INTRINSIC AESTHETIC VALUE REVISTED

Abstract: Every sentient organism needs constantly to re‐assess its environment in order to adjust to any changes in it and to ascertain which aspects are, or become, salient for its current purposes. Such adaptation is of basic evolutionary importance, but for human beings it can be difficult to achieve in the face of radical novelty or when different frames of reference are in conflict. Art by virtue of its integrated structure presents examples of how a partial unification of experience may be envisaged. Art thus helps to meet our constant need for orientation and re‐orientation, though its operation in this respect is invariably outside consciousness. So art can be said to have intrinsic value only within a strictly subjective, phenomenological perspective; more broadly considered from a third‐person viewpoint, the value of art is instrumental. Questions then arise concerning our motivation for seeking or producing art, about the relation of art to other cultural activities, and about the role of pleasure in connection with aesthetic experience; these are briefly discussed.     

Preference for the outcome that follows a relatively aversive event: Contrast or delay reduction?

Pigeons prefer a positive discriminative (S+) stimulus that follows a less preferred event (a large number of required responses, a longer delay, or the absence of food) over a different S+ with a similar history of reinforcement that follows a more preferred event (a single required response, no delay, or food). We proposed that this phenomenon results from contrast (referred to as within-trial contrast) between the less preferred initial event and the signal for reinforcement. Delay reduction theory (Fantino, 1969) can account for these results by proposing that the less preferred initial event lengthens the duration of the trial, thereby allowing the S+ stimulus to occur later in the trial and thus become a better predictor of reinforcement. In the present experiments, we further explored this effect. In Experiment 1, we controlled for trial duration by using a fixed ratio response (30 pecks) as one initial event and the absence of pecking for the same duration as the other initial event (0 pecks). The pigeons showed a reliable preference for the positive stimulus that followed the least preferred initial event. In Experiment 2, we controlled for trial duration by using 30 pecks as one initial event and 1 peck followed by a delay that matched the duration of the preceding 30-peck trial. (Group Time Same). For Group Time Different, there was no delay following the 1-peck initial event. For Group Time Same, preference for the initial event negatively predicted the pigeons’ preference for the S+ stimulus that followed, supporting the contrast account. A somewhat greater preference for the discriminative stimulus that followed the least preferred initial event was found for Group Time Different suggesting that in addition to contrast, delay reduction also may play a small role. However, the greater initial-event preference found for Group Time Different suggests that contrast can account for the group difference as well.     

Hail the impossible: p-values, evidence, and likelihood

Significance testing based on p-values is standard in psychological research and teaching. Typically, research articles and textbooks present and use p as a measure of statistical evidence against the null hypothesis (the Fisherian interpretation), although using concepts and tools based on a completely different usage of p as a tool for controlling long-term decision errors (the Neyman-Pearson interpretation). There are four major problems with using p as a measure of evidence and these problems are often overlooked in the domain of psychology. First, p is uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis and can therefore never indicate evidence for the null. Second, p is conditioned solely on the null hypothesis and is therefore unsuited to quantify evidence, because evidence is always relative in the sense of being evidence for or against a hypothesis relative to another hypothesis. Third, p designates probability of obtaining evidence (given the null), rather than strength of evidence. Fourth, p depends on unobserved data and subjective intentions and therefore implies, given the evidential interpretation, that the evidential strength of observed data depends on things that did not happen and subjective intentions. In sum, using p in the Fisherian sense as a measure of statistical evidence is deeply problematic, both statistically and conceptually, while the Neyman-Pearson interpretation is not about evidence at all. In contrast, the likelihood ratio escapes the above problems and is recommended as a tool for psychologists to represent the statistical evidence conveyed by obtained data relative to two hypotheses.     

The reward value of near-miss situations

Svartdal, F. (2011). The reward value of near‐miss situations. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology52, 209–217. What is a “positive” outcome? Clearly, obtaining something attractive is regarded as positive, but so is avoiding something negative. The present paper compared these two types of situations in scenario‐type evaluations. Participants rated positive (P), avoiding negative (AN), and negative (N) outcomes in terms of luck (Experiment 1) and overall positive/negative evaluations (Experiments 2 and 3). The results demonstrated that evaluations of P and AN outcomes were judged as equally positive, but the emotional basis for these evaluations was very different: The feeling of relief was the dominating emotion in AN situations, whereas joy was the dominating emotion in P situations. Overall, these results indicate that avoidance‐induced reward value may be important as a motivating factor in cognition and action.     

