Experiential tourist shopping value: Adding causality to value dimensions and testing their subjectivity

Previous literature on consumer behavior has tackled the experiential approach in retailing services in depth; however, most of the previous studies have concentrated on the simultaneous but not concatenated effects of value dimensions on satisfaction and/or loyalty. Furthermore, tourists' shopping behavior remains an underdeveloped area of study from the experiential perspective. This work explores experiential tourist shopping value, aiming to (a) explain tourists' loyalty to retailers by adding causality to experiential dimensions and (b) prove the subjectivity of these values. After a diachronic and synchronic review of the literature on experiential shopping value, a structural model with a chain of effects consisting of product quality, service quality, self‐esteem and shopping enjoyment on loyalty, and a multidimensional index as a second‐order model were built with partial least squares and tested on a purposive sample of 374 tourists in Valencia (Spain). Our findings revealed a sequential approach to tourists' shopping experiences where utilitarian values led to social and hedonic ones, all of which were antecedents of loyalty to retailers. Furthermore, the index showed differences by gender and nationality. Although our results are context specific, they add to the value creation process as they show a sequence of effects, and a fully subjective value provision, which changes according to demographics. The originality of this work is that it contributes to the suitability of the experiential paradigm in explaining tourists' shopping behavior by promoting interest in this specific, underdeveloped target area, and also by adding causality and proving the subjectivity of experiential value dimensions.     

Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time

Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.

行为经济学中的损失规避

损失规避是指,人们总是强烈倾向于规避损失：一定数额的损失所引起的心理感受,其强烈程度约相当于两倍数额的获益感受。这种强烈的心理与行为倾向广泛存在于风险与非风险领域,在该两个领域中损失规避的研究范式也不同。损失规避常见于经济和消费等领域,可用于解释行为决策中有悖于规范化理论的诸多现象,如禀赋效应、现状偏差、股权溢价之迷和赢者的诅咒等。然而,损失规避的机制研究还存在许多尚未解决的问题,如损失规避的本质以及适用条件。今后的研究不仅要注重认知角度和情感依恋,还要结合认知过程来研究损失规避的性质和内在机制,以期帮助人们认识、预测及干预由损失规避造成的经济损失和非理性决策。     

社会价值取向与反馈对动态社会两难决策的影响：以水资源两难决策为例

以水资源两难情景为实验任务,探讨了社会价值取向与反馈在社会两难决策中的作用.结果表明: (1)社会价值取向在决策者的两难决策行为中起着非常重要的作用.合作型个体比非合作型个体显著地表现出更多的合作行为.个体的社会价值取向可以作为预测两难决策行为的一个重要因素: (2)不同的反馈类型对具有不同社会价值取向的决策者的决策行为影响不同.非合作型个体受反馈信息影响比较明显,而合作型个体则不易受他人的决策信息影响.     

论进化心理学的“心理机制”

“心理机制”是进化心理学的核心概念。对这一概念的理解直接影响着对整个进化心理学理论的理解。该文尝试从心理学其它相关学科的角度,对这一概念的性质进行充分的解读与分析,同时也指出进化心理学“心理机制”理论之明显误区,并在此基础上对进化心理学价值之所在给予充分的彰显。     

时间自我透视与价值偏好

该研究对大学生时间自我透视与价值偏好之间的关系进行了探讨。结果发现,当从远期的时间距离来透视自我（可能自我知觉）时,个体更加偏好理想主义价值;当个体从近期的时间距离来透视自我（当前自我知觉）时,个体更加偏好实用主义价值。但是,时间自我透视与价值偏好之间并非遵循严格的线性关系。此外,研究还发现,上述规律只出现于个体对自我的知觉中,个体对他人的时间透视并未表现出类似的规律。     

Sex–related self–concepts, cognitive styles and cultural values of traditionality–modernity as predictors of general and domain–specific sexism

Previous studies have determined that masculinity, femininity, need for closure and authoritarianism are significant predictors of sexism. The present study attempted to integrate these variables in order to better understand the nature of general ambivalent sexism and workplace–specific sexism in Singapore. Chinese traditionality and Chinese modernity were specifically examined as potential predictors of sexism. Robust results from hierarchical regressions indicated that these indigenous cultural variables were highly important in predicting general and workplace–specific sexism. Although masculinity and need for closure were unrelated to sexism, participant sex, femininity and authoritarianism significantly predicted sexist attitudes towards women. Most important, Chinese values were found to add significant incremental validity in predicting sexist attitudes beyond what was accounted by the aforementioned predictors. Chinese traditionality significantly predicted sexist attitudes towards women, but Chinese modernity was unrelated to sexism. Implications of these findings were discussed.     

More lives, better lives

Although many people believe that more people would be better, arguments intended to show this are unconvincing. I consider one of Parfit's arguments for a related conclusion, that even when both are worth living, we ought to prefer the better of two lives. Were this argument successful, or so I claim, then it would follow that more people would be better. But there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives. Nor is an attempted rejoinder effective. We can agree that there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives, and yet still maintain there are reasons for improving lives.     

The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good

Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p , not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowing p better than merely truly believing p ? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life.     

Counterexamples to Recovery and the Filtering Condition

David Makinson has argued that the compelling character of counterexamples to the Recovery Condition on contraction is due to an appeal to justificational structure. In “naked theories” where such structure is ignored or is not present, Recovery does apply. This note attempts to show that Makinson is mistaken on both counts. Recovery fails when no appeal is made to justificational structure. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.