全文获取类型
收费全文 | 541篇 |
免费 | 83篇 |
国内免费 | 43篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 12篇 |
2022年 | 13篇 |
2021年 | 8篇 |
2020年 | 27篇 |
2019年 | 32篇 |
2018年 | 37篇 |
2017年 | 37篇 |
2016年 | 39篇 |
2015年 | 21篇 |
2014年 | 21篇 |
2013年 | 81篇 |
2012年 | 32篇 |
2011年 | 15篇 |
2010年 | 12篇 |
2009年 | 27篇 |
2008年 | 29篇 |
2007年 | 42篇 |
2006年 | 25篇 |
2005年 | 22篇 |
2004年 | 19篇 |
2003年 | 36篇 |
2002年 | 11篇 |
2001年 | 9篇 |
2000年 | 11篇 |
1999年 | 9篇 |
1998年 | 3篇 |
1997年 | 5篇 |
1996年 | 7篇 |
1995年 | 3篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 2篇 |
1988年 | 5篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 1篇 |
1983年 | 1篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
1979年 | 3篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有667条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
61.
Igor Douven 《Journal of Cognitive Psychology》2016,28(8):1004-1012
There is evidence that people update their credences partly on the basis of explanatory considerations. Philosophers have recently argued that to minimise the inaccuracy of their credences, people's updates also ought to be partly based on such considerations. However, there are many ways in which explanatory considerations can factor into updating, not all of which minimise inaccuracy. It is an open question whether in their updating, people take explanatory considerations into account in a way that philosophers would deem recommendable. To address this question, we re-analyse data from an experiment reported in Douven and Schupbach, “The role of explanatory considerations in updating” (Cognition, 2015). 相似文献
62.
63.
用户换位型思维是创业者进行机会识别并应对市场竞争的重要因素,但已有研究忽视了其模式、形成机理及对机会信念绩效的影响。针对此问题,基于结构映射理论与注意力参与模型解构用户换位型思维模式,包括吸收式、归纳式、启发式和分析式;然后,从“个体-用户”双元视角探讨与用户有关的先验知识、灵活的角色导向、认知复杂性以及用户需求不确定性和碎片化等因素对用户换位型思维形成的正向影响;最后,以机会信念形成速度和创新性为绩效指标,阐释用户换位型思维模式对机会信念形成绩效的影响,并考察适应新的信息环境和调用自身知识结构的认知管理策略对用户换位型思维模式与机会信念形成绩效的调节作用。研究结论将丰富用户换位型思维的内涵,拓展结构映射理论与注意力参与模型的解释范围,也为指导创业者运用用户换位型思维去识别机会提供参考,对创业者思考与理解用户有重要意义。 相似文献
64.
Leonard Adelman Terry A. Bresnick Matthew Christian James Gualtieri David Minionis 《决策行为杂志》1997,10(4):327-342
The results reported herein support the hypotheses that (1) situation-specific, contextual features of a task can cause people to use explanation-based reasoning (Pennington and Hastie, 1993); (2) such reasoning can cause experienced personnel, both individually and in two-person teams, to reinterpret the meaning of the same information when it is presented in two different ordered sequences; and (3) the result will be primacy or recency (or no) effects depending on whether the most recent conflicting information can be explained away or not, respectively. These results extend the belief-adjustment model proposed by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), which does not address information reinterpretations, and always predicts recency effects for an evaluation task with a short series of conflicting information. More generally, the results demonstrate the importance of situation-specific, contextual features in understanding judgment processes. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
65.
We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them. 相似文献
66.
Arzoo Rafiqi 《Journal for the scientific study of religion》2019,58(3):689-706
The incompatibility of Islam with democracy has been the focal point of many public and scholarly debates. However, very few studies have attempted to investigate empirically whether the followers of Islam are less favorable to democracy than the followers of Christianity. This study extends previous research by conducting empirical and representative analyses of whether Muslims in general and religious and practicing Muslims in particular prefer democracy less than their Christian counterparts. Using country fixed effects regression and data from the World Values Survey (WVS6) that include 52,326 Muslims and Christians, the analyses show that Muslims in general, as well as religious and practicing Muslims, endorse democracy to the same extent as do Christians. Thereby, this study is the first to provide comparative, individual‐level evidence of the influence these religions may have on democratic attitudes. 相似文献
67.
Maiya Jordan 《Ratio》2019,32(2):122-130
According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P. 相似文献
68.
Claudia Blser 《Ratio》2019,32(3):205-214
I argue for a novel answer to the question “What is hope?”. On my view, rather than aiming for a compound account, i.e. analysing hope in terms of desire and belief, we should understand hope as an irreducible concept. After criticizing influential compound accounts of hope, I discuss Segal and Textor's alternative of describing hope as a primitive mental state. While Segal and Textor argue that available developments of the standard definition do not offer sufficient conditions for hope, I question the deep‐seated idea that desire and belief are even necessary conditions for hope. My suggestion is that we should take seriously the fact that we hope in a great variety of ways and should question the search for elements that are common to all cases. A promising alternative follows the Wittgensteinian idea that cases of hope are related in terms of family resemblance, i.e. are multiply realizable on the ontological level while falling under the non‐definable concept of hope. 相似文献
69.
Pierre Le Morvan 《Ratio》2019,32(1):22-31
An ingenious argument – we may call it the Argument from Excuse – purports to show that the Standard View of Ignorance is false and the New View of Ignorance is true. On the former, ignorance is lack of knowledge; on the latter, ignorance is lack of true belief. I defend the Standard View by arguing that the Argument from Excuse is unsound. I also argue that an implication of my case is that Factual Ignorance Thesis (FIT) is false. According to FIT, whenever an agent A acts from factual ignorance, A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the act only if A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the ignorance from which A acts. 相似文献
70.
Chan Jean Lee 《决策行为杂志》2019,32(2):140-151
Many students and applicants take multiple‐choice tests to demonstrate their competence and achievement. When they are unsure, they guess the most likely answer to maximize their score. Despite the impact of guessing on test reliability and individual performance, studies have not examined how patterns of answer sequences in multiple‐choice tests affect guessing. This research presents the test taker's fallacy, which refers to an individual's tendency to expect a different answer to appear for the next question given a run of the same answer choices. The test taker's fallacy exhibits negative recency, similar to the gambler's fallacy. However, extending the sequential judgment literature, the test taker's fallacy shows that negative recency arises even when sequences may or may not be randomly generated. In three studies, including a survey and experiments, the test taker's fallacy is robustly observed. The test taker's fallacy is consistent with the operation of the representativeness heuristic. This research explains what and how test takers guess given a streak of answers and extends judgment under uncertainty to the test‐taking context. 相似文献