Mental Institutions

We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on “objective spirit” which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are pieces of the mind, externalized in their specific time and place. These institutions are the products of shared mental processes. We then use these institutions instrumentally to do further cognitive work, for example, to solve problems or to control behavior.

Research ethics and the principle of Justice as Fairness – A restatement

In my recent article, I addressed the question of whether a potential categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired patients from non-therapeutic medical research would be inaccordance with the Principle of Justice as Fairness. I came to the conclusion that a categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired persons from relevant research projects may collide with Rawls’s understanding of Justice as Fairness. Derek Bell has criticized my paper by denying that it is legitimate to apply Rawls to this bioethical problem. In my restatement I try to show that an extrapolation of John Rawls’s thought to such bioethical cases is possible, because Rawls himself has written that his orientation towards decisionally non-impaired persons is an idealized situation that allows extrapolations. In a second part I try to show that Bell hasroughly misunderstood my concept of “presumed consent” which I make a prerequisite for the legitimisation of research on decisionally impaired persons. In using advance consent as a proposal for resolving the problem, Bell has indirectly confirmed my approach because he is using a similar construct of consent, which operates with similar hypotheses and probabilities of error. I see here no categorical difference between Bell’s conclusion and my discussion. Thus, Bell’s reply does not represent a refutation of my thoughts, but rather it is a para phrased confirmation of my central theses. I conclude by showing the relevance of Rawls, pointing out that the discussion between Bell and me illustrates how Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium is an appropriate approach to finding a solution to this bioethical problem. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

简论社会主义道德的核心和原则

社会主义道德的核心和原则,是理解和把握社会主义道德的本质特征、先进性、高尚性、科学性的关键。为人民服务的丰富内涵及其作为社会主义道德核心的内在根据。集体主义的科学含又及其作为社会主义道德原则的全面分析。     

美国医疗知情同意案例评介

在美国的医疗活动中,知情同意是规范医患关系的一项伦理道德原则,同时,美国司法活动也在医疗事故背景下适用知情同意说,并形成一些司法适用的医疗知情同意的标准和告知责任的范围,介绍和讨论对涉及到这些问题的三个有影响的判例。     

马克思主义与自由主义论战的哲学基础

近年来,从自我所有原则到契约原则,国外马克思主义与自由主义展开了全方位的论战,这一论战涉及到从哲学到经济学、从政治学到伦理学的诸多方面。自由、平等和正义,尽管对于马克思主义和自由主义来说它们的涵义是如此地不同,却是双方所共同追求的价值导向。这些价值标准能否在自我所有原则和契约原则的具体实践中体现出来,正是双方争论的焦点所在。本文围绕着双方的争论,从一些基础理论入手,对双方的论争进行了分析和思考,试图为我们回答时代提出的新挑战,与时俱进地发展马克思主义理论提供一点借鉴作用。     

Beyond mere ownership: transaction demand as a moderator of the endowment effect

Transaction demand refers to the motivation to complete a transaction. As transaction demand increases, owners should sell at lower prices and buyers should buy at higher ones. It was predicted that the endowment effect—the tendency for minimum selling price to exceed maximum buying price for a particular commodity—should be minimized when buyers and sellers have high transaction demand. The results of two experiments supported this hypothesis: In Experiment 1, the endowment effect was observed when participants imagined another individual wanting to buy from or sell to them, but not when they imagined wanting to buy from or sell to another individual. In Experiment 2, a reversal of the endowment effect was observed when transaction demand was high for both prospective buyers and sellers. The findings highlight the importance of motivational factors in addition to other factors (e.g., loss aversion, reference dependence) in determining behavior.     

论医学人文精神的重塑

重塑医学人文精神是一个无法回避而又必须作出回答的紧迫问题。把现代医学技术放到人文哲学的大视野中去体认,从人学本体论意义上现代医学技术的价值理性,进一步澄清人们对医学技术无限崇拜的工具理性的错误认识;阐述了现代医学人文精神的内涵,认为以人为本,确立科学理性对医学技术的指导地位,适时约束医学技术行为应该成为现代医学人文精神的核心理念;提出了重塑现代医学人文精神的基本原则,即：坚持医学技术进步与人的全面发展相一致的原则,坚持医学技术进步与医学工作者道德健全相一致的原则,坚持医学进步与卫生事业持续、协调、健康发展相一致的原则。     

La motivation et son ancrage utilitaire/désirable dans l’évaluation

Motivation has an important place among the personal characteristics that professional assessors take in account. A first study shows that different professionals do not choose the same criteria to assess motivation and also shows that normative factors affect their judgement. Then a series of studies focuses on the valorization of intrinsic motivation and on the anchoring in utility / desirability of this attribution of value. It appears that, compared with extrinsically motivated applicants, intrinsically motivated applicants are rather described by judges with desirable traits than with utility traits. This result is found as well with professionals and non professional respondents. So it seems that the valorization of intrinsic motivation would be more anchored in desirability than in utility, which is a difference with the norm of internality that is clearly anchored in utility.     

A new formulation of the Principle of Indifference

The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. Later, the paper investigates some implications of the new principle of indifference. To conclude, a re-examination of the foundations of the so-called objective Bayesian inference is called for.     

Le renversement de préférence… renversé !

Preference reversal (PR) occurs when pairs of lottery gambles are evaluated under two different conditions: to choose the gamble preferred to play and assign minimum selling price to each gamble. The preference order is then reversed from one condition to another: while it receives the lowest selling price, the gamble less risked is preferred in condition of play. Many times replicated, this result is considered as a cognitive bias. Recent research suggests that it could be related only to the procedure used to present the gambles (i.e., the evaluation mode): either by pair (joint evaluation or JE) in condition of play, or one by one (separate evaluation or SE) in the pricing task. Then, by reversing the evaluation mode in each condition, PR should be reversed, as it is shown in this study: although the phenomenon still occurs when subjects evaluate gambles in the classical paradigm, we observe an inversion of PR when they have, on the one hand, to play in SE, and on the other hand, to sell in JE. Furthermore, an analysis not often used in this literature provides new elements, which can attest to the cognitive mechanisms underlying the phenomenon: by recording the online information (self-paced display time paradigm) we show the effect of an anchoring and adjustment process when riskiest gambles are preferred.