Theorizing lived religion: introduction

ABSTRACT

The introduction to this special issue describes the emergence of the lived religion approach in relation to other approaches within the study of religion and sociology of religion as a way of going beyond the emphasis on texts and institutions, on the one hand, and the focus on the fate of religion in modern times, on the other hand. It also introduces the aim of this special issue, namely ‘theorizing’ lived religion. To do this, the authors summarize how the founders of this approach have conceptualized the topic of ‘lived religion’, adjacent approaches, and the theoretical underpinnings of their work. The authors propose three directions to develop the contribution a lived religion approach might make to theorizing: 1) explicating what is meant by ‘religion’ by drawing on work that studies religion as a category; 2) explicating how concepts and theories are developed based on lived religion research, with particular emphasis on the way tensions between modernist, disenchanting epistemologies and the enchanted, supernatural worlds of practitioners may inform theory and methodological reflection; 3) anchoring the doing of research, emphasizing the full research cycle in religious studies programs so that students have a solid basis for learning how to move back and forth between carrying out original research and conceptual/theoretical work.     

Revisiting the past and back to the future: Horizons of cognition and emotion research

ABSTRACT

To commemorate that Cognition & Emotion was established three decades ago, we asked some distinguished scholars to reflect on past research on the interface of cognition and emotion and prospects for the future. The resulting papers form the Special Issue on Horizons in Cognition and Emotion Research. The contributions to Horizons cover both the field in general and a diversity of specific topics, including affective neuroscience, appraisal theory, automatic evaluation, embodied emotion, emotional disorders, emotion-linked attentional bias, emotion recognition, emotion regulation, lifespan development, motivation, and social emotions. We hope that Horizons will spark constructive debates, while offering guidance for the future growth and development of research on the interface between cognition and emotion. Finally, we provide an update on how Cognition & Emotion has fared over the past year, and announce some changes in editorial policies and the editorial board.     

Where is the Fundamental Disagreement Between Naive Realism and Intentionalism?

This paper aims to reveal the source of the dispute between naive realism and intentionalism. To accomplish this task, it examines Adam Pautz’s challenge to naive realism, according to which a naive intuition about visual phenomenology, which is the only workable case for naive realism, is problematic. It argues that naive realists can address the challenge from Pautz by rejecting his assumption that naive realists and intentionalists agree on the nominal definition of visual phenomenology. The paper then argues that the reason naive realists want to preserve the naive intuition is its irresistibility rather than its reliability. Given this, it concludes that the disagreement between naive realism and intentionalism is rooted in what philosophical projects they tackle. Naive realists are engaged in the philosophical project of delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which the irresistible naive intuition can be true; the intentionalist philosophical project differs from it.     

Führt die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie in einen Relativismus?

This essay is a discussion of Eve-Marie Engels' view on Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). In the first part two of the main doctrines of EE are criticized: (1.) that validity of human knowledge is to be explained as the result of evolutionary adaptation; yet (2.), that human cognitive capacities had been adequate to our ancestors life conditions but fail in relevant situations of modern world. In the second part the concept of reality underlying EE's adaptational view is discussed and compared with Jean Piaget's concept of reality. Finally, it is held that some of the questions recently raised by proponents of EE, far from being new, have been dealt with already in historical epistemology.

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Diese Arbeit entstand im Rahmen des Projekts Nr. 11-2224.87 des Schweizerischen Nationalfonds.