Factor Structure of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking Verbal Form B in a Spanish‐speaking Population

The objective of this study was to compare, through a Confirmatory Factor Analysis, two different theoretical models that explain the operationalized creativity construct with the Verbal Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT), Form B. Model 1 is represented by six factors which correspond to each activity and its respective indicators while Model 2 is integrated by three factors which correspond to each TTCT ability (i.e., Fluency, Originality, and Flexibility) and the corresponding indicators for each variable. The study was carried out with a sample consisting of 432 Spanish‐speaking youngsters of both sexes aged 15–26. According to the research findings, the model which showed the most satisfactory fit identifies six correlated factors that correspond to each of the activities proposed (χ² = 414.48; df = 116; χ²/df = 3.57; GFI = .90; NFI = .95; CFI = .96 and RMSEA = .077). These results are discussed according to its psychometric implications for the construct assessment in different fields.     

Can Word Puzzles be Tailored to Improve Different Dimensions of Verbal Fluency? A Report of an Intervention Study

Verbal fluency is commonly used as a proxy measure of executive functioning, as it involves cognitive flexibility, working memory, and inhibitory control. Previous research has demonstrated that crosswords can be a useful means of improving verbal fluency, results consistent with the cognitive reserve hypothesis; the form of verbal fluency affected has, however, differed across studies. The present study sought to assess the extent to which it was possible to target phonemic (PVF) and semantic verbal fluency (SVF) separately through word puzzles designed to focus on semantic/thematic and structural clues respectively. Fifty-three university students were randomly assigned to one of three groups: semantic/thematic, structural, or a daily diary control group. They were assessed on PVF and SVF at baseline, and immediately following a four-week intervention. Age, sex, and depression scores were controlled for. A 2 × 3 mixed ANCOVA showed that the structural group improved significantly more in PVF during the intervention period than did the semantic/thematic or control groups, with the improvement linked to improved switching performance. The effect size was large. No significant difference in improvement in SVF emerged, although the effect size was moderate. The findings support the notion that it is possible to improve specific forms of verbal fluency through tailored brief word-puzzle interventions.     

Promoting the emergence of advanced knowledge: A review of peak relational training system: Direct training module by Mark R. Dixon

Mark Dixon's (2014) manual, PEAK Relational Training System: Direct Training Module, proposes a novel approach to manualized evaluation and curriculum development. Dixon's PEAK system, introduced in the book as the first of four modules, translates derived relational responding methodology into a new verbal‐behavior approach. The PEAK system is firmly rooted in the basic, conceptual, and applied behavior‐analytic tradition; however, it differs substantially from the competition in its unique application of relational frame theory to produce efficient learning. The manual's accessible nature renders it a viable product for many users and readers. The growing empirical support for PEAK’s efficacy, usability, and psychometrics is impressive and provides a robust empirical basis for the system that is not described within the pages of the manual. Behavior analysts may shy away from a manualized system that explicitly omits discussion of scholarship and empirical bases but would be remiss in doing so, given the potential of PEAK to revolutionize the way clinicians and parents apply the verbal behavior approach.     

Setiya on reasons and causes

Setiya [2013. “Causality in Action”. Analysis Reviews, 73 (3): pp. 512–525] recently gave a novel argument in favor of a causal theory of acting for a reason. He presents three principles relating acting for a reason to psychological states of the agent and uses them to test theories of acting for a reason: theories cannot explain the necessary truth of the conditionals are to be rejected. Surveying a number of alternatives, he finds that only a causal-psychological theory passes this test, that, thus, it must be correct, and that there must be a solution to the problem of deviant causation. Setiya's challenge is forceful, but he does not establish his conclusion. The anticausalist can at this point reverse it: since deviant causation is intractable, some noncausal theory must be able to meet his challenge. This reversal has teeth: Setiya underestimates both the challenges that causal theories face and the resources available to the anticausalist to address his challenge.     

样例设计及呈现方式对学习代数运算规则的促进

为了考察"解释法"、"解释-标记法"两种样例设计方法及其"分步呈现"方式对六年级小学生学习代数运算规则的促进作用,以六年级小学生为被试,以"完全平方和"和"平方差"代数运算样例为学习材料,进行了3项实验研究。结果表明:(1)采用"解释法"设计"完全平方和"和"平方差"的代数运算样例,明显提高了代数运算规则的样例学习效果。(2)在"解释法"设计的样例上添加"运算标记"要运用适当,如果运用不当,特别是"运算标记"过多时,容易增加样例学习的认知负荷,从而降低标记的使用效果。(3)对于运算步骤和"运算标记"过多的样例,采用被试自主控制的"分步呈现"运算步骤的样例学习方式,其学习效果显著优于整体呈现样例的学习效果。     

Verbalization of Decision Strategies in Multiple‐Cue Probabilistic Inference

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inference, people choose between alternatives based on several cues, each of which is differentially associated with an alternative's overall value. Various strategies have been proposed for probabilistic inference (e.g., weighted additive, tally, and take‐the‐best). These strategies differ in how many cue values they require to enact and in how they weight each cue. Do decision makers actually use any of these strategies? Ways to investigate this question include analyzing people's choices and the cues that they reveal. However, different strategies often predict the same decisions, and search behavior says nothing about whether or how people use the information that they acquire. In this research, we attempt to elucidate which strategies participants use in a multiple‐cue probabilistic inference task by examining verbal protocols, a high‐density source of process data. The promise of verbal data is in their utility for testing detailed information processing models. To that end, we apply protocol analysis in conjunction with computational simulations. We find converging evidence across outcome measures, search measures, and verbal reports that most participants use simplifying heuristics, namely take‐the‐best. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Verbal facilitation effects instead of verbal overshadowing in face memory of 4- to 6-year olds

Research on eye witness memory in older children and adults revealed that verbally describing unfamiliar faces impairs later recognition of these faces, known as the “verbal overshadowing effect”. The aim of this study was to investigate whether a verbal overshadowing effect occurs in 4- to 6-year olds, too, and whether visualization (i.e., drawing the seen face) might elicit a visual overshadowing effect. Instead of a verbal overshadowing effect, a verbal facilitation effect was revealed with verbal intelligence being a significant predictor for recognition accuracy in the verbalization group but not in the control group. No effect of visualization was observed on recognition accuracy. Potential explanations for the results are discussed.     

Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck

I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane's libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane's recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane's theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Jones's A-ing butJones*'s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Jones's A-ing and Jones*'sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility.