全文获取类型
收费全文 | 229篇 |
免费 | 11篇 |
国内免费 | 5篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 4篇 |
2021年 | 3篇 |
2020年 | 10篇 |
2019年 | 7篇 |
2018年 | 7篇 |
2017年 | 13篇 |
2016年 | 10篇 |
2015年 | 8篇 |
2014年 | 1篇 |
2013年 | 33篇 |
2012年 | 4篇 |
2011年 | 5篇 |
2010年 | 8篇 |
2009年 | 12篇 |
2008年 | 13篇 |
2007年 | 17篇 |
2006年 | 15篇 |
2005年 | 12篇 |
2004年 | 10篇 |
2003年 | 13篇 |
2002年 | 8篇 |
2001年 | 3篇 |
2000年 | 5篇 |
1999年 | 6篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 3篇 |
1996年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 3篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有245条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
81.
Harjit Bhogal 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(3):447-460
There is a tension in our theorizing about laws of nature: our practice of using and reasoning with laws of nature suggests that laws are universal generalizations, but if laws are universal generalizations then we face the problem of explanatory circularity. In this paper I elucidate this tension and show how it motivates a view of laws that I call Minimal Anti-Humeanism. This view says that the laws are the universal generalizations that are not grounded in their instances. I argue that this view has a variety of advantages that could make it attractive to people with both Humean and anti-Humean inclinations. 相似文献
82.
Timothy O'Connor 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(4):436-448
Abstract: Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves is a rhetorically powerful but philosophically unconvincing attempt to show that a deterministic and ontologically reductionist, but epistemologically pluralist, outlook may peacefully coexist with a robust acceptance of human freedom and moral responsibility. The key to understanding the harmony rests in recognizing that freedom is not a metaphysical or physical condition but is instead a product of deeply embedded social practices. I argue that Dennett's project rests on an unargued and implausible deflationary stance toward basic metaphysics. 相似文献
83.
WILLIAM RAMSEY 《Metaphilosophy》2006,37(1):53-73
A popular argument supporting functionalism has been what is commonly called the “multiple realizability” argument. One version of this argument uses thought experiments designed to show that minds could be composed of different types of material. This article offers a metaphilosophical analysis of this argument and shows that it fails to provide a strong case for functionalism. The multiple realizability argument is best understood as an inference‐to‐the‐best‐explanation argument, whereby a functionalist account of our mental concepts serves to explain our multiple realizability intuitions. I show that the argument is inadequate because alternative accounts of our mental concepts exist that provide equally plausible explanations for these intuitions. Moreover, in the case of our qualia concepts, a nonfunctionalist account explains several other intuitions that functionalism cannot explain. Thus, despite its popularity, the intuition‐based version of the multiple realizability argument is a poor reason for accepting functionalism. 相似文献
84.
Keld Stehr Nielsen 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(1):139-163
Summary Applying the concepts of dynamical systems theory to explain cognitive phenomena is still a fairly recent trend in cognitive science and its potential and consequences are not nearly mapped out. A decade ago, dynamical approaches were introduced as a paradigm shift in cognitive science and in this paper I concentrate on how to substantiate this claim. After having considered and rejected the possibility that continuous time is the crucial factor, I present Kelso’s model of a near-cognitive phenomenon which invokes self-organization as the guiding principle. Then, the explanatory strategy implicit in this approach is explicated and its underlying assumption presented. Finally, I discuss how we should characterize this explanatory framework using the notion of emergence. 相似文献
85.
Henk G. Geertsema 《Zygon》2006,41(2):289-328
Abstract. The idea of cyborg often is taken as a token for the distinction between human and machine having become irrelevant. In this essay I argue against that view. I critically analyze empirical arguments, theoretical reflections, and ultimate convictions that are supposed to support the idea. I show that empirical arguments at this time rather point in a different direction and that theoretical views behind it are at least questionable. I also show that the ultimate convictions presupposed deny basic tenets of traditional Christianity, while their claim to be based on science confuses scientific results with their interpretation on the basis of a naturalistic world‐view. 相似文献
86.
William C. Wimsatt 《Synthese》2006,151(3):445-475
Methodological reductionists practice ‘wannabe reductionism’. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as “reductionist”. “Successional reduction” and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific problem-solving heuristics for constructing inter-level mechanistic explanations show why and when they can provide powerful and fruitful tools and insights, but sometimes lead to erroneous results. I show how traditional metaphysical approaches fail to engage how science is done. The methods used do so, and support a pragmatic and non-eliminativist realism. 相似文献
87.
De-Ontologizing the Debate on Social Explanations: A Pragmatic Approach Based on Epistemic Interests
In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading
for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences—refining the conceptual tools of social scientists—and
less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation
and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation
in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation,
and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating
a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.
相似文献
Erik WeberEmail: |
88.
The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis
is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which
empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates
on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causal–explanatory inference
will make it easier to resist the thesis of underdetermination. For, if we are not restricted to inference to the best explanation
only at the level of major theories, we will be able to acknowledge that there is a structure in data sets which imposes serious
constraints on possible theoretical alternatives. We describe how Differential Inference, a form of inference based on contrastive
explanation, can be used in order to generate causal hypotheses. We then go on to consider how experimental manipulation of
differences can be used to achieve Difference Closure, thereby confirming claims of causal efficacy and also eliminating possible
confounds. The model of Differential Inference outlined here shows at least one way in which it is possible to ‘reason from
the phenomena’. 相似文献
89.
Karl E. Peters 《Zygon》2003,38(2):333-354
Much good work has been done on the evolution of human morality by focusing on how “selfish genes” can give rise to altruistic human beings. A richer research program is needed, however, to take into account the ambivalence of naturally evolved biopsychological motivators and the historical pluralism of human morality in religious systems. Such a program is described here. A first step is to distinguish the ultimate cause of natural selection from proximate causes that are the results of natural selection. Next, some proximate causes are suggested as possible conditions of biological and emotional valuing as well as of customary social morality and individual rational ethical thought. Finally, different moral perspectives of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity are briefly presented in order to illustrate how one might inquire about the selection of a variety of biopsychological and cultural proximate causes that enable the evolution of a plurality of religious moral systems. 相似文献
90.
John F. Haught 《Zygon》2003,38(4):769-782
Abstract. This essay is based on a lecture delivered at the 2002 IRAS Star Island conference, the theme of which was “Is Nature Enough? The Thirst for Transcendence.” I had been asked to represent the position of those who would answer No to the question. I thought it would stimulate discussion if I presented my side of the debate in a somewhat provocative manner rather than use a more ponderous approach that would argue each point in a meticulous and protracted fashion. Here I lay out a theological position that finds naturalism wanting in three ways: in terms of human spiritual needs, in terms of the mind's need for deep explanation, and in terms of the perennial human search for truth. Again, the style of presentation, like that of the original lecture, prohibits the kind of philosophical development that an adequate answer to each of the issues requires. The purpose is that of evoking discussion on a most important question. 相似文献