Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs

We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be reduced to acceptance tests for unnested conditionals. Thus, iterated revision can be accomplished in a virtual manner, using uniterated revision.     

A comparison of two approaches to education about carrier testing for cystic fibrosis

We tested the efficacy of two types of educational materials for genetic counseling: a traditional information brochure and one adding a role model story. Brochures were alternated weekly at a prenatal genetics center. Subjects were asked to read the brochure and fill out a questionnaire covering demographics and variables from the health belief model (impact, barriers, motivation, susceptibility, knowledge, severity). A group of 409 pregnant women and 251 male partners participated. Study design was quasiexperimental, using a post-test only comparison group. The brochure with modeling enhanced the perception of both risk and the severity of the disease and was inversely associated with the assessment of barriers, but did not directly impact on the decision to pursue testing; only 12% chose to be tested, with no significant differences between groups. While suggestive, the study is not confirmatory and should be repeated with a more heterogenous group of women.     

中学生精神信仰及其与生活满意度的关系

运用问卷法对431名中学生的精神信仰和生活满意度进行研究,结果表明：中学生精神信仰的总体状况呈现出社会信仰最强、实用信仰次之、超自然信仰最弱的特点。在社会信仰上更注重国家民族信仰,在实用信仰上更注重家庭信仰,在超自然信仰上更注重宗教信仰;精神信仰各维度对不同领域生活满意度的预测作用各不相同。不同生活满意度水平的学生在社会信仰和实用信仰的所有构成维度上的得分均存在显著差异。     

A neuropsychological dimension for anchoring effects

Previous research has shown that strength of handedness predicts differences in sensory illusions, Stroop interference, episodic memory, and beliefs about body image and the origin of species. Recent evidence also suggests handedness differences in the susceptibility to information framing and persuasion. The present paper extends this line of work to decision anchoring effects. In Experiment 1, 131 introductory psychology students responded to 12 real‐world knowledge questions after being given random, uninformative high or low anchors. Results indicated that “strong‐handers” showed larger anchoring effects than “mixed‐handers.” In Experiment 2, 89 introductory psychology students responded to 6 real‐world knowledge questions in a modified, two‐step anchoring task in which participants were given a credible source for the anchored information and asked to give pre‐ and post‐anchor estimates. In contrast to Experiment 1, results revealed that mixed‐ and strong‐handers were affected similarly by anchoring. In Experiment 3, 158 students were asked to estimate the answer to one of two versions of 8! (8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1 or 1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8)—a multiplication problem in which the high and low anchors are inherently informative. Here, mixed‐handers showed larger anchoring effects than strong‐handers. A theory centered around the notion of hemispheric specialization and the communication between the two halves of the brain as well as arguments about the informativeness of anchors, metacognition, and recent theorizing in the anchoring literature are used to account for these data. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

儿童欺骗的情境依赖

采用竞争游戏的方式研究3～6岁儿童在外显和隐蔽情境里的欺骗。结果表明4、5岁儿童行为上的隐蔽欺骗和错误信念理解显著相关;3岁儿童语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）和错误信念理解显著相关;各年龄段儿童行为上的外显欺骗和错误信念理解没有显著相关。和Cartson（1998）的研究结果不一致的是,本研究中4、5、6岁儿童的隐蔽欺骗人数显著超过外显欺骗人数。结果提示,语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）不仅和儿童的执行功能有关,还可能和欺骗时的情境压力有关。     

西方关于儿童欺骗研究的新进展

欺骗是指意图培养他人的错误信念,以至于使他人产生错误或进入误区的行为。本文介绍了西方关于儿童欺骗研究的新进展,其中包括欺骗与说谎的区别,欺骗的理论假设、相关研究,以及儿童欺骗研究的焦点和现存问题。     

Belief, faith, and acceptance

Belief is a central focus of inquiry in the philosophy of religion and indeed in the field of religion itself. No one conception of belief is central in all these cases, and sometimes the term ‘belief’ is used where ‘faith’ or ‘acceptance’ would better express what is intended. This paper sketches the major concepts in the philosophy of religion that are expressed by these three terms. In doing so, it distinguishes propositional belief (belief that) from both objectual belief (believing something to have a property) and, more importantly, belief in (a trusting attitude that is illustrated by at least many paradigm cases of belief in God). Faith is shown to have a similar complexity, and even propositional faith divides into importantly different categories. Acceptance differs from both belief and faith in that at least one kind of acceptance is behavioral in a way neither of the other two elements is. Acceptance of a proposition, it is argued, does not entail believing it, nor does believing entail acceptance in any distinctive sense of the latter term. In characterizing these three notions (and related ones), the paper provides some basic materials important both for understanding a person’s religious position and for appraising its rationality. The nature of religious faith and some of the conditions for its rationality, including some deriving from elements of an ethics of belief, are explored in some detail.     

The virtues of belief: toward a non-evidentialist ethics of belief-formation

William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name ethics of belief can nevertheless be preserved. However, in the second half of the paper I argue that Clifford’s response to the problem of unethical belief is insufficiently attentive to the role played by self-deception in the formation of unethical beliefs. By contrasting the first-person perspective of a doxastic agent with the third-person perspective of an outside observer, I argue that unethical belief is a symptom of deficiencies of character: fix these, and belief will fix itself. I suggest that the moral intuitions implicit in our response to examples of unethical belief (like Clifford’s famous example of the ship owner) can better be accounted for in terms of a non-evidentialist virtue ethics of belief-formation, and that such an account can survive the rejection of strong versions of doxastic voluntarism.

Joseph Butler, “Upon Self-Deceit” (1726)