社会医疗保险道德风险博弈与防控措施研究

通过对社会医疗保险道德风险产生原因与特征的探讨,根据不完全信息重复博弈模型对社会医疗保险道德风险进行了系统分析,据此提出了社会医疗保险道德风险的防控措施,以期实现对道德风险的有效防控,提高社会医疗保险基金的安全。     

“To eat or not to be eaten?” Collective risk-monitoring in groups

The importance of risk-monitoring has been increasing in many key aspects of our modern lives. This paper examines how individuals monitor such risks collectively by extending a behavioral ecological model of animal foraging to human groups. Just as animals must forage for food under predatory risk, humans must divide valuable material and psychological resources between foraging activity and risk-monitoring activity. We predicted that game-theoretic aspects of the group situation complicate such a trade-off decision in resource allocation, eventually yielding a mixed equilibrium in a group. When the equilibrium is reached, only a subset of members engage in the risk-monitoring activity while others free-ride, concentrating mainly on their own foraging activity. Laboratory groups engaging in foraging under moderate risk provided a support to this prediction. When the risk-level was set higher, however, “herding behavior” (conforming to the dominant behavior) interfered with the emergence of equilibrium. Implications for risk management are discussed.     

The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making

People often do not realize they are being influenced by an incidental emotional state. As a result, decisions based on a fleeting incidental emotion can become the basis for future decisions and hence outlive the original cause for the behavior (i.e., the emotion itself). Using a sequence of ultimatum and dictator games, we provide empirical evidence for the enduring impact of transient emotions on economic decision making. Behavioral consistency and false consensus are presented as potential underlying processes.     

暴力电子游戏的短期脱敏效应：两种接触方式比较

比较主、被动接触暴力电子游戏的脱敏效应,以44名男性大学生为被试,利用生物反馈仪测量被试主动参与游戏或被动观看游戏录像前后,及随后观看暴力视频过程中皮电与心率的变化（脱敏效应的生理指标）。结果表明：（1）暴力电子游戏可以产生脱敏效应。接触游戏15分钟后,暴力游戏组观看暴力视频过程中皮电的增加值明显小于非暴力游戏组;（2）游戏的接触方式对于脱敏效应的程度无显著影响,但主动参与组对于游戏内容知觉到更高的愉快与更低的沮丧     

合作指数与描述方式对儿童囚徒困境博弈中合作行为的影响

本研究采用囚徒困境任务,考察了91名10~12岁儿童和101名成人在博弈决策中合作行为的特点。并分别考察合作指数和描述方式这两个变量对个体合作性的影响。结果表明:(1)描述方式对儿童的合作行为有显著影响,表现为"回避"描述中较之"趋向"描述有更多合作行为,而描述方式对成人则无影响。(2)儿童对合作指数不敏感,平均合作率显著高于成人,表现出合作倾向;成人平均合作率随合作指数的升高而升高,但始终处于几率水平之下,表现出竞争倾向。     

胃癌根治术中常规放置空肠营养管的博弈思考

规范化的胃癌根治术是我国胃癌治疗的发展方向,本文回顾性分析胃癌根治术中常规放置空肠营养管和术后早期肠内营养在胃癌规范化治疗中的作用。结果表明空肠营养管置入和对照组术后并发症率无显著性差异（P=0.501）,早期联合肠内营养可有效缩短住院时间（P=0.0115）。结合博弈论的观点分析,胃癌根治术中放置空肠营养管在并发症预防和治疗中有重要作用,可能避免不必要的二次开腹手术,因此是一种对于医患双方都最为有利的策略选择。     

变革型领导力和交易型领导力：团队绩效的预测指标

在高不确定,高度竞争,高度挑战的任务情景下,领导力在团队中将扮演怎样的角色？变革型领导力与交易型领导力又是如何预测团队任务绩效的？为了回答这些问题,该研究对130名学生被试,31个团队,用ERP沙盘模拟游戏来进行模拟实验。通过高度模拟现实中企业经营的情景,从而提高实验结果的外部效度。实验结果表明,变革型领导力与交易型领导力都能够积极地预测团队任务绩效,消极领导力与任务绩效呈负相关,虽然并没有达到统计学显著水平,但研究结果的方向都支持了实验假设。     

Signalling signalhood and the emergence of communication

A unique hallmark of human language is that it uses signals that are both learnt and symbolic. The emergence of such signals was therefore a defining event in human cognitive evolution, yet very little is known about how such a process occurs. Previous work provides some insights on how meaning can become attached to form, but a more foundational issue is presently unaddressed. How does a signal signal its own signalhood? That is, how do humans even know that communicative behaviour is indeed communicative in nature? We introduce an experimental game that has been designed to tackle this problem. We find that it is commonly resolved with a bootstrapping process, and that this process influences the final form of the communication system. Furthermore, sufficient common ground is observed to be integral to the recognition of signalhood, and the emergence of dialogue is observed to be the key step in the development of a system that can be employed to achieve shared goals.     

PREVENTING BACK INJURIES IN HOSPITAL SETTINGS: THE EFFECTS OF VIDEO MODELING ON SAFE PATIENT LIFTING BY NURSES

This study evaluated video scoring and feedback about scoring as a safety intervention among 6 nursing staff. The dependent variable was safety behavior on one‐person transfers. Following baseline, 5 nursing staff participated in an information phase. A video scoring phase was then introduced for all 6. A feedback phase was added for 2 participants. All participants experienced treatment withdrawal. Information resulted in improvements for all 5 participants who received it. Further improvements were observed during video scoring for the 5 participants who improved following information. No improvements were observed for the participant who received only video scoring. Safety feedback further improved safety for the 2 participants who received it. However, participants' behavior returned to video scoring levels during withdrawal.     

Delay, Probability, and Social Discounting in A Public Goods Game

A human social discount function measures the value to a person of a reward to another person at a given social distance. Just as delay discounting is a hyperbolic function of delay, and probability discounting is a hyperbolic function of odds-against, social discounting is a hyperbolic function of social distance. Experiment 1 obtained individual social, delay, and probability discount functions for a hypothetical $75 reward; participants also indicated how much of an initial $100 endowment they would contribute to a common investment in a public good. Steepness of discounting correlated, across participants, among all three discount dimensions. However, only social and probability discounting were correlated with the public-good contribution; high public-good contributors were more altruistic and also less risk averse than low contributors. Experiment 2 obtained social discount functions with hypothetical $75 rewards and delay discount functions with hypothetical $1,000 rewards, as well as public-good contributions. The results replicated those of Experiment 1; steepness of the two forms of discounting correlated with each other across participants but only social discounting correlated with the public-good contribution. Most participants in Experiment 2 predicted that the average contribution would be lower than their own contribution.