Behavioral intervention to treat selective mutism across multiple social situations and community settings

We evaluated a behavioral intervention for a 9-year-old girl with selective mutism. The intervention consisted of role play and video self-modeling. The frequency of spoken initiations, responses to questions, and communication breakdowns was measured during three social situations (i.e., ordering in a restaurant, meeting new adults, and playing with new children) and in three community settings. Results demonstrated increases in spoken initiations and responses and decreases in communication breakdowns across all situations and settings.     

Using multiple-exemplar training to teach a generalized repertoire of sharing to children with autism

The current study examined the utility of multiple-exemplar training to teach children with autism to share. Stimuli from 3 of 4 categories were trained using a treatment package of video modeling, prompting, and reinforcement. Offers to share increased for all 3 children following the introduction of treatment, with evidence of skill maintenance. In addition, within-stimulus-category generalization of sharing was evident for all participants, although only 1 participant demonstrated across-category generalization of sharing. Offers to share occurred in a novel setting, with familiar and novel stimuli, and in the presence of novel adults and peers for all participants during posttreatment probes.     

Behaving as expected: Public information and fairness norms

What is considered to be fair depends on context‐dependent expectations. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation—that is, upon normative expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their beliefs about which choices are considered fair. We discuss how these results fit into a theory of social norms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public good provision in inter‐team conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit‐sharing rule

A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free‐riding. Extending existing literature, we focus on asymmetric competitions between teams of unequal size, and competitions between more than two teams. Comparing two protocols for sharing the prize—egalitarian and proportional profit‐sharing rules—we find that (i) free‐riding diminishes and (ii) team members contribute more toward their team's effort when they belong to the larger team and when the profit‐sharing rule is proportional. (iii) Additionally, under the egalitarian profit‐sharing rule team members contribute more than predicted by the equilibrium solution. We discuss implications of our findings for eliciting contributions in competitive environments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Group‐based evaluations for pupil‐on‐teacher violence: The impact of teacher intervention strategy

Although extreme violence to teachers is rare, the fact remains that in the UK, 29% of teachers report having been physically assaulted by a pupil (ATL, 2008a ). The ways in which responsibility for such assaults are attributed can have legal, educational and managerial implications. In the current study, teachers (N = 66), pupils (N = 68) and parents (N = 64) from a large secondary school in the UK read an incident report form outlining an incident depicting a pupil physically assaulting a teacher. The incident report was manipulated such that, prior to being assaulted, the teacher had either separated the assailant pupil from another pupil using a physical or non‐physical intervention. Results revealed that participating parents' and teachers' evaluations of the assailant's parents and the teacher differed from those of pupils in several ways. The results are discussed in terms of group‐based responsibility for deviant behaviour and implications for teacher behaviour in response to pupil on teacher violence. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

父母与青少年的信任水平及代际传递

以往研究指出,人际信任有其家庭根源。本研究以198个家庭中的青少年及其父母为研究对象,采用投资博弈任务测量子女及其父母的信任水平,考察他们的信任水平的特点及父母和子女之间是否存在信任的代际传递现象。研究结果发现:(1)青少年男生的信任水平稍高于女生,父亲的信任水平高于母亲;(2)父亲和母亲的信任水平都不能预测女生的信任水平;但父亲信任水平能线性预测其儿子的信任;母亲与儿子的信任水平则呈倒U型曲线关系。本研究结果证实了信任存在代际传递的现象,并揭示了父母角色及子女性别在信任代际传递中的调节作用,对于进一步理解信任在家庭内的传递过程有启发意义。     

Experimental study of the differential effects of playing versus watching violent video games on children's aggressive behavior

There is great concern about the effects of playing violent video games on aggressive behavior. The present experimental study was aimed at investigating the differential effects of actively playing vs. passively watching the same violent video game on subsequent aggressive behavior. Fifty-seven children aged 10-13 either played a violent video game (active violent condition), watched the same violent video game (passive violent condition), or played a non-violent video game (active non-violent condition). Aggression was measured through peer nominations of real-life aggressive incidents during a free play session at school. After the active participation of actually playing the violent video game, boys behaved more aggressively than did the boys in the passive game condition. For girls, game condition was not related to aggression. These findings indicate that, specifically for boys, playing a violent video game should lead to more aggression than watching television violence.     

Fairness and bargaining power in threshold public goods experiments

Experiments on three two‐person threshold public good provision games, namely, the simultaneous, sequential, and dictator games, are conducted to explore the motives behind giving. Players who move simultaneously are endowed with equal bargaining power, and players who move first are endowed with more bargaining power than players who move subsequently. Dictators are indubitably endowed with complete bargaining power. Since the differences between the bargaining powers of two players increase from the simultaneous to the sequential to the dictator game, comparisons among games allow us to trace whether the contribution behavior is motivated by fairness or is simply due to the strategic concern. The experimental evidence shows that the strategic concern explains the overall contribution behavior better than the motive of fairness. However, in the final round 26% of the dictators share the threshold evenly with their opponents, suggesting that some subjects do play fairly. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

有效测量元认知监控的新方法：Mastermind任务分析

元认知监控是元认知的核心成分,而且是内隐程度较高的心理活动。研究采用认知操作法,对经典的Mastermind游戏任务加以改编,结合访谈分析,探讨了适合考察元认知监控的任务难度和有效的元认知监控指标。研究结果发现：（1）对于大学生来说,在游戏4（要求从六种颜色中选出四种正确的颜色,且排列位置也要正确）中当知觉难度最大且又可以经过努力选择策略、根据反馈进行有效选择时,才会在最大程度上激发元认知监控,使得游戏成绩提高;（2）“监测时间”是元认知监测的有效测量指标,而“违背反馈次数”是元认知控制的有效测量指标。     

An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games

A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes thatAnn believes that Bob’s assumption is wrongThis is formalized to show that any belief model of a certain kind must have a ‘hole.’ An interpretation of the result is that if the analyst’s tools are available to the players in a game, then there are statements that the players can think about but cannot assume. Connections are made to some questions in the foundations of game theory.Special Issue Ways of Worlds II. On Possible Worlds and Related Notions Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and Stig Andur Pedersen