When (and When Not) to Make Exceptions: Links among Age,Precedent Setting Decisions,and Argument Evaluation

Negative precedents are set when, in the absence of mitigating conditions, social rules are not enforced by relevant authorities. This study examined the effects of normative (i.e., to enforce rules) and nonnormative arguments (i.e., to “make exceptions”) on decisions that could establish negative precedents and whether those effects differed for children and adolescents. As expected, on baseline problems, age correlated positively with decision-making performance. After receiving normative arguments, normative decisions increased and adolescents—but not preadolescents—transferred their understanding to novel problems. Nonnormative arguments led to decrements in normative decisions across ages. However, only for preadolescents did performance decrements following nonnormative arguments transfer to novel problems. Discussion focuses on the abilities to engage in “metacognitive intercession,” variability in children’s and adolescents’ decisions, and developments in the understanding of the consequences of violating the social rules.     

Children's Anticipated Responses to Hypothetical Peers With Undesirable Characteristics: Role of Peers' Desire to Change,Effort to Change,and Outcome

The authors explored the extent to which 5th- and 6th-grade students’ anticipated responses to hypothetical peers with undesirable characteristics (e.g., being overweight) are influenced by information that each peer (a) desired (or did not desire) to change the characteristic, (b) exerted effort (or did not exert effort) to change the characteristic, and (c) was successful (or unsuccessful) in changing the characteristic. In general, the children anticipated responding more favorably to peers who were successful in overcoming an undesirable characteristic than those who were unsuccessful. However, across both outcome conditions, peers who wanted to change and exerted effort to change were rated more favorably than were peers who reported no effort to change an undesirable characteristic, regardless of whether or not they had expressed a desire to change that characteristic. For peers whose failure to change an undesirable characteristic was associated with no effort to change, those who expressed a desire to change were rated more favorably than those who expressed no desire to change.     

Prior distributions for random choice structures

We study various axioms of discrete probabilistic choice, measuring how restrictive they are, both alone and in the presence of other axioms, given a specific class of prior distributions over a complete collection of finite choice probabilities. We do this by using Monte Carlo simulation to compute, for a range of prior distributions, probabilities that various simple and compound axioms hold. For example, the probability of the triangle inequality is usually many orders of magnitude higher than the probability of random utility. While neither the triangle inequality nor weak stochastic transitivity imply the other, the conditional probability that one holds given the other holds is greater than the marginal probability, for all priors in the class we consider. The reciprocal of the prior probability that an axiom holds is an upper bound on the Bayes factor in favor of a restricted model, in which the axiom holds, against an unrestricted model. The relatively high prior probability of the triangle inequality limits the degree of support that data from a single decision maker can provide in its favor. The much lower probability of random utility implies that the Bayes factor in favor of it can be much higher, for suitable data.     

I like you,I like you not: Understanding the formation of context-dependent automatic attitudes

Previous research has shown that automatic evaluations can be highly context dependent. Expanding on past research demonstrating context effects for existing attitudes toward familiar objects, the present research examined basic principles that guide the formation of context-dependent versus context-independent automatic attitudes. Results from four experiments showed that: (a) newly formed attitudes generalised to novel contexts when prior experiences with the attitude object were evaluatively homogeneous; (b) when prior experiences were evaluatively heterogeneous, automatic evaluations became context sensitive, such that they reflected the contingency between the valence of prior experiences and the context in which these experiences occurred; and (c) when prior experiences were evaluatively heterogeneous across different contexts, novel contexts elicited automatic evaluations that reflected the valence of first experiences with the attitude object. Implications for research on automatic evaluation and attitude change are discussed.     

The effect of object–valence relations on automatic evaluation

Two experiments tested the effect of co-occurrence of a target object with affective stimuli on automatic evaluation of the target when the relation between the target and the affective stimuli suggests that they have opposite valence. Participants learned about targets that ended an unpleasant noise or a pleasant music. The valence of such targets is opposite to the valence of the affective stimuli that co-occur with them. Participants reported preference for targets that ended noise over targets that ended music, but automatic evaluation measures revealed the opposite preference. This suggests that automatic evaluation is sensitive to co-occurrence between stimuli more than to the relation between the stimuli, and that relational information has a stronger influence on deliberate evaluation than on automatic evaluation. These conclusions support the associative-propositional evaluation model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), and add evidence regarding the sensitivity of the evaluative-conditioning effect to relational information.     

