Beyond the Information Given: Causal Models in Learning and Reasoning

ABSTRACT— The philosopher David Hume's conclusion that causal induction is solely based on observed associations still presents a puzzle to psychology. If we only acquired knowledge about statistical covariations between observed events without accessing deeper information about causality, we would be unable to understand the differences between causal and spurious relations, between prediction and diagnosis, and between observational and interventional inferences. All these distinctions require a deep understanding of causality that goes beyond the information given. We report a number of recent studies that demonstrate that people and rats do not stick to the superficial level of event covariations but reason and learn on the basis of deeper causal representations. Causal-model theory provides a unified account of this remarkable competence.     

Infant perception of causal motion produced by humans and inanimate objects

Both the movements of people and inanimate objects are intimately bound up with physical causality. Furthermore, in contrast to object movements, causal relationships between limb movements controlled by humans and their body displacements uniquely reflect agency and goal-directed actions in support of social causality. To investigate the development of sensitivity to causal movements, we examined the looking behavior of infants between 9 and 18 months of age when viewing movements of humans and objects. We also investigated whether individual differences in gender and gross motor functions may impact the development of the visual preferences for causal movements. In Experiment 1, infants were presented with walking stimuli showing either normal body translation or a “moonwalk” that reversed the horizontal motion of body translations. In Experiment 2, infants were presented with unperformable actions beyond infants’ gross motor functions (i.e., long jump) either with or without ecologically valid body displacement. In Experiment 3, infants were presented with rolling movements of inanimate objects that either complied with or violated physical causality. We found that female infants showed longer looking times to normal walking stimuli than to moonwalk stimuli, but did not differ in their looking time to movements of inanimate objects and unperformable actions. In contrast, male infants did not show sensitivity to causal movement for either category. Additionally, female infants looked longer at social stimuli of human actions than male infants. Under the tested circumstances, our findings indicate that female infants have developed a sensitivity to causal consistency between limb movements and body translations of biological motion, only for actions with previous visual and motor exposures, and demonstrate a preference toward social information.     

Because there was a cause for concern: An investigation into a word-specific prediction account of the implicit-causality effect

In Koornneef and Van Berkum's (2006) eye-tracking study of implicit causality (Caramazza, Grober, Garvey, & Yates, 1977), midsentence delays were observed in the processing of sentences such as “David blamed Linda because she _{(bias-congruent)}/he _{(bias-incongruent)} … ” when the pronoun following because was incongruent with the bias of the implicit-causality verb. The authors suggested that these immediate delays could be attributed to participants predicting a bias-congruent pronoun after because. According to this explanation, any other word placed after because should cause processing delays. The present investigation aimed to test this explanation by using sentences of the form “David blamed Linda because she _{(bias-congruent)}/he _{(bias-incongruent)}/there _{(bias-neutral)} … ”. Since significant immediate delays were observed in sentences containing a bias-incongruent pronoun (relative to a bias-congruent pronoun) but not in sentences containing there, the results of this study support an immediate integration effect but pose a problem to the word-specific prediction account of the implicit causality effect.     

Making the uncontrollable seem controllable: The role of action in the illusion of control

It is well known that certain variables can bias judgements about the perceived contingency between an action and an outcome, making them depart from the normative predictions. For instance, previous studies have proven that the activity level or probability of responding, P(R), is a crucial variable that can affect these judgements in objectively noncontingent situations. A possible account for the P(R) effect is based on the differential exposure to actual contingencies during the training phase, which is in turn presumably produced by individual differences in participants' P(R). The current two experiments replicate the P(R) effect in a free-response paradigm, and show that participants' judgements are better predicted by P(R) than by the actual contingency to which they expose themselves. Besides, both experiments converge with previous empirical data, showing a persistent bias that does not vanish as training proceeds. These findings contrast with the preasymptotic and transitory effect predicted by several theoretical models.     

Disambiguating the effects of target travelled distance and target vanishing point upon representational momentum

Representational Momentum (RM) was the name given to a phenomenon whereby the last seen position of a suddenly vanished moving target is judged as located further ahead in the direction of movement. We argue in this paper that the role of target travelled distance and of target vanishing position in the modulation of RM have been unduly confounded in previous research. Shortcomings arising from this confounding are noticed and discussed. An experiment that dissociates factorially the effects of these two variables in Michotte-like causal displays as well as in noncausal displays is presented and concludes that vanishing point, not length of travel, is the relevant factor to consider.     

