Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck

What is it to have conclusive reasons to believe a proposition P? According to a view famously defended by Dretske, a reason R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that, while knowing that P is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe that P, having such reasons cannot be understood in terms of the truth of this counterfactual condition. Simple examples show that it is possible to believe P on the basis of reasons that satisfy the counterfactual, and still get things right about P only as a matter of luck. Seeing where this account of conclusive reasons goes wrong points to an important distinction between having conclusive reasons and relying on reasons that are in point of fact conclusive. It also has wider consequences for whether modal principles like sensitivity and safety can rule out the pernicious kind of epistemic luck, or the kind of luck that interferes with knowledge.     

Mindfulness and False-Memories: The Impact of Mindfulness Practice on the DRM Paradigm

Mindfulness practice is the cultivation of awareness to the present moment and has been shown in recent years to have beneficial effects on cognition. However, to date, the data regarding the impact of mindfulness on memory—and specifically on memory distortions—is scarce and incomplete. The present study was aimed to examine whether mindfulness practice would have an effect on true and false memories. To this end, the effect of mindfulness meditation practice on memory performance was examined in two experiments in which false memories were provoked using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In Experiment 1, college students were randomly divided into either a 5-week mindfulness-practice group (n = 29) or a waitlist control group (n = 22). In Experiment 2, college students were randomly divided into either a brief mindfulness session (n = 21) or a mind-wandering control group (n = 19). The results indicated that mindfulness increased the recognition of true memories with no effect on spontaneous false-memories, yet increased the rate of provoked false-memories. These findings are discussed in terms of memory sensitivity and response bias, and it is argued that mindfulness may have a lesser effect on encoding processes than previously suggested.     

Enhanced visual performance in obsessive compulsive personality disorder

Visual performance is considered as commanding modality in human perception. We tested whether Obsessive–compulsive personality disorder (OCPD) people do differently in visual performance tasks than people without OCPD. One hundred ten students of Ferdowsi University of Mashhad and non‐student participants were tested by Structured Clinical Interview for DSM‐IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID‐II), among whom 18 (mean age = 29.55; SD = 5.26; 84% female) met the criteria for OCPD classification; controls were 20 persons (mean age = 27.85; SD = 5.26; female = 84%), who did not met the OCPD criteria. Both groups were tested on a modified Flicker task for two dimensions of visual performance (i.e., visual acuity: detecting the location of change, complexity, and size; and visual contrast sensitivity). The OCPD group had responded more accurately on pairs related to size, complexity, and contrast, but spent more time to detect a change on pairs related to complexity and contrast. The OCPD individuals seem to have more accurate visual performance than non‐OCPD controls. The findings support the relationship between personality characteristics and visual performance within the framework of top‐down processing model.     

Sensitivity,Induction, and Miracles

Sosa, Pritchard, and Vogel have all argued that there are cases in which one knows something inductively but does not believe it sensitively, and that sensitivity therefore cannot be necessary for knowledge. I defend sensitivity by showing that inductive knowledge is sensitive.     

Assessment sensitivity in legal discourse

We explain three phenomena in legal discourse in terms of MacFarlane’s assessment-sensitive semantics: incompatible applications of law, assessments of statements about what is legally the case, and retrospective overruling. The claim is that assessment sensitivity fits in with the view, shared by many legal theorists at least with respect to hard cases, that the final adjudicator’s interpretation of legal sources is constitutive of the applied norm. We argue that there are strong analogies between certain kinds of statements in legal discourse as understood in light of that view and discourse about matters of taste and future contingents. Thus, if assessment-sensitive semantics provides a compelling account of discourse about matters of taste and future contingents, then it likewise provides a compelling account of those statements in legal discourse.     

金钱惩罚促进Stroop任务中的行为表现

本研究通过Stroop任务和修改版MIDT相结合,目的是考察不同额度金钱惩罚对Stroop任务行为表现的影响。结果发现：（1）无论是中性试次,一致试次还是不一致试次,金钱惩罚不仅减少了被试的行为反应时,而且提高了正确率;（2）非惩罚条件与惩罚条件下的冲突效应以及其他不同额度惩罚条件下的冲突效应差异不显著;（3）金钱惩罚对不一致试次反应时的影响与个体的惩罚敏感性呈显著负相关,而与奖赏敏感性无关。结果表明,金钱惩罚能够促进个体的一般行为表现,但是不会提高冲突抑制能力。同时,金钱惩罚对认知行为的影响与其惩罚敏感性密切相关。     

Learning Experiences and Anxiety Sensitivity in Normal Adolescents

The present study examined the relationships between learning experiences with respect to somatic symptoms and levels of anxiety sensitivity in youths. Fifty-two normal adolescents aged 12 to 14 years were interviewed about their learning experiences with anxiety-related and nonanxiety-related somatic symptoms and completed the Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index. Results showed that informational learning to some extent contributed to adolescents' anxiety sensitivity levels. That is, parents' transmission of the idea that somatic symptoms might be dangerous was significantly associated with levels of anxiety sensitivity. Other learning experiences such as parental reinforcement or observational learning were not found to be related to anxiety sensitivity. It can be concluded that learning experiences seem to play a small but significant role in the development of high levels of anxiety sensitivity.     

Maternal Sensitivity and the Visual Attentiveness of Children Who Are Deaf

Maternal sensitivity may be even more important for the development of deaf infants' social and cognitive competence than previous research has shown it to be for hearing children. We report ratings of mothers' sensitivity and infants' time in coordinated joint attention (CJA) during play interactions video-taped in a laboratory at 9,12 and 18 months. Participants include 80 dyads in four groups: two matched for hearing status (Deaf or Hearing mothers with deaf or hearing babies), two unmatched for hearing status (Deaf mothers/hearing babies and Hearing mothers/deaf babies). Mothers in matched dyads were rated more sensitive than mothers in unmatched dyads. Deaf infants with Deaf mothers showed more time in CJA compared to infants in unmatched dyads. However, significant correlations of sensitivity and attention were found only for the two unmatched hearing status groups at 18 months. These results are discussed in terms of dyadic hearing status differences, intuitive parenting and developmental stage. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.