Examining the contextual and temporal stability of perceptions of emotional utility

The present research examined the degree to which perceptions of emotional utility are stable across contexts and over time. Self-reported perceptions of emotional utility and actual experience of emotion were measured in two samples of college students. In Study 1, participants were presented with two different types of goals (independent vs. interdependent) and were asked to rate the degree to which they found different types of emotions (e.g., appreciation, pride) useful in each context. In Study 2, participants completed daily online questionnaires in which they responded to questions assessing perceptions of emotional utility and actual affect in relation to personal goals. As predicted, across both samples, perceived utility of specific types of emotions was found to be associated with specific types of goals. Importantly, perceived utility of emotion was also found to be a relatively stable individual difference variable, even after taking into account the actual experience of emotion.     

The Effects of Need for Cognition and Need for Affect on Partisan Evaluations

The voting behavior literature has advanced two prominent theoretical models of partisanship: the social psychological and rational models. Implicit to both stylized models is the assumption that all partisans process information similarly. Yet, growing research in psychology suggests that individuals possess different motivations when evaluating information. We propose that the applicability of the stylized models of partisanship is conditioned on individuals' need for cognition (NFC) and need for affect (NFA), with the social psychological model being most applicable to individuals who have a high NFA and the rational model most applicable to those with a high NFC. To test this proposition, we fielded a survey in which respondents who identified with the two major political parties in the United States (Democrat or Republican) were randomly assigned factual information that depicted either their party or their opposing party in a negative light. Respondents were then asked to assess the actions of that party and subsequently evaluate both political parties. We find evidence that is generally consistent with the proposition that the stylized models of partisanship are conditionally dependent on the extent to which individuals possess a need to engage in effortful thinking or a need to seek out emotions.     

Process Evaluation of A Physical Activity Self-Management Program For Children: Spark

Abstract

SPARK is a controlled field study of a multi-component elementary school program to promote physical activity. One component is a weekly classroom-based self-management program, with the goal of increasing physical activity outside of school. The curriculum included goal setting, behavioral skills training, a reward system, and parent involvement. An evaluation of curriculum implementation and association between process and outcome was conducted using direct observation of lessons, subjective ratings by 24 teachers and 391 parents, and participation records of 549 students. Teachers viewed the self-management curriculum less positively than the physical education curriculum. Teachers were observed implementing an average of 65% of curriculum elements, which may have contributed to the limited effects of the self-management program. Student participation in the program, measured by points earned for doing out of school physical activity, was correlated significantly with changes in body mass index and multiple psychosocial variables among boys but not girls. Barriers to full program implementation were identified, and a remaining challenge is to improve self-management curriculum implementation by teachers.     

Imprecise Epistemic Values and Imprecise Credences

A number of recent arguments purport to show that imprecise credences are incompatible with accuracy-first epistemology. If correct, this conclusion suggests a conflict between evidential and alethic epistemic norms. In the first part of the paper, I claim that these arguments fail if we understand imprecise credences as indeterminate credences. In the second part, I explore why agents with entirely alethic epistemic values can end up in an indeterminate credal state. Following William James, I argue that there are many distinct alethic values that a rational agent can have. Furthermore, such an agent is rationally permitted not to have settled on one fully precise value function. This indeterminacy in value will sometimes result in indeterminacy in epistemic behaviour—that is, because the agent’s values aren’t settled, what she believes might not be.     

The Design and Evaluation of a Hope Enhancement Programme for Adults

The study evaluated the effectiveness of a hope enhancement programme for a group of adults and its impact on general psychological well-being. The intervention programme focused on participants' abilities to set feasible goals, planning ways to reach those goals (pathways) and increase determination and motivation (agency) to reach these goals. The workshop-format programme, consisted of six two-hour sessions conducted over five days. A pre and post-test design included an experimental group (n = 8), control group (n = 8) and ‘chat group’ (n = 8). Findings indicated that the programme increased hope levels of the experimental group as indicated by the Hope Scale and the Hopefulness Subscale of the Hunter Opinions and Personal Expectations Scale. Well-being also improved as indicated by a significant increase in sense of coherence along with a positive change in satisfaction with life. Recommendations for future research were made.