The guise of the good and the problem of partiality

According to the guise of the good thesis, we desire things under the ‘guise of the good.’ Here I sympathetically articulate a generic formulation of the guise of the good thesis, and address a problem for the view, which I call the problem of partiality. The problem is, roughly, that our partial pro-attitudes –for example, our special concern for ourselves –do not correspond to what is absolutely good. I criticize three solutions to the problem, and propose an alternative strategy, on which partial pro-attitudes constitute a species of illusion.     

Liar,liar: Consistent lying decreases belief in the truth

This study investigated the effects of lying on belief ratings for autobiographical childhood events. Participants lied by trying to convince the experimenter that likely events had not happened and that unlikely events had happened. Participants consistently lied, consistently told the truth, and alternated lying and truth telling across two sessions. Results showed that consistent false assents increased belief in those false events and that consistent false denials decreased belief in those true events. False denials had a larger influence on belief than did false assents. False assents that were told first were more likely to increase in belief than were false assents told in the second session. False denials decreased belief in the true event regardless of when they were told. These results suggest that lying influences confidence ratings both by increasing belief in a lied‐about event and by decreasing belief in a true event.     

Belief Revision,Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

道德信仰的两重规定及其限度

道德必须以信仰为基础 ,道德信仰既是对道德的信仰 ,又是对善的终极追求。两者合为一体 ,统一于道德信仰这一主体的道德意识之中的 ,它们从不同的角度与层面反映了人对道德的态度与意愿。这是研究道德信仰应有的理论视点。     

道德信仰危机的成因及其克服

道德信仰是对道德的终极关怀,是理性的非理性存在方式,是人的精神支柱。道德理想主义,制度安排不尽合理,市场经济负面效应以及社会主义低谷是道德信仰危机的重要根源。发展经济,加强制度伦理建设,强化规则意识等克服道德信仰危机的主要措施。     

幼儿心理理论的发展与其日常同伴交往关系的研究

通过行为观察(儿童与同伴的一对一游戏)、同伴提名和教师评估,探讨心理理论发展与儿童日常同伴交往之间的关系。52名4~5岁的学前儿童参与了本实验。研究结果表明:(1)4岁以后,儿童的心理理论能力产生了实质性的变化。(2)幼儿心理理论的发展与儿童游戏情境中的同伴交往具有显著的正相关,心理理论发展水平不同的儿童在游戏中的“交往敏感”和“交往表达”两方面具有极其显著的差异。(3)儿童的心理理论水平整体上与同伴提名、教师评估相关不显著,但与儿童的亲社会行为具有紧密的关系。我们推测,儿童心理理论的发展通过影响亲社会行为间接指导儿童日常生活中的同伴交往与同伴关系。     

The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it

ABSTRACT

According to the transparency approach, achievement of self-knowledge is a two-stage process: first, the subject arrives at the judgment ‘p’; second, the subject proceeds to the judgment ‘I believe that p.’ The puzzle of transparency is to understand why the transition from the first to the second judgment is rationally permissible. After revisiting the debate between Byrne and Boyle on this matter, I present a novel solution according to which the transition is rationally permissible in virtue of a justifying argument that begins from a premise referring to the mental utterance that is emitted in the course of judging ‘p.’     

又有一项生物学信条受到挑战

生物学上的一条新发现———终末分化的神经细胞和心肌细胞具有分裂增殖的能力，向传统理论提出了挑战。指出了真理受一定时代和范围的限制，具有相对性，我们不能超越客观事实去片面追求完善的真理，又要敢于在新技术手段的支持下，提出新观点，勇于向传统观念挑战     

Transparency and reflection

ABSTRACT

Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of questions about our own mental states to questions about the non-mental world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. I critically discuss some prominent recent accounts of such transparency, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of the phenomenon, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or ‘non-positional’ self-awareness into reflective, ‘positional’ self-knowledge.