Intended responses to romantic partners’ annoying behaviours vary with willpower beliefs

When a romantic partner behaves in an annoying way – for example, by leaving a mess – we might respond with frustration or understanding. Responses may vary with contextual factors, including whether the partner could be mentally fatigued or depleted. We hypothesized that limited willpower theorists – who believe self-control diminishes with use – might be especially likely to consider their partner’s preceding mental exertion. Two preregistered studies (combined N = 428) examined participants’ responses to four hypothetical scenarios. Limited theorists responded more compassionately to infractions performed after fatiguing days than to those performed after relaxing days; non-limited theorists responded more consistently, regardless of context. Beliefs about one’s own willpower, rather than beliefs about one’s partner’s willpower, can affect how people respond to their partner’s undesirable behaviours.     

Optimizing stress responses with reappraisal and mindset interventions: an integrated model

Background: The dominant perspective in society is that stress has negative consequences, and not surprisingly, the vast majority of interventions for coping with stress focus on reducing the frequency or severity of stressors. However, the effectiveness of stress attenuation is limited because it is often not possible to avoid stressors, and avoiding or minimizing stress can lead individuals to miss opportunities for performance and growth. Thus, during stressful situations, a more efficacious approach is to optimize stress responses (i.e., promote adaptive, approach-motivated responses).

Objectives and Conclusions: In this review, we demonstrate how stress appraisals (e.g., [Jamieson, J. P., Nock, M. K., & Mendes, W. B. (2012). Mind over matter: reappraising arousal improves cardiovascular and cognitive responses to stress. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(3), 417–422. doi:10.1037/a0025719]) and stress mindsets (e.g., [Crum, A. J., Salovey, P., & Achor, S. (2013). Rethinking stress: The role of mindsets in determining the stress response. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(4), 716–733. doi:10.1037/a0031201]) can be used as regulatory tools to optimize stress responses, facilitate performance, and promote active coping. Respectively, these interventions invite individuals to (a) perceive stress responses as functional and adaptive, and (b) see the opportunity inherent in stress. We then propose a novel integration of reappraisal and mindset models to maximize the utility and effectiveness of stress optimization. Additionally, we discuss future directions with regard to how stress responses unfold over time and between people to impact outcomes in the domains of education, organizations, and clinical science.     

Loneliness and inducing incremental theories of social interactions to produce adaptive change

College students (n = 388) participated in a two‐part online study (a survey and an experiment) examining the role of implicit theories in the experience of loneliness. Survey results revealed that lonely people tend to endorse entity theories of social competence and friendship. Experimental results showed that inducing an incremental theory of social competence reduced communication apprehension and increased social engagement among individuals regardless of their levels of loneliness. Inducing an incremental theory of friendship increased social engagement but did not influence the level of communication apprehension or social avoidance. Overall, the results suggest that an incremental theory of social interactions can reduce thoughts that are not conducive to fostering social connections among people in general, including lonely ones.     

Three decades of Cognition & Emotion: A brief review of past highlights and future prospects

Over the past three decades, Cognition & Emotion has been one of the world’s leading outlets for emotion research. In this article, we review past highlights of and future prospects for the journal. Our tour of history covers three periods: The first period, from 1987 to 1999, was a pioneering era in which cognitive theories began to be applied to the scientific analysis of emotion. The second period, from 2000 to 2007, was characterised by a sharp increase in the number of empirical research papers, a lot of which were concerned with automatic processing biases and their implications for clinical psychology. During the third period, from 2008 to 2017, a new focus emerged on self-regulatory processes and their implications for emotion. We then turn to the present profile of Cognition & Emotion and introduce our new editorial team. Finally, we consider how the journal’s future success can be continued and increased by a) providing authors with fast and high-quality feedback; b) offering attractive publication formats, including the newly introduced Registered Reports for pre-registered studies; and c) consolidating key methodological paradigms with reproducible findings.     

Why do we need perceptual content?

Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004 Travis, C. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind, 113, 57–94.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.     

A very obscure definition: Descartes’s account of love in the Passions of the Soul and its scholastic background

The definition of love given by Descartes in the Passions of the Soul (art. 79–84) has never stopped puzzling commentators. If the first Cartesian textbooks discreetly evoke or even fail to discuss Descartes’s account of love, Spinoza harshly criticizes it, pointing out that it is ‘on all hands admitted to be very obscure’. More recently several scholars have noticed the puzzling (or even paradoxical) character of the articles of the Passions of the Soul on love and hate. In this paper, I would like to propose a reassessment of the definition of love provided by the Passions of the Soul and the Letters to Elisabeth and Chanut. By tracing back Descartes’s scholastic sources (namely Aquinas’s treatises on the passions and charity in the Summa Theologiae), I will demonstrate how Descartes builds up his definition of love by displacing or subverting the meaning of several major elements of the thomistic vulgata on love. Hence, a significant part of the obscurity of the definition given by the Passions of the Soul possibly finds its ultimate rationale in this attempt to recover some traditional questions of the scholastic debate on love, while advancing new answers to them.     

A theory-based epistemology of modality

We have some justified beliefs about modal matters. A modal epistemology should explain what’s involved in our having that justification. Given that we’re realists about modality, how should we expect that explanation to go? In the first part of this essay, I suggest an answer to this question based on an analogy with games. Then, I outline a modal epistemology that fits with that answer. According to a theory-based epistemology of modality, you justifiably believe that p if (a) you justifiably believe a theory that says that p and (b) you believe p on the basis of that theory.     

Some Dare Call It Conspiracy: Labeling Something a Conspiracy Theory Does Not Reduce Belief in It

“Conspiracy theory” is widely acknowledged to be a loaded term. Politicians use it to mock and dismiss allegations against them, while philosophers and political scientists warn that it could be used as a rhetorical weapon to pathologize dissent. In two empirical studies conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I present an initial examination of whether this concern is justified. In Experiment 1, 150 participants judged a list of historical and speculative theories to be no less likely when they were labeled “conspiracy theories” than when they were labeled “ideas.” In Experiment 2 (N = 802), participants who read a news article about fictitious “corruption allegations” endorsed those allegations no more than participants who saw them labeled “conspiracy theories.” The lack of an effect of the conspiracy‐theory label in both experiments was unexpected and may be due to a romanticized image of conspiracy theories in popular media or a dilution of the term to include mundane speculation regarding corruption and political intrigue.     

Are good salespeople born or made? A new perspective on an age-old question: implicit theories of selling ability

Considering implicit theories in a sales context can provide a framework for better understanding salesperson motivation and behavior. The current research develops, tests, and examines the relevance of an Implicit Theories of Selling Ability (ITSA) measure, which measures the extent to which a person believes selling is an incremental (made) ability versus an entity (born) ability. After pre-testing the ITSA measure, two studies found an unfavorable pattern of outcomes associated with an entity belief of selling ability, consistent with research in other domains. Experimental validity for ITSA is demonstrated, thus supporting a direct relationship between ITSA and sales-relevant constructs, and suggesting manipulation of ITSA as a potential training intervention. This research extends past sales research on implicit theories by developing a sales-specific implicit theories measure and by examining goal orientations and behavior within the social-cognitive model (SCM). Conceptualizing sales performance behaviors from this SCM perspective reveals important considerations for both researchers and practitioners regarding salesperson hiring, training, and placement.