Angels and devils: sadism and violence in children

This paper looks at violence and sadism in child and adolescent patients. Psychoanalytic and developmental ideas are brought together to make sense of these children’s presentations and the clinical challenges of therapeutic work with them. Differences are outlined between cold and hotter forms of aggression. The contribution of Glasser and his concept of the core complex is central to the paper, as is an understanding of addictive processes often seen in aggression, including sexual aggression.     

Bi‐ocularity,the functioning mind of the psychoanalyst

With the use of clinical material the author discusses the importance of a ‘bi‐ocular’ mode of attentiveness, one pole of which rests on the psychic process of reverie and the other on ‘analysing’. This is necessary to foster the development of a psychic space in which experiences which were ‘in the shadow’ or unrepresented, can come to the fore and be given shape first pictorially and later ideationally. This requires staying with and fostering the ambiguity of the different times and spaces without collapsing them into the clear, logical and explanatory. It requires the psychoanalyst to make space for that which is ‘other’, other than just apparently here and now, and other than just ‘you and me’, while maintaining the analytic ‘fire’ in a situation in which there is ‘no model in real life’, a place maximally geared to that which is not apparent.     

Accidentally True Beliefs and the Williamsonian Mental State of Knowing

In this paper, I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind (KSM). Using the fake barn case, I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determine whether the Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from certain other similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind (i.e., accidentally true beliefs). Then, some tentative externalist accounts of the supposed differences between the Williamsonian mental state of knowing and accidentally true beliefs will be critically assessed, implying that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson’s KSM thesis. Ultimately, I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising, which indicates that active externalism would be called for by Williamson’s KSM thesis.     

An Actor's Knowledge and Intent Are More Important in Evaluating Moral Transgressions Than Conventional Transgressions

An actor's mental states—whether she acted knowingly and with bad intentions—typically play an important role in evaluating the extent to which an action is wrong and in determining appropriate levels of punishment. In four experiments, we find that this role for knowledge and intent is significantly weaker when evaluating transgressions of conventional rules as opposed to moral rules. We also find that this attenuated role for knowledge and intent is partly due to the fact that conventional rules are judged to be more arbitrary than moral rules; whereas moral transgressions are associated with actions that are intrinsically wrong (e.g., hitting another person), conventional transgressions are associated with actions that are only contingently wrong (e.g., wearing pajamas to school, which is only wrong if it violates a dress code that could have been otherwise). Finally, we find that it is the perpetrator's belief about the arbitrary or non‐arbitrary basis of the rule—not the reality—that drives this differential effect of knowledge and intent across types of transgressions.     

The analysand and analyst team practicing reciprocal free association: Defenders and deniers

Abstract

By 1900, Freud had formulated an original and operational method of psychoanalytic treatment and research: the technique of free association. In 1912–1915 and later writings, he recommended it as a fundamental procedure and process, called the fundamental rule, in psychoanalytic therapy. In recent years, free association as a method has been variously misrepresented, misunderstood, and denied by some schools of psychoanalysis. This paper reviews the history of free associations and argues for upholding the continuity and relevance of Freud's fundamental methodology and for a renewal of interest in reciprocal, i.e., interactive and interpersonal, free association.     

Exact ferromagnetic ground state of pentagon chains

We model conducting pentagon chains with a multi-orbital Hubbard model and prove that well below half filling, exact ferromagnetic ground states appear. The rigorous method we use is based on the transformation of original hamiltonian into positive semidefinite form. This technique is independent of the spatial dimension and does not require integrability of the model. The obtained ferromagnetism is connected to dispersionless bands but in a much broader sense than flat-band ferromagnetism requires, where on every site a Hubbard term is present. In our case, only a small percentage of, even randomly distributed, sites are only interacting.     

Understanding coexistence of internal states in children and adults

We investigated the conceptualization of suffering and well-being states pertaining to physical and psychological domains by examining children's and adults’ acceptance of coexistence of two co-occurring internal states. Children and adults decided whether pairs of states may coexist, justified their answers, and reported whether they had personal experience of that. The pairs of states could involve same valence and different domain, different valence and different domain, and different valence and same domain. The results showed that acceptance, plausibility, complexity, and causality of justifications vary depending on age and/or type of state co-occurrence. The role of factors like cognitive processing, personal experience, and asymmetric organization of the constructs of valence and domain is discussed, in light of the applied relevance of the findings.     

Flat intentions – crazy dispositions?

Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions with strong internal conditions are capable of rationality. This paper explores in how far a broadly dispositional view of intention supports their claims. Its first point will come as a surprise: Intentions indeed involve dispositions toward follies in plenty. Natural objections against this bizarre-sounding claim are shown to fail, and standard counterfactual analyses of disposition locutions are shown to underpin it further. However, since the dispositions at issue are pro tanto dispositions, the consequences are not as odd as might be expected: When hedged by reasonable habits to reconsider one’s intentions, dispositions toward follies do not entail any actual crazy behavior. On balance, unconditional intention is therefore found rational after all. Dispositions toward crazy actions need not be crazy dispositions.     

Subjective distress associated with chronic stuttering

Stuttering is a chronic condition involving involuntary disruption to speech fluency. While elevated social anxiety has been found to be a risk factor for adults who have stuttered all their lives, it is unclear how stuttering influences other negative mood states such as interpersonal sensitivity and depressive mood. Consequently, controlled research was conducted that investigated negative affectivity across a number of domains in adults who stutter. Participants included 200 adults who have stuttered since childhood, with comparisons made to 200 non-stuttering controls of similar age and sex. The adults who stuttered were found to have significantly elevated levels of distress and negative mood states compared to the controls. As expected, significant differences were found for anxiety, however, significant and substantial differences were also found across a broad range of negative affect, including dimensions such as somatization, interpersonal sensitivity, depressive mood, hostility and paranoia. The implications of these findings for the better management of stuttering are discussed.Educational objectives: The reader will be able to describe: (a) the negative impact of a chronic disorder like stuttering on people who have stuttered all their life; (b) the factor structure of the SCL-90-R; (c) the negative affectivity construct, and (d) the difference between psychogenic theories of stuttering and neurological theories of stuttering.