‘Foolishness to Greeks’: Plantinga and the Epistemology of Christian Belief

A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness, silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages seem to point to very different accounts of how it is that we come to know God, and a very different range of critical concepts by which the truth of such knowledge can be assessed. In this paper, I begin to explore what might be at stake in these different languages of knowing God, drawing particularly on Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. I will argue that his is a distorted account of the epistemology of Christian belief, and that this has implications for his project of demonstrating the rational acceptability of Christian faith for the 21st century.

Précis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium.     

The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.

Replies to commentators on <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.

Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief

In this paper I look at three challenges to the very possibility of an ethics of belief and then show how they can be met. The first challenge, from Thomas Kelly, says that epistemic rationality is not (merely) a form of instrumental rationality. If this claim is true, then it will be difficult to develop an ethics of belief that does not run afoul of naturalism. The second challenge is the Non-Voluntarism Argument, which holds that because we cannot believe at will and because ought implies can, there can be no ethics of belief. The third challenge comes from Richard Feldman, who claims that there is no such thing as ought all-things-considered. He says, for example, that moral oughts can be weighed against other moral oughts and that epistemic oughts can be compared to each other, but that there is no way to weigh moral oughts against epistemic oughts. If this is true, then norms about what one ought to believe are not nearly as important as one might have hoped or as philosophers have traditionally thought. In answering these three challenges, I try to show how and why the project of developing epistemic norms might be a promising avenue of research, despite claims to the contrary.     

关系推理中信念偏差效应的研究

采用结论评估范式,考察时向和空间关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式,以及心理模型理论对关系推理中信念偏差效应的解释力。研究结果表明,关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式与三段论有所不同,不论是时间推理还是空间推理中都存在信念主效应,但没有发现信念与逻辑的交互作用;心理模型理论不能对关系推理中信念偏差效应作出合理解释。     

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

公共物品两难中相互依赖关系对合作行为的影响

本文关注初始关系建立过程中互动双方相互依赖关系对个体合作行为的影响,认为情境中表征个体间相互依赖关系的线索会对激活被试在情境中的社会动机并影响被试的信任信念,进而影响互动双方的合作行为。操作互动双方问基于互动制约的相互依赖和基于利益共同的相互依赖,模拟高相互依赖和低相互依赖关系情境。结果表明：①不同的相互依赖关系能够激活不同的社会动机和信任信念;②不同的相互依赖关系中,被试的合作行为有显著差异;③在特定的相互依赖关系中,被试的合作行为与其本身的信任倾向无显著相关;④特定相互依赖关系下被试的社会动机带有策略性,信任信念对被试合作行为的预测能力较强。     

心理理论和语言发展的关系

大量的研究表明心理理论和语言之间存在着密切的关系,但具体关系如何,一直存在争议。文章介绍了心理理论和语言关系的新近研究,着重阐述了目前关于二者关系的两种观点： （1）心理理论和语言发展之间不仅是早期揭示的一般相关关系,而是可能存在着因果关系——或以语言为因,或以心理理论为因;（2）心理理论和语言都受第三种因素影响,如执行功能和生长环境,但这些因素是究竟如何影响心理理论和语言发展的,还需深入探讨。文章最后对该领域今后的研究提出了新的见解和思路,包括对不同语言能力间的比较研究,对二者关系的跨文化研究和毕生取向研究等     

5～8岁儿童对模糊信息具有多重解释的理解

参照Carpendale和Chandler的实验范式,研究儿童对于“人们可能对同样信息给出不同解释”这一现象的理解,考察5~8岁儿童的解释性心理理论的发展。结果表明,5岁儿童不能理解心理过程的解释性,认为同样的信息只有一种合理的解释。从6岁开始,儿童才认识到,模糊信息可以有多种解释,但6、7岁时的这种理解并不完善,成绩随着任务要求而变化。8岁儿童才有比较稳定的解释性心理理论。