Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.     

Greatness and misery in the teaching of the psychology of learning

Overshadowed by more popular disciplines, the study of learning seems to have lost its prominent place in the undergraduate psychology curriculum. In the first part of this essay, we argue that one reason for this state of affairs is the current content of psychology of learning courses, namely, its disproportionate emphasis on facts, procedures, and everyday examples at the expense of functional and conceptual investigations. In the second part of the essay, we outline an alternative approach to the teaching of learning, one that emphasizes basic contents such as the conceptualization of learning as a biological adaptation or the study of temporal regulation, critical methodological issues such as the logic of experimental designs or the difficulties of measuring behavior, and broad epistemological problems such as the role of hypothetical constructs, the advantages of quantitative reasoning, or the origins of knowledge and its integration. By using learning as a means towards more fundamental ends, the splendor of the discipline and its prominent place in the undergraduate curriculum may be restored.     

Reviews

Stephen J. Pope The Evolution of Altruism and the Ordering of Love
Edited by Murray Rae, Hilary Regan, and John Stenhouse Science and Theology: Questions at the Interface
Edited by Peter A. French, T. E. Uehling Jr., and H. K. Wettstein Philosophical Naturalism
Edited by Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal
Mark William Worthing God, Creation, and Contemporary Physics     

The politics of situating knowledge: An exercise in social epistemology

This essay forges links between Popperians and feminists by considering the connections between Donna Haraway's situated knowledge and Karl R. Popper's situational logic. It is concerned with the political commitments behind methodological issues, with the degree to which there can be a Popperian contribution to the feminist vision of a successor science, and with ways of dealing with, while not resolving, the political differences between socialist feminists and libertarian Popperians.     

Postmodernist theory and the physician-patient relationship

The author discusses the postmodernist claim that the grand theories have lost credibility, even in the field of medical science and practice. Rather than representing a shared reality among physician and patient, illness represents two quite distinct realities — the meaning of one being significantly and distinctively different from the meaning of the other. However, existential clinical narratives can function as important bridges between the world of the patient and the world of the physician. Such narratives provide important information regarding the patient's biographical situation and, particularly, the personal and cultural meanings which are a function of the biographical situation. At the same time, these narratives provide physicians with useful information for the practice of medicine.     

Justice,instruction, and the good: The case for public education in Aristotle and Plato's Laws

This paper develops an interpretation and analysis of the arguments for public education which open Book VIII of Aristotle's Politics, drawing on both the wider Aristotelian corpus and on examination of continuities with Plato's Laws.Part II: Sections IV–VII examine the arguments for the first of the two conclusions which Aristotle advances in VIII. 1, namely that education is important enough to merit the legislator's attention. It is shown, through a development of links between Politics V and the arguments of VIII. 1, that Aristotle's two arguments for this conclusion are calculated to appeal to two distinct subgroups within his intended audience, those who would be moved by a desire to promote the common good, and those who could only be counted on to desire the preservation of their own rule.     

What is an expert?

Experts play an important role in society, but there has been little investigation about the nature of expertise. I argue that there are two kinds of experts: those whose expertise is a function of what theyknow (epistemic expertise), or what theydo (performative expertise). Epistemic expertise is the capacity to provide strong justifications for a range of propositions in a domain, while performative expertise is the capacity to perform a skill well according to the rules and virtues of a practice. Both epistemic and performative experts may legitimately disagree with one another, and the two senses are conceptually and logically distinct.     

The value of philosophy: A Canguilhemian perspective

This paper represents a philosophical reflection on the nature and value of philosophy itself. Georges Canguilhem somewhat scandalously argued that the fundamental value of philosophy does not lie in truth. He suggests that truth is a typical value of science because truth is what science says and what is said scientifically. Why would a philosopher depreciate his own discipline? And does he really do so? Or is there a different motivation: to help philosophy to become a much more self-confident voice? And if truth is no longer a value of philosophy, what value fits it better? The article follows Canguilhem in his conception of truth, science, and philosophy. It is against the background of these considerations that the specific revised anthropology of the scientist or philosopher is formed. The main question is what this means for current philosophy and why it could be inspiring for philosophers today.