Is the brain a memory box?

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.     

Explanation and the Hard Problem

This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the ‘sense of understanding’ that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case against it being a necessary condition, and work by J.D. Trout that exploits psychological research on the hindsight and overconfidence biases is used to show that it is not a sufficient condition. It is argued, however, that certain intellectual and moral concerns give us good reason to still try to meet the hard problem’s explanatory challenge, despite its extrascientific nature.     

合作数学问题解决与心理模型建构关系研究

合作学习研究者很早就开始关注合作互动中解释的作用。Chi关于自我解释的研究表明解释是一种非常有效果的学习现象,能够起到修补和建立学习者的心理模型的作用。本研究以28名高一学生为被试,采取了两种程序的合作学习任务,研究中虽然没有发现两种程序在问题解决结果上的显著差异,但是却表现出在心理模型建构方面互动效果上的差异,或表现为同等效果下的互动次数有显著性差异。     

THE MODERN STUDY OF MYTH AND ITS RELATION TO SCIENCE

The history of the modern study of myth can be divided into two main categories: that which sees myth as the primitive counterpart to natural science, itself considered overwhelmingly modern, and that which sees myth as almost anything but the primitive counterpart to natural science. The first category constitutes the nineteenth‐century approach to myth. The second category constitutes the twentieth‐century approach. Tylor and Frazer epitomize the nineteenth‐century view. Malinowski, Eliade, Bultmann, Jonas, Camus, Freud, and Jung epitomize the twentieth‐century approach. The question for the twenty‐first century is whether myth can be brought back to the physical world, but in a way compatible with science. The case of the myth of Gaia will be considered as a possible way of doing so.     

Teaching Early Modern Philosophy as a Bridge between Causal or Naturalistic and Conceptual Thought

It is a challenge in teaching early modern philosophy to balance historical faithfulness to the arguments and concerns of early modern philosophers and interpreting them as relevant to the kinds of thinking that contemporary undergraduate students find plausible. Early modern philosophy is unique, however, in applying modern scientific method directly to problems concerning nonphysical aspects of reality that our contemporary scientific thought, and with it mainstream contemporary culture, no longer find amenable in their own, independent right to reliable reasoned approaches. At the same time, early modern philosophy often also takes seriously purely conceptual or logically consequential thought in the investigation of these topics, as our mainstream contemporary culture does not. This kind of thought, we argue, is distinctive of philosophy in general and appropriate to nonphysical aspects of reality. Early modern philosophy, then, offers a bridge between the kind of reasoned, objective thought our mainstream culture finds plausible and thought about nonphysical reality or, in general, the thought that characterizes philosophy.     

THE ULTIMATE INSIGHT: THE PATIENT'S AWARENESS OF MOTHER'S FILICIDAL WISHES

The author reviews myths and traditional tales in which the protagonist is a filicidal mother. In a displaced form, filicidal mothers appear as the ubiquitous witches of folklore. This imago is universal in fantasies and pavor nocturnus in children, regardless of the quality of care of the real maternal figures. To this phenomenon—the result of defensive externalization of primitive fears—a fundamental dimension is added when this dread seems corroborated by the mother's manifestly murderous wishes and behavior. Clinical examples of this pathogenic circumstance are provided, with comments on the development of dissociation versus repression, depending on the severity of early traumas. The evolution of symptoms and character disorder in adulthood is discussed, as well as interpretive and technical dilemmas posed by these patients.     

How Do Logics Explain?

Anti-exceptionalists about logic maintain that it is continuous with the empirical sciences. Taking anti-exceptionalism for granted, we argue that traditional approaches to explanation are inadequate in the case of logic. We argue that Andrea Woody's functional analysis of explanation is a better fit with logical practice and accounts better for the explanatory role of logical theories.     

What is special about indexical attitudes?

In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it to share someone else’s indexical attitudes without rejecting some plausible thesis about propositional attitudes. In the end, I assess Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever’s considerations on intentional action and extract an argument from them that could – if successful – neutralize my own. I finish by arguing that their argument has an important flaw, thus failing to convince us that indexical attitudes are just as ordinary as any other.