The Role of Time in the Quest for Understanding Psychological Mechanisms

The lead-lag structure of multivariate time-ordered observations and the possibility to disentangle between-person (BP) from within-person (WP) sources of variance are major assets of longitudinal (panel) data. Hence, psychologists are making increasing use of such data, often with the intent to delineate the dynamic properties of psychological mechanisms, understood as a sequence of causal effects that govern psychological functioning. However, even with longitudinal data, psychological mechanisms are not easily identified. In this article, we show how an adequate representation of time may enhance the tenability of causal interpretations in the context of multivariate longitudinal data analysis. We anchor our considerations with an example that illustrates some of the main problems and questions faced by applied researchers and practitioners. We distinguish between static versus dynamic and discrete versus continuous time modeling approaches and discuss their advantages and disadvantages. We place particular emphasis on different ways of addressing BP differences and stress their dual role as potential confounds versus valuable sources of information for improving estimation and aiding causal inference. We conclude by outlining an approach that offers the potential of better integration of information on BP differences and WP changes in the search for causal mechanisms along with a discussion of current problems and limitations.     

The Limits of Experience and Explanation: F. A. Lange and Ernst Mach on Things in Themselves

In the middle of the nineteenth century, advances in experimental psychology and the physiology of the sense organs inspired so-called ‘Back to Kant’ Neo-Kantians to articulate robustly psychologistic visions of Kantian epistemology. But their accounts of the thing in itself were fraught with deep tension: they wanted to conceive of things in themselves as the causes of our sensations, while their own accounts of causal inference ruled that claim out. This paper diagnoses the source of that problem in views of one Neo-Kantan, F. A. Lange, and argues that it is solved only by Ernst Mach. No less than Lange and other Neo-Kantians, Mach was inspired to develop a psychologistic account of the foundations of knowledge, but his account also includes a coherent denial of things in themselves’ existence. Finally, this paper uses this account of Lange and Mach on things in themselves to illuminate Mach's relation to a certain strain of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of his own time: his views constitute a more fully coherent version of the psychologistic theory of knowledge Back to Kant figures tried to articulate.     

The effect of body and part-based motion on the recognition of unfamiliar objects

We investigated the role of global (body) and local (parts) motion on the recognition of unfamiliar objects. Participants were trained to categorise moving objects and were then tested on their recognition of static images of these targets using a priming paradigm. Each static target shape was primed by a moving object that comprised either the same body and parts motion; same body, different parts motion; different body, same part motion as the learned target or was non-moving. Only the same body but not the same part motion facilitated shape recognition (Experiment 1), even when either motion was diagnostic of object identity (Experiment 2). When parts motion was more related to the object's body motion then it facilitated the recognition of the static target (Experiment 3). Our results suggest that global and local motions are independently accessed during object recognition and have important implications for how objects are represented in memory.     

The Effects of Intent,Outcome, and Causality on Moral Judgments and Decision Processes

Over the past decade, moral judgments and their underlying decision processes have more frequently been considered from a dynamic and multi-factorial perspective rather than a binary approach (e.g., dual-system processes). The agent’s intent and his or her causal role in the outcome–as well as the outcome importance–are key psychological factors that influence moral decisions, especially judgments of punishment. The current research aimed to study the influence of intent, outcome, and causality variations on moral decisions, and to identify their interaction during the decision process by embedding the moral scenarios within an adapted mouse-tracking paradigm. Findings of the preregistered study (final n = 80) revealed main effects for intent, outcome, and causality on judgments of punishment, and an interaction between the effects of intent and causality. We furthermore explored the dynamics of these effects during the decision process via the analysis of mouse trajectories in the course of time. It allowed detecting when these factors intervened during the trial time course. The present findings thus both replicate and extend previous research on moral judgment, and evidence that, despite some ongoing challenges, mouse-tracking represents a promising tool to investigate moral decision-making.