Who am I?: The influence of affect on the working self-concept

Two experiments investigated the impact of affect on the working self-concept. Following an affect induction, participants completed the Twenty Statements Test (TST) to assess their working self-concepts. Participants in predominantly happy and angry states used more abstract statements to describe themselves than did participants in predominantly sad and fearful states. Evaluations of the statements that participants generated (Experiment 2) demonstrate that these effects are not the result of (1) participants describing positively and negatively valenced information at different levels of abstraction, or (2) valence-based affective priming. Further, half of the participants in Experiment 2 were led to attribute their affect to the manipulation prior to completing the TST. This manipulation eliminated the influence of affect on the working self-concept. Taken together, these results are consistent with theory and research on the informative functions of affect.     

The world smiles at me: Self-referential positivity bias when interpreting direction of attention

Recent research suggests that eye-gaze direction modulates perceived emotional expression. Here we explore the extent to which emotion affects interpretation of attention direction. We captured three-dimensional face models of 8 actors expressing happy, fearful, angry and neutral emotions. From these 3D models 9 views were extracted (0°, 2°, 4°, 6°, 8° to the left and right). These stimuli were randomly presented for 150 ms. Using a forced-choice paradigm 28 participants judged for each face whether or not it was attending to them. Two conditions were tested: either the whole face was visible, or the eyes were covered. In both conditions happy faces elicited most “attending-to-me” answers. Thus, emotional expression has a more general effect than an influence on gaze direction: emotion affects interpretation of attention direction. We interpret these results as a self-referential positivity bias, suggesting a general preference to associate a happy face with the self.     

Sex differences in scanning faces: Does attention to the eyes explain female superiority in facial expression recognition?

Previous meta-analyses support a female advantage in decoding non-verbal emotion (Hall, 1978, 1984), yet the mechanisms underlying this advantage are not understood. The present study examined whether the female advantage is related to greater female attention to the eyes. Eye-tracking techniques were used to measure attention to the eyes in 19 males and 20 females during a facial expression recognition task. Women were faster and more accurate in their expression recognition compared with men, and women looked more at the eyes than men. Positive relationships were observed between dwell time and number of fixations to the eyes and both accuracy of facial expression recognition and speed of facial expression recognition. These results support the hypothesis that the female advantage in facial expression recognition is related to greater female attention to the eyes.     

Corticospinal excitability during the observation of social behavior

Evidence suggests that the observation of an action induces in the observers an enhancement of motor evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded by the observer’s muscles corresponding to those involved in the observed action. Although this is a well-studied phenomenon, it remains still unclear how the viewer’s motor facilitation is influenced by the social content characterizing the observed scene. In the present study we investigated the facilitation of the corticospinal system during the observation of either an action that does not imply a social interaction (i.e., an actor throwing a ball against a wall), or an action which implies a social interaction (i.e., an actor passing a ball to a partner). Results indicate that MEPs amplitude is enhanced during the observation of a social rather than an individual action. We contend that the increase in MEPs activation might reflect an enhancement of the simulative activity stemming from the mirror system during the observation of social interactions. Altogether these findings show that the human corticospinal system is sensitive to social interactions and may support the role of the mirror neurons system in social cognition.     

Autonomy in Action: Linking the Act of Looking to Memory Formation in Infancy via Dynamic Neural Fields

Looking is a fundamental exploratory behavior by which infants acquire knowledge about the world. In theories of infant habituation, however, looking as an exploratory behavior has been deemphasized relative to the reliable nature with which looking indexes active cognitive processing. We present a new theory that connects looking to the dynamics of memory formation and formally implement this theory in a Dynamic Neural Field model that learns autonomously as it actively looks and looks away from a stimulus. We situate this model in a habituation task and illustrate the mechanisms by which looking, encoding, working memory formation, and long‐term memory formation give rise to habituation across multiple stimulus and task contexts. We also illustrate how the act of looking and the temporal dynamics of learning affect each other. Finally, we test a new hypothesis about the sources of developmental differences in looking.     

Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition

We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous signals; digital computation requires strings of digits. But current neuroscientific evidence indicates that typical neural signals, such as spike trains, are graded like continuous signals but are constituted by discrete functional elements (spikes); thus, typical neural signals are neither continuous signals nor strings of digits. It follows that neural computation is sui generis. Finally, we highlight three important consequences of a proper understanding of neural computation for the theory of cognition. First, understanding neural computation requires a specially designed mathematical theory (or theories) rather than the mathematical theories of analog or digital computation. Second, several popular views about neural computation turn out to be incorrect. Third, computational theories of cognition that rely on non‐neural notions of computation ought to be replaced or reinterpreted in terms of neural computation.     

An Eye‐Tracking Study of Exploitations of Spatial Constraints in Diagrammatic Reasoning

Semantic studies on diagrammatic notations (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1990 ; Shimojima, 1995 ; Stenning & Lemon, 2001 ) have revealed that the “non‐deductive,” “emergent,” or “perceptual” effects of diagrams (Chandrasekaran, Kurup, Banerjee, Josephson, & Winkler, 2004 ; Kulpa, 2003 ; Larkin & Simon, 1987 ; Lindsay, 1988 ) are all rooted in the exploitation of spatial constraints on graphical structures. Thus, theoretically, this process is a key factor in inference with diagrams, explaining the frequently observed reduction of inferential load. The purpose of this study was to examine the empirical basis for this theoretical suggestion, focusing on the reality of the constraint‐exploitation strategy in actual practices of diagrammatic reasoning. Eye movements were recorded while participants used simple position diagrams to solve three‐ or four‐term transitive inference problems. Our experiments revealed that the participants could exploit spatial constraints on graphical structures even when (a) they were not in the position of actually manipulating diagrams, (b) the semantic rule for the provided diagrams did not match their preferences, and (c) the constraint‐exploitation strategy invited a partly adverse effect. These findings indicate that the hypothesized process is in fact robust, with the potential to broadly account for the inferential advantage of diagrams.     

A Comparison of American and Nepalese Children's Concepts of Freedom of Choice and Social Constraint

Recent work has shown that preschool‐aged children and adults understand freedom of choice regardless of culture, but that adults across cultures differ in perceiving social obligations as constraints on action. To investigate the development of these cultural differences and universalities, we interviewed school‐aged children (4–11) in Nepal and the United States regarding beliefs about people's freedom of choice and constraint to follow preferences, perform impossible acts, and break social obligations. Children across cultures and ages universally endorsed the choice to follow preferences but not to perform impossible acts. Age and culture effects also emerged: Young children in both cultures viewed social obligations as constraints on action, but American children did so less as they aged. These findings suggest that while basic notions of free choice are universal, recognitions of social obligations as constraints on action may be culturally learned.     

Evidence for spatial navigational impairments in hydrocephalus patients without spina bifida

The cognitive sequelae of hydrocephalus have mostly been explored with standardised clinical tasks. The aim of the present research was determine whether impairments on these abstract tasks extend to everyday spatial and navigational behaviour. Patients with hydrocephalus, but without spina bifida, were compared to a control group on tests of searching behaviour, landmark memory, route learning, and path integration. Participants with hydrocephalus displayed reduced sensitivity to spatial cueing, less accurate route-learning, and significantly less accurate spatial updating. These data represent an important empirical demonstration of spatial navigational impairments due to hydrocephalus outside of the context of spina bifida. We discuss some of the cognitive, neural, and individual differences factors that might contribute to this particular pattern of impairments.     

EMBODIED COGNITION AND RELIGION

It is argued that there are good scientific grounds for accepting that cognition functions in a way that reflects embodiment. This represents a more holistic, systemic way of thinking about human beings, and contributes to the coordination of scientific assumptions about mind and body with those of the faith traditions, moving us beyond sterile debates about reductionism. It has been claimed by Francisco Varela and others that there is an affinity between Buddhism and embodied cognition, though it is argued here that they are less closely aligned than is sometimes assumed. Embodied cognition also accords well with the holistic strand of thinking about human nature in Judeo‐Christian thinking. While accepting the persuasiveness of the general case for cognition being embodied it is suggested here that some forms of cognition are more embodied than others, and that it may be one of the distinctive features of humans that they have developed a capacity for relatively nonembodied forms of cognition.