The Most Agreeable of All Vices: Nietzsche as Virtue Epistemologist

It has been argued with some justice by commentators from Walter Kaufmann to Thomas Hurka that Nietzsche's positive ethical position is best understood as a variety of virtue theory – in particular, as a brand of perfectionism. For Nietzsche, value flows from character. Less attention has been paid, however, to the details of the virtues he identifies for himself and his type. This neglect, along with Nietzsche's frequent irony and non-standard usage, has obscured the fact that almost all the virtues he praises are intellectual rather than moral. The vices he most despises include dogmatism, intellectual partisanship, faith, boredom, the desire for certainty and pity. The virtues he most appreciates include curiosity, honesty, scepticism, creativity, the historical sense, intellectual courage and intellectual fastidiousness. These tables of values place Nietzsche squarely among so-called responsibilist virtue epistemologists, such as Lorraine Code and Linda Zagzebski, who emphasize that knowledge is infused with desire and affect. I argue that curiosity construed as the specification of the will to power in the domain of epistemology is the cardinal Nietzschean virtue, and that the others – especially intellectual courage and honesty – are presupposed by curiosity. Thus, Nietzsche turns out to accept his own peculiar brand of the thesis of the unity of virtue.     

Kierkegaard's Mirrors: Interest,Self, and Moral Vision

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history.     

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology.     

The natural history of information processors

By spanning the traditional scientific theories in the search for an epistemological home for information it is found that Physics (together with some inputs from Automata Theory) provides the criteria to identify the universals that characterize information processors. It is well known, however, that Physics and Mathematics alone are insufficient to answer some fundamental questions that arise in further speculations on the subject of information. It seems that Biology, in the realm of Evolution Theory and in terms of Natural Selection, is at present the only place able to offer the objective context required to properly characterize information as an object of scientific inquiry.

In this communication we intend to show, by establishing a working equivalence between the epistemological questions that should characterize a theory of information and those questions that characterize the science of Biology, how a science of information can be more objectively characterized. It is only by referring to selective pressures that we can solve the otherwise unanswerable philosophical question of whether it is possible to know if two players of a game are, in fact, playing the same game (the semantic question). It is also shown that it is possible, by using conventional criteria, to establish a phylogenesis of information processors from where we conclude that every information processor now existing in the universe (even computers and robots) has an ancestor that has once been a living being.

It is here suggested, however, that Biology is only a provisory epistemological ground for laying the foundations of an information science. A more inclusive theory should be founded on a generalization of the Theory of Evolution where mutation and natural selection should be described, not in terms of the characteristic media and mechanisms of biological systems, but of the identified universals of information processors.     

GAIA,OCKHAM'S RAZOR,THE SCIENCE OF COMPLEXITY

In this article, the author describes his sense of synchronicity with Edgar Morin's concepts of complexity. Although Morin only briefly addresses Gaia per se, the implications of Morin's work may reveal the Gaia concept as an element of the general breakthroughs of complexity science. Morin demonstrates a phase transition that is gaining momentum right now, whereby the new, more benign science is overwhelming the old Cartesian world.     

Science and its applications: INSERM reflections

The history of science must be introduced onto the curriculum, scientific culture must be developed if the young are to receive a global, healthy understanding of science and technology.

The experiment pioneered by INSERM clubs is, from this point of view, exemplary.     

FOCUS: ComplexityandPsychology Guest Editors: Giuseppe Mininni and Mauro Maldonato

Recently the complexity of discursive practices has been widely acknowledged by the humanities and social sciences. In fact, to know anything is to know in terms of one or more discourse. The “discursive turn” in psychology may be considered as a new paradigm oriented to a correct study of (wo)man only if it is able to grasp the semiotical ground of psychic experience both as an “effort after meaning” and as a “struggle over meaning.” In this sense the notion of “diatext” has been proposed as a contribution in working out a psychosemiotical approach to understand how the discursive practices assign subject-positions to the agents of each interlocution scenario.     

What,and Where,Luck is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey

In ‘What Luck Is Not’, Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of fortune. Fortune is luck-involving, and therefore easily confused with luck, but it is not itself lucky.