Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

Is the victim Max (Planck) or Moritz? How victim type and social value orientation affect dishonest behavior

Does the potential victim of dishonest behavior—a family or a bank, a pensioner or an insurance firm—affect the propensity to engage in such behavior? We investigate the effect of victim type—an individual person or an impersonal institution—on dishonest behavior and test whether it interacts with potential perpetrators' social value orientation (prosocial or proself). In a between‐subjects design, we allowed experimental participants (N = 368) to misreport private information in order to increase (decrease) their profit (loss) at the expense of either another participant or the experimenter's budget. Both prosocials and proselfs engaged in dishonesty, but proselfs did so much more. Furthermore, prosocials reduced their dishonesty when the victim was another person, rather than an institution, but proselfs did not. A direct implication is that the dishonesty of prosocials may be curbed by increasing the salience of the adverse effect their dishonesty has on other individual people but that such interventions will not be effective for proselfs. In contrast with recent results, we did not find a general effect of increased dishonesty under a loss (vs. gain) frame.     

The relationship between attitudes toward suicide and willingness to pay for suicide prevention: a cross-sectional study in Japan

There are gaps in our knowledge of the role attitudes toward suicide play in determining people’s willingness to participate (WTP) for suicide prevention. We conducted a large nationwide cross-sectional study with the aim of clarifying the relationship between WTP for reducing suicide risk and attitudes toward suicide. Ordinal logistic regression analyses (n = 1771) showed that there were significant associations of WTP for suicide prevention with ‘Suicide as a right’ (β = ?.15, 95% CI: ?.25 to ?.04, p = .006), ‘Preventability/readiness to help’ (β = .81, 95% CI: .69–.94, p < .001) and ‘Common occurrence’ (β = .32, 95% CI: .19–.46, p < .001). ‘Incomprehensibility/unpredictability’ did not show an association with WTP. Taxpayer acceptance for suicide prevention is more likely to be achieved through provision of information that increases endorsement of ‘preventability/readiness to help’ and ‘common occurrence’ factors, and decreases ‘suicide as a right’ scores.     

The Relatively Infinite Value of the Environment

Some environmental ethicists and economists argue that attributing infinite value to the environment is a good way to represent an absolute obligation to protect it. Others argue against modelling the value of the environment in this way: the assignment of infinite value leads to immense technical and philosophical difficulties that undermine the environmentalist project. First, there is a problem of discrimination: saving a large region of habitat is better than saving a small region; yet if both outcomes have infinite value, then decision theory prescribes indifference. Second, there is a problem of swamping probabilities: an act with a small but positive probability of saving an endangered species appears to be on par with an act that has a high probability of achieving this outcome, since both have infinite expected value. Our paper shows that a relative (rather than absolute) concept of infinite value can be meaningfully defined, and provides a good model for securing the priority of the natural environment while avoiding the failures noted by sceptics about infinite value. Our claim is not that the relative infinity utility model gets every detail correct, but rather that it provides a rigorous philosophical framework for thinking about decisions affecting the environment.     

Philosophy Makes No Progress,So What Is the Point of It?

Philosophy makes no progress. It fails to do so in the way science and mathematics make progress. By “no progress” is meant that there is no successive advance of a well‐established body of knowledge—no views are definitively established or definitively refuted. Yet philosophers often talk and act as if the subject makes progress, and that its point and value lies in its doing so, while in fact they also approach the subject in ways that clearly contradict any claim to progress. This article presents evidence for, and a theoretical explanation of, the view that philosophy makes no progress, concluding with an account of what philosophy is and what the point and value of it is. Philosophy should not be shy about being what it is, nor should it pretend to be what it is not. What it is should be reflected in philosophizing and the way it is taught.     

Reinforcement value and fixed‐interval performance

The concept of reinforcement value summarizes the effect of different variables, such as reinforcement delay, reinforcement magnitude, and deprivation level, on behavior. In the present set of experiments, we evaluated the effect of reinforcement devaluation on performance under FI schedules. The literature on timing and reinforcement value suggests that devaluation generates longer expected times to reinforcement than the same intervals trained under control conditions. We devalued reinforcement with delay in Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2, and diminished deprivation in Experiments 3A and 3B. Devaluation reduced response rates, increased the number of one‐response intervals, and lengthened postreinforcement pauses, but had inconsistent effects on other timing measures such as quarter life and breakpoint. The results of delayed reinforcement and diminished deprivation manipulations are well summarized as reinforcement devaluation effects. These results suggest that devaluation may reduce stimulus control. In addition, we argue that the process by which delayed reinforcement affects behavior might also explain some effects observed in other devaluation procedures through the concept of reinforcement value.     

Psychological ethical climate,leader–member exchange and commitment to superior customer value: influencing salespeople’s unethical intent and sales performance

In today’s competitive environment, salespeople are challenged with creating customer value in an ethical manner while meeting performance goals. Sales supervisors play a critical role in ensuring that this challenge is met. This research examines the roles of psychological ethical climate and leader–member exchange (LMX) in encouraging salespeople’s commitment to providing superior customer value, reducing their unethical intentions and improving sales performance. Results indicate that business-to-business salespeople’s psychological ethical climate perceptions influence their perceived relationship with their sales supervisor (i.e. LMX relationship) as well as their commitment to providing superior customer value. LMX also directly influences commitment to providing superior customer value, which in turn affects salespeople’s unethical intent and quota performance. Theoretical and managerial implications based on the study’s findings are provided, as well as directions for future research.     

Evaluating Effort: Influences of Evaluation Mode on Judgments of Task‐specific Efforts

The claim that humans adapt their actions in ways that avoid effortful processing (whether cognitive or physical) is a staple of various theories of human behavior. Although much work has been carried out focusing on the determinants of such behaviors, less attention has been given to how individuals evaluate effort. In the current set of experiments, we utilized the general evaluability theory to examine the evaluability of effort by examining subjective value functions across different evaluation modes. Individuals judged the anticipated effort of four task‐specific efforts indexed by stimulus rotation, items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation across joint (i.e., judged comparatively) and single evaluation modes (i.e., judged in isolation). General evaluability theory hypothesizes that highly evaluable attributes should be consistently evaluated (i.e., demonstrate similar subjective value functions) between the two modes. Across six experiments, we demonstrate that the perceived effort associated with items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation can be considered relatively evaluable, while the effort associated with stimulus rotation may be relatively inevaluable. Results are discussed within the context of subjective evaluation, internal reference information, and strategy selection. In addition, methodological implications of evaluation modes are considered. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Value From Regulatory Fit

Abstract— Where does value come from? I propose a new answer to this classic question. People experience regulatory fit when the manner of their engagement in an activity sustains their goal orientation or interests regarding that activity. When there is fit, people engage more strongly in what they are doing and "feel right" about it. Fit influences the strength of value experiences—how good or how bad one feels about something—independently of the pleasure and pain experiences that are associated with outcomes. It uniquely contributes to people's experience of the value of things. Fit is shown to influence judgments and decision making, attitude and behavior change, and task performance.