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141.
Christopher Hoyt 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(1):39-49
It is well understood that Wittgenstein defends religious faith against positivistic criticisms on the grounds of its logical independence. But exactly how are we to understand the nature of that independence? Most scholars take Wittgenstein to equate language-games with belief-systems, and thus to assert that religions are logical schemes founded on their own basic beliefs and principles of inference. By contrast, I argue that on Wittgenstein’s view, to have religious faith is to hold fast to a certain picture of the world according to which one orients one’s actions and attitudes, possibly even in dogmatic defiance of contrary evidence. Commitment to such a picture is grounded in passion, not intellection, and systematic coherence is largely irrelevant. 相似文献
142.
Horne M 《The Journal of analytical psychology》2007,52(2):127-142
Humans are from birth embedded in a historical and contemporary context of meanings. This always constrains their theoretical and practical activities. In this paper, I will be suggesting that there are no guiding 'truths' outside such contexts. In order to understand the foundations of any concept or new idea, it is important to comprehend the context in which it is embedded. Candidates and some of their teachers have very little knowledge of the intellectual context in which Jung or any other analytic theorist wrote. As a result, the analytic 'founders' are often believed to have discovered 'truths' transcending the context of history and of everyday life. They were, however, as much creative synthesizers as pure originators. I propose that the components of all analytic theories emerge from their embeddedness. I contend, therefore, that the understandings of these components such as psychic causality, epistemology and identity formation were quite differently conceived at the time the analytic founders were working than they are today. I will give examples to show how the acceptance of this attitude is useful in inculcating a discerning approach in candidates towards traditionally accepted analytic theories and practices. This can provide them with a method to promote their individual creative development. 相似文献
143.
廖申白 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(2):251-263
The concept of right or fit is an important element entailed, but not fully articulated, in the concept of action or practice in Aristotle’s theory of virtue; which, however, turns to be of the utmost importance in later Western ethics. Right is concerned with both feelings and actions, and is not the same for all individuals. It lies in between the two extremes of the spectrum of practical affairs, yet by no means equidistant from them. This account of the concept of fitness or right is derived from the categories of quantity, relationship, and quality rather than from that of substance. Thus, it seems that virtue is relative to vice or error within a continuous existence. If, however, the right of passion and action is environmental and concrete, is it multiple and not singular? To this question, Aristotle gives his reply on two levels: On the level of concrete practitioners, what is right and fit to one man might not be so to another man, and hence the right of practice is not singular but multiple; whereas on the level concerned with the only right choice compared with the two extremes or errors, the right of practice will always be singular. 相似文献
144.
Jessica Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):397-405
In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to
the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten
the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened
by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
相似文献
Jessica BrownEmail: |
145.
ERNEST SOSA 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(2):203-213
Abstract: Susana Nuccetelli discusses critically my account of Moore's Proof of the External World. Noah Lemos takes up my views on skepticism and my distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Otávio Bueno focuses on my treatment of dream skepticism. In this article I offer replies to my three critics. 相似文献
146.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):107-109
This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium. 相似文献
147.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):137-147
Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views
on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith
focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and
how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
相似文献
Ernest SosaEmail: |
148.
Matthew William McKeon 《Synthese》2009,167(1):163-182
An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional
account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism
of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical
and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional
accounts fail to reflect that the former knowledge is basic, i.e., independent of knowledge derived from other sciences. Appealing
to Russell’s pre-Principia logic, I defend conditional accounts against this criticism by sketching a rationale for thinking
that there are infinitely many logical objects. 相似文献
149.
《管子》在强调"以法治国"的同时,又推崇"守国之度,在饰四维"的德教思想,而且二者相互为用,共同服务于以君主为核心的国家统治,表现出了齐法家学派独特的治国经民理论。 相似文献
150.
REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM
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Timothy D. Hackenberg 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2009,91(3):391-402
An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science. 相似文献