西方关于儿童欺骗研究的新进展

欺骗是指意图培养他人的错误信念,以至于使他人产生错误或进入误区的行为。本文介绍了西方关于儿童欺骗研究的新进展,其中包括欺骗与说谎的区别,欺骗的理论假设、相关研究,以及儿童欺骗研究的焦点和现存问题。     

儿童欺骗的情境依赖

采用竞争游戏的方式研究3～6岁儿童在外显和隐蔽情境里的欺骗。结果表明4、5岁儿童行为上的隐蔽欺骗和错误信念理解显著相关;3岁儿童语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）和错误信念理解显著相关;各年龄段儿童行为上的外显欺骗和错误信念理解没有显著相关。和Cartson（1998）的研究结果不一致的是,本研究中4、5、6岁儿童的隐蔽欺骗人数显著超过外显欺骗人数。结果提示,语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）不仅和儿童的执行功能有关,还可能和欺骗时的情境压力有关。     

纳西族和汉族儿童情绪理解能力的发展

选取3～5岁的纳西族儿童107人,3～5岁的汉族儿童90人,使用情绪理解任务系统地考察了他们情绪理解的发展,同时还测量了两个民族儿童的错误信念理解和语言能力。结果表明,两个民族儿童情绪理解能力具有相似的发展规律,但完成各任务的成绩有显著差异,提示了两个民族儿童情绪理解能力发展的不同步性。研究还发现,心理理论社会知觉成分与认知成分随年龄的增长相互促进和相互制约,并且都与语言能力有关。     

In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief

Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief.     

An agentive non-intentionalist theory of self-deception

The self-deception debate often appears polarized between those who think that self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves (‘intentionalists’), and those who think that intentional actions are not significantly involved in the production of self-deceptive beliefs at all. In this paper I develop a middle position between these views, according to which self-deceivers do end up self-deceived as a result of their own intentional actions, but where the intention these actions are done with is not an intention to deceive oneself. This account thus keeps agency at the heart of self-deception, while also avoiding the paradox associated with other agency-centered views.     

FAITH,BELIEF, AND THE COMPATIBILITY OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Recent attacks on the compatibility of science and religion by the “militant modern atheists” (Jerry Coyne, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens) have posed serious challenges for anyone who supports the human importance of religious faith (particularly their identification of “faith” with “believing without evidence”). This article offers a critical analysis of their claims compared with those who do not equate faith with belief. I conclude that (i) the militant modern atheist interpretation of faith undervalues transformative religious experiences, (ii) that more people of faith hold it for this reason than their opponents acknowledge, and (iii) that meaningful dialogue between religion and science is both possible and desirable.     

Beliefs as signals: A new function for belief

Beliefs serve at least two broad functions. First, they help us navigate the world. Second, they serve as signals to manipulate others. Philosophers and psychologists have focused on the first function while largely overlooking the second. This article advances a conception of signals and makes a prima facie case for a social signaling function for at least some beliefs. Truth and rational support are often irrelevant to the signaling function. If some beliefs evolved for a signaling function, then we should expect various biases that aid in the manipulation of others.     

Knowledge before Gettier

According to a historical claim oft-repeated by contemporary epistemologists, the ‘traditional’ conception of knowledge prevailed in Western philosophy prior to the publication in 1963 of Edmund’s Gettier’s famous three-page article ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’. On this conception, knowledge consists of justified true belief. In this article, I critically consider evidence for and against this historical claim, and conclude with a puzzle concerning its widespread acceptance.     

初中生公正世界信念对其学业成就的影响:感知的教师支持和班级公正的中介作用

公正世界信念作为一种社会认知倾向,对于个体发展具有普遍影响,但是在学校情境中探索公正世界信念与学业成就的关系及影响机制的研究却很有限。本研究以郑州市两个区县的2584名初中一年级学生为被试,考察公正世界信念对其学业成就的影响,从班级生态环境的角度,探索个体对教师支持和班级公正的感知在二者之间的中介作用。结果发现：初中生的公正世界信念可显著预测其学业成就;在控制了性别、年龄后,学生的公正世界信念可分别通过对教师支持和班级公正的感知间接影响其学业成就,公正世界信念还可以通过感知的教师支持影响对班级公正的感知,进而影响学业成就的多重中介路径发挥作用。个体对班级教师支持和班级公正的感知是公正世界信念影响学业成就的重要途径。     

“I deserve a treat”: Exercise motivation as a predictor of post-exercise dietary licensing beliefs and implicit associations toward unhealthy snacks

ObjectiveTo explore whether exercise motivation predicted two of the potential mechanisms that may explain why individuals engage in unhealthy compensatory snack consumption following exercise; specifically (a) post-exercise conscious licensing beliefs, and (b) post-exercise implicit attitudes toward unhealthy snacks.DesignObservational study.MethodOne hundred and nineteen healthy participants completed a 40-min session of moderate intensity stationary cycling, and subsequently completed measures of explicit licensing and implicit associations toward unhealthy snack foods and drinks.ResultsIndividuals driven by more controlled (relative to autonomous) forms of exercise motivation reported greater compensatory licensing beliefs (Est = −0.08, p < 0.001) even after accounting for a number of relevant covariates. No significant relationship emerged between exercise motivation and implicit associations toward unhealthy snacks (Est = 0.12, p = 0.81).ConclusionThe findings demonstrate that exercise motivation may predict conscious licensing beliefs toward unhealthy snack foods and drinks post-exercise. Understanding the modifiable factors – such as exercise motivation – that predict post-exercise dietary beliefs is important for supporting individuals’ weight loss and health goals.