Human observing: Maintained by stimuli correlated with reinforcement but not extinction

College students received points exchangeable for money (reinforcement) on a variable-time 60-second schedule that alternated randomly with an extinction component. Subjects were informed that responding would not influence either the rate or distribution of reinforcement. Instead, presses on either of two levers (“observing responses”) produced stimuli. In each of four experiments, stimuli positively correlated with reinforcement and/or stimuli uncorrelated with reinforcement were each chosen over stimuli correlated with extinction. These results are consistent with prior results from pigeons in supporting the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing and in not supporting the uncertainty-reduction hypothesis.     

Competing Conceptions of Diagnostic Reasoning – Is There a Way Out?

Diagnostic errors are more frequently a result of the clinician's failure to combine medical knowledge adequately than of data inaccuracy. Diagnostic reasoning studies are valuable to understand and improve diagnostic reasoning. However, most diagnostic reasoning studies are characterized by some limitations which make these studies seem more simple than diagnostic reasoning in real life situations actually is. These limitations are connected both to the failure to acknowledge components of knowledge used in clinical practice as well as to acknowledge the physician-patient relationship's influence on clinical knowledge and on the reasoning process itself. In addition the modes of reasoning described in these studies frequently is oversimplified. In this paper three simplistic and competing models of diagnostic reasoning are analyzed and criticized, followed by an evaluation of two alternative models proposing a combined view.     

Rat defensive behavior: burying noxious food.

In Experiment 1, rats living in chambers containing bedding material were injected with a toxicosis-producing dose of lithium chloride shortly after their initial taste of sweetened condensed milk. They consumed no additional milk and used the bedding to bury the spout through which the milk had been delivered, although they did not bury a concurrently available water spout. In another control condition, rats did not bury a spout containing a novel solution (saccharin) not paired with toxicosis. In Experiment 2, rats did not bury a milk spout until milk consumption was followed by toxicosis. In Experiment 3, rats buried a spout containing Tabasco pepper sauce but not a concurrently available water spout. Thus, burying the food source appears to be an integral component of the rat's defensive reaction to noxious food.     

Familiarity Bias and Belief Reversal in Relative Likelihood Judgment

People are often called on to make an assessment of the relative likelihood of events (e.g., which of two investments is more likely to outperform the market?) and their complements (which of the two investments is more likely to perform no better than the market?). Probability theory assumes that belief orderings over events and their complements should mirror each other (i.e., P(A) >/= P(B) iff P (not-A) 相似文献   

Rational Moral Ignorance

What should a person do when, through no fault of her own, she ends up believing a false moral theory? Some suggest that she should act against what the false theory recommends; others argue that she should follow her rationally held moral beliefs. While the former view better accords with intuitions about cases, the latter one seems to enjoy a critical advantage: It seems better able to render moral requirements ‘followable’ or ‘action-guiding.’ But this tempting thought proves difficult to justify. Indeed, whether it can be justified turns out to depend importantly on the rational status of epistemic akrasia. Furthermore, it can be argued, from premises all parties to the moral ignorance debate should accept, that rational epistemic akrasia is possible. If the argument proves successful, it follows that a person should sometimes act against her rationally held moral convictions.     

Sometimes inclusion breeds suspicion: Self‐uncertainty and belongingness predict belief in conspiracy theories

In the present contribution, the author investigated the idea that messages communicating inclusion by others lead to stronger conspiracy beliefs about impactful societal events than messages communicating exclusion by others. These effects of belongingness, however, were expected only among people who experience high levels of self‐uncertainty. In Study 1, a manipulation of belongingness predicted belief in conspiracy theories only among people with unstable self‐esteem (an individual difference indicator of self‐uncertainty), while controlling for self‐esteem level. In Study 2, a manipulation of belongingness influenced belief in conspiracy theories only among participants who were experimentally induced to feel uncertain about themselves. It is concluded that among self‐uncertain people, inclusion breeds suspicion about the causes of impactful and harmful societal events.     

风险来源与决策:背信规避现象及人际联结需求的作用

经典的风险决策研究及相关理论模型关注人们如何对以不同概率出现的损益结果进行评价与选择,但很少区分和探究在相同概率和损益值下不同风险来源对决策的影响。事实上,决策情境中的风险既可能源自客观因素,也可能源自人为因素。与相同大小的客观风险相比,人们更规避人为风险,这种现象被称为"背信规避"。本研究采用信任博弈任务,通过最小可接受概率法和决策选择法两种方式探讨风险来源对决策冒险性的影响。结果发现:(1)中国被试存在"背信规避"现象,即对人为风险的规避程度高于客观风险;(2)当恐惧情绪被唤起时,被试对人为风险的规避程度降低,使得背信规避现象消失,甚至出现"反背信规避"倾向;(3)人际联结需求影响背信规避,人为风险下人际联结需求中介了恐惧情绪对决策冒险性的影响。上述结果有助于加深我们对风险来源影响决策的现象及其机制的理解。     

Eyes on the Prize? Evidence of Diminishing Attention to Experienced and Foregone Outcomes in Repeated Experiential Choice

Recently, there has been increased interest in decisions‐from‐experience (where decision makers learn from observing the outcomes of previous choices), which provide valuable insights into the learning and preference construction processes underlying many daily decisions. Several process models have been developed to capture these processes, and while such models often fit the data well, many assume that the decision maker is a vigilant observer, processing each outcome. In two studies, we provide a critical test of this assumption using eye tracking to record directed visual attention when participants choose repeatedly among two options, each time being shown the outcome for their chosen option and for the foregone option. Consistently, we find that the vigilance assumption is not supported, with decision makers often not attending to outcome information. Moreover, (in)attention to outcomes is predictable, with vigilance decreasing as more choices are made, and being greater for obtained than for foregone outcomes, and when options deliver only gains as opposed to losses or a mixture of gains and losses. Furthermore, we find that this variation in attentional allocation plays a central role in the apparent indecisiveness (inconsistency) in choice, with increased attention to foregone outcomes predicting switches to that option on the next choice. Together, these findings highlight the value of eye tracking in investigations of decisions‐from‐experience, providing novel insight into the cognitive processes underlying them. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.