Framing the Ultimatum Game: Gender differences and autonomic responses

The present study aimed at investigating whether the way offers are framed in the Ultimatum Game (UG) affects behavioral and autonomic responses in men and women. The “I give you” and “I take” expressions were used as gain and loss frames, respectively. Skin conductance and heart rate were recorded as indices of autonomic activation in response to unfair, mid‐value, and fair offers. Acceptance rates were higher in men than in women under the gain frame. Moreover, men showed higher acceptance rates under the gain than under the loss frame with mid‐value offers, whereas women's choices were not affected by frame. On the physiological level, men produced differential autonomic response patterns during decision‐making when offers were presented under gain and loss framing. The “I take” frame, by acting as a loss frame, elicited in men the characteristic defensive response pattern that is evoked by aversive stimulation, in which increases in skin conductance are coupled with increases in heart rate. On the other hand, the “I give you” frame, by acting as a gain frame, elicited in men increases in skin conductance associated with prevailing heart rate deceleratory responses, reflecting a state of enhanced attention and orienting. In contrast, women's autonomic reactivity was not affected by frame, consistent with behavioral results. Phasic changes in heart rate were crucial in revealing differential functional significance of skin conductance responses under different frames in men, thus questioning the assumption that this autonomic measure can be used as an index of negative emotional arousal in the UG.     

The demotion of alpha‐homo sapiens: Consciousness,punctuated equilibrium,and the laws of the game

The result of using Eigen and Winkler's LIFE/DEATH GAME to integrate Rashevksy's social physics and Rapoport's mathematical game theory, synchrony removes the arbitrariness from problems of ethics. It focuses on the primary conflicts between strategies that optimize individual survival and those that optimize survival of groups. According to synchrony, cooperation is an optimal strategy, not because cooperation conforms to some ethical pattern, but because the evolution of our technical societies has made the alternatives to cooperation potentially lethal at all levels of human interaction. Eigen and Winkler offer hypercycles as a possible method of resolving problems that conventional wisdom has labeled “irreconcilable differences.”

Combined with the findings of clinical psychologist Paul Meehl and cultural anthropologist Magoroh Maruyama, Eigen and Winkler's LIFE/ DEATH GAME indicates that a pattern of reasoning, called Alpha‐H, is not only a formidable obstacle to cooperation, it threatens contemporary societies with extinction through violent conflicts, social upheavals economic collapse or all three together.

The Demotion of Alpha‐H argues that an inability to deal constructively with change and/or diversity is Alpha‐H's fatal flaw. And the removal of gender bias toward opponent processes reasoning is a crucial step toward correcting it. The key concept is the LIFE/DEATH GAME.     

Vigilant Self‐regulation and Costly Punishment in Public Goods Situations

Applying regulatory focus theory to the context of social dilemma situations, the present research demonstrates that individual differences in vigilant, prevention‐focused self‐regulation predict the tendency to invest private resources to punish uncooperative interaction partners (costly punishment), a behaviour that typically has strong positive effects on the collective level of cooperation. Analyses further support the distinctiveness of the vigilance system proposed in regulatory focus theory (prevention focus) in comparison with general defensive inhibitory tendencies (measured with Carver and White's Behavioral Inhibition System scale). Results document that individual differences in prevention‐focused self‐regulation but not differences in general defensive inhibitory tendencies are positively related to costly punishment. In sum, the findings indicate that vigilant, prevention‐focused self‐regulation plays a crucial role in the context of sanctions that enforce cooperation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Logic Games are Complete for Game Logics

Game logics describe general games through powers of players for forcing outcomes. In particular, they encode an algebra of sequential game operations such as choice, dual and composition. Logic games are special games for specific purposes such as proof or semantical evaluation for first-order or modal languages. We show that the general algebra of game operations coincides with that over just logical evaluation games, whence the latter are quite general after all. The main tool in proving this is a representation of arbitrary games as modal or first-order evaluation games. We probe how far our analysis extends to product operations on games. We also discuss some more general consequences of this new perspective for standard logic.     

Effects of priming self‐construals on self‐evaluations: Cultural game player perspective

This study examined the validity of situational view on culture‐specific behaviours focusing on self‐evaluation. Two experiments with American students as samples were conducted to examine whether priming their self‐construals would affect individuals' self‐evaluation. In Experiment 1, the participants' self‐evaluation was compared across different conditions of primed self‐contruals. In Experiment 2, the participants were split into 2 groups based on their initial default self‐consturals and, the self‐evaluations were compared across the 2 groups after priming self‐contruals. The results demonstrated that although the participants' self‐evaluation was initially in accord with their default self‐construal, it changed into accord with the primed self‐construals. The findings supported the proposed cultural game player view. Implications on situational view of self‐evaluation are also discussed.     

Blame Game and Rotten Apples in Private Investigation Reports: The Case of Hadeland and Ringerike Broadband in Norway

Blame game is a term often used to describe a phenomenon that happens in groups of people when something goes wrong. The blame game hypothesis postulates that private investigators may be misled in their search for suspects and that suspected individuals do not necessarily become subject to a fair investigation by financial crime specialists and fraud examiners. The rotten apple hypothesis postulates that it is comforting to assume that one bad apple within an organisation is essentially responsible for the crime that is all too prevalent. The rotten apple view of white‐collar crime is a comfortable perspective to apply to business and public organisations as it allows them to look no further than suspect a single individual. Based on a case study of the Norwegian company Hadeland and Ringerike Broadband, this paper discusses blame game and rotten apple issues in an internal investigation report written by an external financial crime specialist. The study finds support for both hypotheses, as blame is mainly isolated to the criminal and his superior, and both board and top management are protected from scrutiny. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

亲社会视频游戏对国外青少年行为的影响

视频游戏对青少年行为影响的研究焦点主要集中在暴力视频游戏带来的消极影响上。随着研究的深入以及积极心理学的兴起,研究者开始关注亲社会视频游戏对青少年行为的积极影响,并进行了相关的研究,研究大多以一般学习模型为理论框架。一般学习模型认为亲社会视频游戏通过影响与亲社会相关的认知、情感和生理唤醒而对亲社会行为产生作用。已有研究显示,亲社会视频游戏会促进青少年的亲社会行为,同时减少青少年的攻击性行为。研究者们采用多种方法探索亲社会视频游戏影响青少年行为的心理机制,证明了一般学习模型的理论构想。未来研究需要进一步研究性别、人格、文化等因素的影响,并开展相关的认知神经机制研究。     

Effect of body size on aggression in the ant,Cataglyphis niger (Hymenoptera; Formicidae)

In polymorphic ants, such as Cataglyphis niger, sterile individual workers from the same nest show some degree of variation in size and/or morphology. We studied whether worker size and size difference between opponents had an effect on aggression during conspecific encounters. Although the capacity to recognize nestmates was shared by all individuals, some patterns of agonistic behaviors were size related. Escape was mostly displayed by the small workers, and threat, associated with ritualized fights, by the large workers. As game theory predicted, ants of C. niger adjusted their level of aggression as a function of the size of the opponent. However, only large individuals used such assessment strategies, responding with escalation of aggression towards small workers and reduction of aggression towards large ones. On the contrary, small individuals behaved in the same manner whatever the opponent's size. Differences between both morphological castes were discussed with reference to the resource holding assessment models. Aggr. Behav. 25:369–379, 1999. © 1999 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.