Intolerance of Uncertainty as a Contributor to Fear and Avoidance Symptoms of Panic Attacks

Panic disorder symptoms are persistent for 50–80% of cases even after treatment, resulting in experiences of disability and dissatisfaction in life. Previous research has focused on anxiety sensitivity (AS) and its dimensions as contributing to symptoms of panic disorder; however, recent research has suggested that intolerance of uncertainty (IU)—the tendency for a person to consider the possibility of a negative event occurring as threatening, irrespective of the actual probability of its occurrence—may also play a critical role. The current study was designed to assess the specific relationships between dimensions of IU (i.e. prospective IU and inhibitory IU) and the fear and avoidance symptoms associated with panic disorder. Participants included 122 community members (81% women) with a history of at least one panic attack who participated in a larger study on fear. Participants completed measures of AS, IU, and panic disorder symptoms. Correlation and regression analyses supported a significant and substantial relationship between AS, inhibitory IU, and panic disorder symptoms. Inhibitory IU accounted for relatively more variance in avoidance symptoms related to panic disorder than did the fears of physical sensations dimension of AS. As such, further investigation of the role of IU in panic disorder symptoms appears warranted. Comprehensive results, implications, and directions for future research are discussed.     

Cognitive risk factors explain the relations between neuroticism and social anxiety for males and females

The hierarchical model of vulnerabilities to emotional distress contextualizes the relation between neuroticism and social anxiety as occurring indirectly through cognitive risk factors. In particular, inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty (IU; difficulty in uncertain circumstances), fear of negative evaluation (FNE; fear of being judged negatively), and anxiety sensitivity (AS) social concerns (fear of outwardly observable anxiety) are related to social anxiety. It is unclear whether these risk factors uniquely relate to social anxiety, and whether they account for the relations between neuroticism and social anxiety. The indirect relations between neuroticism and social anxiety through these and other risk factors were examined using structural equation modeling in a sample of 462 individuals (M age = 36.56, SD = 12.93; 64.3% female). Results indicated that the relations between neuroticism and social anxiety could be explained through inhibitory IU, FNE, and AS social concerns. No gender differences were found. These findings provide support for the hierarchical model of vulnerabilities to emotional distress disorders, although the cognitive risk factors accounted for variance beyond their contribution to the relation between neuroticism and social anxiety, suggesting a more complex model than that expressed in the hierarchical model of vulnerabilities.     

The Seller's Sense: Buying–Selling Perspective Affects the Sensitivity to Expected Value Differences

Previous work comparing pricing decisions by buyers and sellers has primarily focused on the endowment effect, the phenomenon that selling prices exceed buying prices. Here, we examine whether pricing decisions by buyers and sellers also vary in sensitivity to differences between objects' expected values (EVs). Both a loss‐aversion account (which posits that losses are weighted more heavily than gains) and a loss‐attention account (which posits increased attention to a task when it involves possible losses) predict that pricing decisions by sellers should exhibit higher sensitivity. The latter, however, additionally predicts that this pattern should only emerge under certain conditions. In studies 1 and 2, we reanalyzed two published datasets in which participants priced monetary lotteries as sellers or buyers. It emerged that sellers showed greater EV sensitivity (defined as the rank correlation between the set price for each lottery and its EV) except in a condition with an extended deliberation time of 15 seconds. In study 3, the buyer–seller difference in EV sensitivity was replicated even when the pricing task was presented repeatedly, while in study 4, it was eliminated when buying and selling trials were randomly mixed. The reduction of the “seller's sense” in long deliberation and mixed trials settings supports an attentional resource‐based account of the differences between sellers and buyers in their EV sensitivity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Encouraging Prosocial Decisions: The Role of Fairness Salience and Uncertainty

Although the decision to engage in prosocial behavior has received research attention, the literature offers a limited understanding of fairness and uncertainty as antecedents. We propose that one can encourage prosocial decision making simply by invoking the notion of fairness because of its effects on the perceived trustworthiness of the invoking party. We also elucidate the complex role of uncertainty in prosocial decisions in that it has a negative effect while also serving to strengthen the positive effect of fairness salience. Our ideas are tested in two prosocial decision contexts, including participative pricing (i.e., “pay what you want”) and charitable giving. Data from an archival study of a naturally occurring event and two controlled experiments offer support for our arguments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

澳门人少涉赌是规避风险还是规避后悔？

是风险规避还是后悔规避左右人们的冒险行为？基于风险行为跨领域特殊性,本研究假设：决策者是规避风险还是规避后悔具有领域特异性。本研究选取有涉赌经验的澳门居民为样本,以其参与13种博彩的次数为指标考察其真实风险行为。结果验证了上述假设,风险规避说或后悔规避说都不能单独解释个体的风险倾向,个体是风险规避、后悔规避,或二者皆有,取决于其所处的具体风险情境类别。该发现有助于加深对风险行为特征的认识,亦可为预防及应对问题赌博提供启发和指导。     

"I had so much it didn't seem fair": Eight-year-olds reject two forms of inequity

Research using economic games has demonstrated that adults are willing to sacrifice rewards in order to prevent inequity both when they receive less than a social partner (disadvantageous inequity) and when they receive more (advantageous inequity). We investigated the development of both forms of inequity aversion in 4- to 8-year-olds using a novel economic game in which children could accept or reject unequal allocations of candy with an unfamiliar peer. The results showed that 4- to 7-year-olds rejected disadvantageous offers, but accepted advantageous offers. By contrast, 8-year-olds rejected both forms of inequity. These results suggest that two distinct mechanisms underlie the development of the two forms of inequity aversion.     

Subjective expected utility without preferences

This paper proposes a theory of subjective expected utility based on primitives only involving the fact that an act can be judged either “attractive” or “unattractive”. We give conditions implying that there are a utility function on the set of consequences and a probability distribution on the set of states such that attractive acts have a subjective expected utility above some threshold. The numerical representation that is obtained has strong uniqueness properties.     

Looking back versus looking ahead: framing of time and work at different stages of a project

Progress on a well‐defined project can be described along a task dimension in terms of amount done, or as amount of work still to be completed. Time‐limited projects can also be described on a temporal dimension in terms of time spent versus time left. Five experiments are reported showing that such frames have predictable implications for speakers as well as for listeners: Statements by a team leader about time spent and work left are perceived as suggestions to “hurry up,” whereas complementary statements about work done and time left indicate that the team can take it more easy. The first set of statements further implies that the team is behind schedule, whereas the last two statements suggest that the team is ahead of the plan. In line with this, speakers preferred work done and time left statements when they were ahead of schedule, but not when they were behind. “Hurry up” and “behind schedule” interpretations were also shown to be dependent upon stage, being more prominent in the final stages than during the initial stages of a project. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Financial Constraints Influence Consumer Behavior: An Integrative Framework

Financial constraints are economic limitations on behavior. Given that millions of people experience chronic or episodic financial constraints, we sought to review research that provides insight into how they affect consumer behavior. We propose an integrative framework that draws insights from multiple literatures that have examined financial constraints from different perspectives. The framework distinguishes between four perspectives, which are rooted in literatures on resource scarcity, choice restriction, social comparison, and environmental uncertainty and highlights different temporal stages of responding to financial constraints, distinguishing between reacting, coping, and adapting. Beyond the obvious negative effects of financial constraints, our framework emphasizes consumer resilience, highlighting that consumers often successfully cope with and devise adaptive strategies to deal with financial constraints. By broadening the behavioral and temporal scope of financial constraints considered within consumer psychology, this framework helps us to understand the often strong and sometimes counterintuitive effects of financial constraints on consumer behavior.