versus dynamic and discrete versus continuous time modeling approaches and discuss their advantages and disadvantages. We place particular emphasis on different ways of addressing BP differences and stress their dual role as potential confounds versus valuable sources of information for improving estimation and aiding causal inference. We conclude by outlining an approach that offers the potential of better integration of information on BP differences and WP changes in the search for causal mechanisms along with a discussion of current problems and limitations.     

Because there was a cause for concern: An investigation into a word-specific prediction account of the implicit-causality effect

In Koornneef and Van Berkum's (2006) eye-tracking study of implicit causality (Caramazza, Grober, Garvey, & Yates, 1977), midsentence delays were observed in the processing of sentences such as “David blamed Linda because she _{(bias-congruent)}/he _{(bias-incongruent)} … ” when the pronoun following because was incongruent with the bias of the implicit-causality verb. The authors suggested that these immediate delays could be attributed to participants predicting a bias-congruent pronoun after because. According to this explanation, any other word placed after because should cause processing delays. The present investigation aimed to test this explanation by using sentences of the form “David blamed Linda because she _{(bias-congruent)}/he _{(bias-incongruent)}/there _{(bias-neutral)} … ”. Since significant immediate delays were observed in sentences containing a bias-incongruent pronoun (relative to a bias-congruent pronoun) but not in sentences containing there, the results of this study support an immediate integration effect but pose a problem to the word-specific prediction account of the implicit causality effect.     

Making the uncontrollable seem controllable: The role of action in the illusion of control

It is well known that certain variables can bias judgements about the perceived contingency between an action and an outcome, making them depart from the normative predictions. For instance, previous studies have proven that the activity level or probability of responding, P(R), is a crucial variable that can affect these judgements in objectively noncontingent situations. A possible account for the P(R) effect is based on the differential exposure to actual contingencies during the training phase, which is in turn presumably produced by individual differences in participants' P(R). The current two experiments replicate the P(R) effect in a free-response paradigm, and show that participants' judgements are better predicted by P(R) than by the actual contingency to which they expose themselves. Besides, both experiments converge with previous empirical data, showing a persistent bias that does not vanish as training proceeds. These findings contrast with the preasymptotic and transitory effect predicted by several theoretical models.     

The effect of body and part-based motion on the recognition of unfamiliar objects

We investigated the role of global (body) and local (parts) motion on the recognition of unfamiliar objects. Participants were trained to categorise moving objects and were then tested on their recognition of static images of these targets using a priming paradigm. Each static target shape was primed by a moving object that comprised either the same body and parts motion; same body, different parts motion; different body, same part motion as the learned target or was non-moving. Only the same body but not the same part motion facilitated shape recognition (Experiment 1), even when either motion was diagnostic of object identity (Experiment 2). When parts motion was more related to the object's body motion then it facilitated the recognition of the static target (Experiment 3). Our results suggest that global and local motions are independently accessed during object recognition and have important implications for how objects are represented in memory.     

Disambiguating the effects of target travelled distance and target vanishing point upon representational momentum

Representational Momentum (RM) was the name given to a phenomenon whereby the last seen position of a suddenly vanished moving target is judged as located further ahead in the direction of movement. We argue in this paper that the role of target travelled distance and of target vanishing position in the modulation of RM have been unduly confounded in previous research. Shortcomings arising from this confounding are noticed and discussed. An experiment that dissociates factorially the effects of these two variables in Michotte-like causal displays as well as in noncausal displays is presented and concludes that vanishing point, not length of travel, is the relevant factor to consider.     

Causality as individual essence: its bearing on synchronicity

Causality, time, and number are subjectively lived realities and need to be noticed as such. Fundamental to the wide range of living experience, they are also basic to scientific knowing. In this article I examine causality in relation to an article on synchronicity by Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach. My examination is neither scientific nor metaphysical, but rather phenomenological, as it is a clarification of form as individual essence of a thing. This non‐material form of an individual thing in the widest sense of the word ‘thing’ was rejected and so lost during modern seventeenth‐century science but, renewed now, can help describe synchronicity. A commentary by William Willeford follows.