A relational recasting of the principles of emotional competence

ABSTRACT

Carolyn Saarni’s theory of emotional competence has made a central contribution by directing attention to some important functions of emotion in social interaction. Her work is permeated with examples of how emotions function within both successful and unsuccessful social interactions and relationships. An examination of her stated principles of emotional competence suggest in places a perspective that is primarily intrapsychic in nature, harking back to the early roots of emotion theory and research. In this piece, we note where Saarni has advanced implications of a relational theory of emotion for understanding emotional competence. In addition, we reframe some of Saarni’s principles to make them more consistent with current relational approaches to emotion. Finally, we offer additions and extensions that we believe are compatible with the general direction of her thinking before her untimely death.     

Unmasking a shady mirror effect: Recognition of normal versus obscured faces

Hockley, Hemsworth, and Consoli (1999) Hockley, W. E., Hemsworth, D. E. and Consoli, A. 1999. Shades of the mirror effect: Recognition of faces with and without sunglasses. Memory & Cognition, 27: 128–138. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] found that following the study of normal faces, a recognition test of normal faces versus faces wearing sunglasses produced a mirror effect: The sunglasses manipulation decreased hit rates and increased false-alarm rates. The stimuli used by Hockley et al. (1999) Hockley, W. E., Hemsworth, D. E. and Consoli, A. 1999. Shades of the mirror effect: Recognition of faces with and without sunglasses. Memory & Cognition, 27: 128–138. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] consisted of separate poses of models wearing or not wearing sunglasses. In the current experiments, we separately manipulated same versus different depictions of individual faces and whether or not the faces were partially obscured. The results of a simulation and four experiments suggest that the test-based, mirror effect observed by Hockley et al. (1999) Hockley, W. E., Hemsworth, D. E. and Consoli, A. 1999. Shades of the mirror effect: Recognition of faces with and without sunglasses. Memory & Cognition, 27: 128–138. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] is actually two separable effects.     

The science and meaning of the self

Scientists and practitioners alike invest in theorizing the self in psychology, but prioritize differently theoretical and practical objectives. Theorizing the self differs also when mapped onto the 'science versus art' debate, viewed historically and with reference to the philosophy of science. Jung's model of the psyche is compared and contrasted with social cognitive models of self-concept. Finally, some implications of social constructionism are considered.     

分类中相似性的理论与模型

相似性在分类的原型理论、样例理论、定义理论和理论解释观中都扮演着重要的角色。人们对相似性的研究由来已久,但是它在分类的领域中至今仍是一个相对模糊的概念,这部分地由于揭示相似性的真正机制将涉及到复杂的信息加工过程。本文以分类中的相似性为出发点介绍了近期相似性研究的一些理论与模型并在此基础上对概念和分类领域中的相似性研究进行了分析和总结。     

A Review Of Geraldine Jonçich's The Sane Positivist: A Biography Of Edward L. Thorndike

This book review, unfinished at the author's death, examines in historical context Thorndike's law of effect, his Animal Intelligence monograph of 1898, and related works on learning and behavior.     

Modeling modeling

Models are tools; they need to fit both the hand and the task. Presence or absence of a feature such as a pacemaker or a cascade is not in itself good. Or bad. Criteria for model evaluation involve benefit-cost ratios, with the numerator a function of the range of phenomena explained, goodness of fit, consistency with other nearby models, and intangibles such as beauty. The denominator is a function of complexity, the number of phenomena that must be ignored, and the effort necessary to incorporate the model into one's parlance. Neither part of the ratio can yet be evaluated for MTS, whose authors provide some cogent challenges to SET.     

Quality of life - three competing views

The aim of the present paper is to describe three different attempts, which have been made by philosophers, to define what quality of life is; and to spell out some of the difficulties that faces each definition. One, Perfectionism, focuses on the capacities that human beings possess: capacities for friendship, knowledge and creative activity, for instance. It says that the good life consists in the development and use of these capacities. Another account, the Preference Theory, urges that satisfying one's preferences, or desires, is what improves one's quality of life. And a third account, Hedonism, sees life-quality as consisting in the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The paper describes and evaluates objections to each of these views, thereby displaying their weaknesses and strengths. Since no view comes out as the right one there is a choice to be made. At the end of the paper it is being discussed how well each of the views cohere with different methodologies used in quality of life research. Also it is suggested that considerations about what the research is to be used for are relevant.     

Interresponse-time punishment: a basis for shock-maintained behavior.

Lever pressing of squirrel monkeys postponed brief electric shock according to a free-operant shock-postponement procedure. Pressing also produced shock with a probability proportional to the duration of the current interresponse time in some conditions, or to the fifth ordinally-preceding interresponse time in others. These conditions provided equal frequencies and temporal distributions of response-produced shocks either contingent on or independent of the current interresponse-time duration, respectively. Shock delivered contingent on the current interresponse-time duration resulted in shorter mean interresponse times and higher overall response rates that shock delivered independent of the current interresponse time. In subsequent conditions, response-produced shocks were sufficient to maintain responding following suspension of the postponement procedure only when those shocks were contingent on the current interresponse time. Presenting shock independent of the current interresponse time, conversely, suppressed response rate and ultimately led to cessation of responding in the absence of a conjoint shock-postponement procedure. These results demonstrate interresponse-time punishment in the absence of any indirect avoidance contingencies based on overall shock-frequency reduction, and strongly support similar interpretation at the more local level of shock-frequency reduction correlated with particular interresponse times. Differential punishment of long interresponse times also provides both an a priori basis for predicting whether a schedule of shock presentation will maintain or suppress responding and a framework for interpreting many of the functional relations between overall response rate and parameters of consequent shock presentation. Finally, these results and others indicate the importance of response-consequence contiguity above and beyong any notion of noncontiguous contingency in the control of behavior.     

On the Relation Between Religiosity and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories: The Role of Political Orientation

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory-driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta-analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian-dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need-related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.