阿马蒂亚·森的分配正义观

阿马蒂亚·森的分配正义见解 ,以主体为中心 ,一方面强调分配上的能力本位 ,主张源头的产出保证 ;另一方面 ,注意分配是外部条件 ,提倡分配过程中的权利平等。这是对罗尔斯正义论的具体化 ,是从经济伦理学的视野对分配正义的新认识。但是对能力及其与效用关系的解释上 ,需要进一步完善。     

政府权能道德的理论探源

政府权能的道德基础和道德限度为西方无数思想家所关注 ,由此形成了流派各异的思想理论 ,主要有政府建立基于更大的善业的理性权能观、政府使命在于实现公平与正义的正义权能观、政府权力源于公民权利让渡的契约权能观和政府边界止于个人自由和权利的功利权能观。这些政府权能道德理论在今天仍有十分重要的启示意义。     

Biased extensive measurement: The homogeneous case

In the homogeneous case of one type of objects, we prove the existence of an additive scale unique up to a positive scaling transformation without transitivity of indifference and with a property of homothetic invariance weaker than monotonicity. The representation, which is a particular case of a semiorder representation, reveals a unique positive factor α?1 that biases extensive structures and explains departures from these standard axioms of extensive measurement (α=1). We interpret α as characterizing the qualitative influence of the underlying measurement process and we show that it induces a proportional indifference threshold.     

Causes of Allais common consequence paradoxes: An experimental dissection

The common consequence paradox of Allais can be decomposed into three simpler principles: transitivity, coalescing, and restricted branch independence. Different theories attribute such paradoxes to violations of restricted branch independence only, to coalescing only, or to both. This study separates tests of these two properties in order to compare these theories. Although rank-dependent utility (RDU) theories, including cumulative prospect theory (CPT), violate branch independence, the empirical pattern of violations is opposite that required by RDU theories to account for Allais paradoxes. Data also show systematic violations of coalescing, which refute RDU theories. The findings contradict both original and CPTs with or without their editing principles of combination and cancellation. Modal choices were well predicted by Birnbaum's RAM and TAX models with parameters estimated from previous data. The effects of event framing on these tests were also assessed and found to be negligible.     

Accuracy,Verisimilitude, and Scoring Rules

Suppose that beliefs come in degrees. How should we then measure the accuracy of these degrees of belief? Scoring rules are usually thought to be the mathematical tool appropriate for this job. But there are many scoring rules, which lead to different ordinal accuracy rankings. Recently, Fallis and Lewis [2016] have given an argument that, if sound, rules out many popular scoring rules, including the Brier score, as genuine measures of accuracy. I respond to this argument, in part by noting that the argument fails to account for verisimilitude—that certain false hypotheses might be closer to the truth than other false hypotheses are. Oddie [forthcoming], however, has argued that no member of a very wide class of scoring rules (the so-called proper scores) can appropriately handle verisimilitude. I explain how to respond to Oddie's argument, and I recommend a class of weighted scoring rules that, I argue, genuinely measure accuracy while escaping the arguments of Fallis and Lewis as well as Oddie.     

An ordinal evaluation of categorical judgement data by random utilities and a corresponding correlation analysis

Categorical judgement data are analyzed along the lines of random utility theory. A class of orders is introduced (categorical weak orders); their characteristic vectors are regarded as points in a Euclidean space; their convex hull forms a polytope whose facets are fully characterized. This polytope is shown to correspond to an order polytope. Furthermore, its relation to the biorder polytope is pointed out. The convex representations of a given point of the polytope are discussed. The impact of these results on the methods of analyzing data arising from a categorical judgement procedure is outlined. In particular, some consequences are drawn with respect to the usual evaluation of correlations of such data.     

Establishing sustainable strategies in urban underground engineering

Growth of urban areas, the corresponding increased demand for utility services and the possibility of new types of utility systems are overcrowding near surface underground space with urban utilities. Available subsurface space will continue to diminish to the point where utilidors (utility tunnels) may become inevitable. Establishing future sustainable strategies in urban underground engineering consists of the ability to lessen the use of traditional trenching. There is an increasing interest in utility tunnels for urban areas as a sustainable technique to avoid congestion of the subsurface. One of the principal advantages of utility tunnels is the substantially lower environmental impact compared with common trenches. Implementing these underground facilities is retarded most by the initial cost and management procedures. The habitual procedure is to meet problems as they arise in current practice. The moral imperative of sustainable strategies fails to confront the economic and political conflicts of interest. Municipal engineers should act as a key enabler in urban underground sustainable development.     

Thurstonian modeling of ranking data via mean and covariance structure analysis

Although Thurstonian models provide an attractive representation of choice behavior, they have not been extensively used in ranking applications since only recently efficient estimation methods for these models have been developed. These, however, require the use of special-purpose estimation programs, which limits their applicability. Here we introduce a formulation of Thurstonian ranking models that turns an idiosyncratic estimation problem into an estimation problem involving mean and covariance structures with dichotomous indicators. Well-known standard solutions for the latter can be readily applied to this specific problem, and as a result any Thurstonian model for ranking data can be fitted using existing general purpose software for mean and covariance structure analysis. Although the most popular programs for covariance structure analysis (e.g., LISREL and EQS) cannot be presently used to estimate Thurstonian ranking models, other programs such as MECOSA already exist that can be straightforwardly used to estimate these models.This paper is based on the author's doctoral dissertation. Ulf Böckenholt was my advisor. The author is indebted to Ulf Böckenholt for his comments on a previous version of this paper and to Gerhard Arminger for his extensive support on the use of MECOSA. The final stages of this research took place while the author was at the Department of Statistics and Econometrics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Conversations with my colleague there, Adolfo Hernández, helped to greatly improve this paper.     

How Should What Economists Call “Social Values” Be Measured?

Most economists and some philosophers distinguish individual utilities from interpersonal social values. Even if challenges to that conceptual distinction can be met, further philosophically interesting questions arise. I pursue three in this paper, using, as context for the discussion, health economics and its attempt to discern empirically a social welfare function to help guide rationing decisions. (1) To discern these utilities and values in a manner that is morally appropriate if they are to influence rationing decisions, who should be queried? To discern individual health state utilities, persons in precisely those states should be asked (generically, “patients”), but for social values, representatives of the general public should be. (2) To discern social values, what should representatives of the public be asked? They should be asked “person trade-off” (PTO) questions that encompass their own self-interest, not PTO questions that focus only on others. (3) What must public representatives understand before they respond to such questions? Despite the philosophically complex problem of patient adaptation, they should understand (among other things) the health state utilities elicited from actual patients with the conditions at issue.