Interpersonal trust and market value moderates the bias in women’s preferences away from attractive high-status men

Women appear to exhibit a subtle reluctance to engage in long-term relationships with physically attractive, high-status men. We propose that this bias away from men of very high market value is based on fear that these males may desert a relationship and also on the comparative self-perceived market value of the women. Therefore, interpersonal trust and perceived market value should moderate the extent of this counterintuitive bias. To test this proposal, we asked women with varying levels of interpersonal trust and self-perceived desirability to consider physically-attractive and physically-average men of high, medium and low socioeconomic status and rate each in terms of attractiveness as a long-term partner. Results showed that women’s perceptions of their own desirability and their level of trust predicted their ratings of men with high-value in the mating market, and that women with high levels of both desirability and trust were less likely to show a bias away from high-value men. Interpersonal trust and desirability moderate the degree to which women find physically attractive men attractive as potential partners.     

Trajectory of risky decision making for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85

The ability to make advantageous decisions in the face of uncertainty is an essential human skill, yet the development of such abilities over the lifespan is still not well understood. In the current study, from childhood through older adulthood, we tracked the developmental trajectory of risk taking for gains and losses, and expected value (EV) sensitivity in risky choices. In the gain domain, risk‐taking decreased consistently across the lifespan. In the loss domain, risk‐taking was relatively constant across ages, a result we attribute to the pervasiveness of loss aversion. EV sensitivity showed an inverted‐U‐shaped function, increasing from childhood to adulthood but then decreasing for the elderly, which occurred for both risky gains and risky losses. This finding is consistent with neuropsychological and neuroanatomical evidence concerning the role of the frontal lobe in decision making, which is relatively late to develop during childhood but may degrade earlier in the later years. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rapid acquisition of choice and timing and the provenance of the terminal-link effect

Eight pigeons responded in a concurrent-chains procedure in which terminal-link schedules changed pseudorandomly across sessions. Pairs of terminal-link delays either summed to 15 s or to 45 s. Across sessions, the location of the shorter terminal link changed according to a pseudorandom binary sequence. On some terminal links, food was withheld to obtain start and stop times, measures of temporal control. Log initial-link response ratios stabilized within the first half of each session. Log response ratio was a monotonically-increasing but nonlinear function of programmed log terminal-link immediacy ratio. There was an effect of absolute terminal-link duration on log response ratio: For most subjects, preference for the relatively shorter terminal-link delay was stronger when absolute delays were long than when absolute delays were short. Polynomial regressions and model comparison showed that differences in degree of nonlinearity, not in sensitivity to log immediacy ratio, produced this effect. Temporal control of stop times was timescale invariant with scalar variability, but temporal control of start times was not consistent across subjects or terminal-link durations.     

学业情绪与学业成绩的关系及其影响因素研究

学业情绪指教学或学习过程中与学生学业相关的各种情绪体验,包括高兴、厌倦、无助、焦虑等。学业情绪与学业成绩之间相互影响:学业情绪对学业成绩具有预测作用、而学业成绩对学业情绪具有回馈作用。学业控制感和成就目标通过影响学业情绪来影响学业情绪与学业成绩之间的关系。未来的研究方向主要在进一步探讨学业情绪与学业成绩之间的关系以及学业情绪对学业成绩的影响机制等方面。     

Understanding social suffering: a phenomenological investigation of the experience of inequality

As global market conditions erode traditional forms of solidarity, there is evidence of psychological disturbance among a number of social groups as a direct result. This paper investigates this issue among a disadvantaged working‐class group in South Yorkshire (England) and argues that understanding emerging forms of social suffering requires both a social and a person‐centred approach that transcends normal clinical/psycho‐analytic accounts. The attempt here is to create well‐founded terms of reference that will support investigators who seek to embed agents' case histories in a social‐psychological framework as they set about illuminating social pathologies. The paper attempts to trace the contours of pathology holistically by following its traces as they are manifest in everyday experience and articulated in conversation; thus putting agents' everyday perceptions of the data at the heart of this account. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

HOW I SEE PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND BEYOND

Abstract: This article raises some questions about the relevance and value of philosophy at present and suggests some ways in which philosophy can become relevant again. It challenges philosophers to become more actively engaged in the world and to restore Western philosophy's original vision of “love of wisdom,” a value sorely lacking in the present‐day world and abandoned by much of contemporary Western philosophy. The pursuit of wisdom would involve the quest for sound judgment and synoptic insights regarding the ends humankind should strive to realize, including moral visions to help Homo sapiens emerge from the atavistic jungle. It would also involve sound judgment regarding the proper means for the attainment of these desirable ends. For these things to be possible, philosophy would need to draw upon humankind's collective wisdom in philosophy, religion, and myth, and on advances in scientific knowledge, thereby gaining an ever‐deeper understanding of ourselves and of our place in the cosmos.