试论道德价值的生成——公民道德建设中的一个基本的理论问题

人及其存在的二重性是道德价值生成的内在根据 ,客观的社会物质生活条件对道德价值的决定作用只有通过人及其存在的二重性这个中介才能实现 ;道德价值的生成经历了需要———秩序和要求———应当———行为规范的社会实践过程 ;道德价值的特殊性就在于它是功利价值和精神价值、外在社会价值和内在主体价值的统一。     

简析天人合德的理论意蕴

天人合一是中国哲学的根本特征之一 ,它在传统伦理思想中表现为天人合德。这一命题规定了传统道德的本体、道德价值的本原以及人的道德本性 ,是传统伦理思想最核心的理念和最根本的特征。它固然存在许多理论上的缺失 ,但又极富思辨性 ,对伦理学上的许多重大理论问题都提供了自己的解答。这对于我们今天探究这些问题 ,仍然具有启迪意义。     

Locomotion, assessment, and regulatory fit: Value transfer from “how” to “what”

Regulatory fit is experienced when people pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory orientation. Previous research on promotion and prevention orientations has found that regulatory fit increases people’s perception that a decision they made was “right,” which in turn transfers value to the decision outcome, including being willing to pay more for a product than those who chose the same product without regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000; Higgins et al., in press). We predicted that the effect of regulatory fit on monetary value could be generalized to locomotion and assessment orientations. Participants were willing to pay over 40% more for the same book-light when it was chosen with a strategy that fit their regulatory orientation (assessment/“full evaluation”; locomotion/“progressive elimination”) than when it was chosen with a non-fit strategy.     

Why We Care Whether Our Beliefs Are True: An Answer to Stephen Stich?

Do we really care whether our beliefs are true? Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer: Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is “a consistently negative” one. He argues that there is neither intrinsic nor instrumental value in having true beliefs. However, his argument is based on some very dubious reasons. For instance, one of his reasons is that if we value true beliefs intrinsically, we will leave out a huge space of mental states that have no truth values but would vastly increase their user’s power or happiness or biological fitness. But this is false because we can value different things intrinsically at the same time. He is even less successful in arguing against instrumental value in having true beliefs. He admits that he does not establish a knockdown argument against the value of having true beliefs, but he insists that the burden of argument be surely on those who maintain that there is value in having true beliefs. To meet his challenge, we have shown that there is cognitive intrinsic value in holding true beliefs and that generally, true beliefs are more conducive to our survival than false beliefs. If we completely depend on our false beliefs to achieve our goals, we will act like a blind cat who can only catch a mouse by chance.     

行为决策中的忽略偏差：心理机制与影响因素

忽略偏差是指在由忽略所导致的损失与由行为所导致的同等的或者更少的损失之间, 个体更容易接受忽略所导致的损失。个体在日常行为决策的各种领域, 特别是在公共政策制定中均会出现忽略偏差。目前忽略偏差的心理机制主要有损失规避和标准理论两种。忽略偏差的影响因素主要包括保护性价值观、选择结果的信息知悉度、负性情绪、社会角色和文化价值观念等。未来的研究则需要从忽略偏差的产生根源, 与决策规避中其他偏差的关系, 群体决策中忽略偏差的影响以及忽略偏差的应用研究领域, 特别是公共管理与公共政策领域等方面进行深入的研究。     

Reward Influence on the Heart: Cardiovascular Response as a Function of Incentive Value at Five Levels of Task Demand

This study examined cardiovascular effects of incentive value in men and women confronted with cognitive challenges that were more and less difficult to meet. Participants performed computer memory tasks varying in difficulty from low to high, with instructions that they could earn chances toward a $100 prize or $10 prize by attaining a 90% success rate. Analysis of cardiovascular responses assessed during work revealed an interaction between difficulty and incentive value for heart rate. Participants' heart rate responses were proportional to task difficulty and unaffected by incentive value in all conditions except for the most difficult one. Where difficulty was greatest, $100 participants showed relatively high heart rate responsiveness, whereas $10 participants showed low heart rate responsiveness. This heart rate finding corroborates and extends cardiovascular results from previous experiments, and lends further support to the view that cardiovascular responses will be proportional to incentive value only under some task conditions.     

From an axiological standpoint

I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final value described is either identical with the classical notion of intrinsic value or is not a plausible candidate for the primary concept of axiology.     

The world may not be just for you but you'd better not say it: On the social value of expressing personal belief in a just world

The expression of personal belief in a just world (PBJW) has been discussed as a criterion of excellence in social judgments. In four experimental studies we hypothesized and found that targets who express high versus low PBJW are judged as more: (i) deserving of success and (ii) suited to socio-organizational expectations. The four studies show that suitability to socio-organizational expectations mediates the relation between PBJW expressed and success deservingness, even after controlling for judgments of likability, status, rationality, optimism, and targets as victims. Studies 2 and 3 show this pattern occurs regardless of target performance appraisal. Study 4 indicates that expressing low PBJW decreases the social value of individuals, but expressing high PBJW does not increase it. We discuss the impact of PBJW expression on people's lives, namely on upward social mobility of members of low-status groups, and the influence of the negativity bias on judgments caused by PBJW expression.     

Succeeding competently: towards an anti-luck condition for achievement

Achievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently (and thus an achievement), only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make success likely, and that this is the reason why she acts that way.