The Religious Function of Jaina Philosophy:AnekāntavādaReconsidered

This paper considers the socio-religious rationale for the Jaina theory of the non-one-sided nature of reality (anekāntavāda). In doing so it rejects the received view thatanekāntavāda's exclusive function is to promote non-violence at the intellectual level. Instead it advances a model which emphasizes the way in whichanekāntavādasustains a real connection between karmic matter and the soul (jīva) and so maintains the rationale for identity defining ascetic practice. The social and religious dangers of one-sided (ekānta) views for the Jaina tradition are demonstrated by a consideration of the Digambara teacher Kundakunda's idiosyncratic use of the two truths model of reality.     

‘We don't do God’: A critical retrospective of New Labour's approaches to ‘religion or belief’ and ‘faith’

Given that Tony Blair was once infamously told by an aide that in Britain ‘we don't do God’, the New Labour Government that he led was responsible for developing and implementing a series of policies that brought religion firmly into British political spaces. Adopting two policy approaches, these approaches focused on ‘religion or belief’ and ‘faith’. Alongside the incorporation of ‘religion and belief’ into the broadening equalities framework, New Labour encouraged greater engagement with faith communities initially through urban regeneration before implementing a more faith-specific programme, namely the interfaith framework. Drawing on three research projects, this article retrospectively considers the extent to which these approaches were joined up and whether – and indeed how – they contributed to New Labour's overarching measurements of success: creating a more equal society.     

WHAT IS “MYTHIC REALITY”?

Abstract. The topic of the March 2011 symposium in Zygon is “The Mythic Reality of the Autonomous Individual.” Yet few of the contributors even discuss “mythic reality.” Of the ones who do, most cavalierly use “myth” dismissively, as simply a false belief. Rather than reconciling myth with reality, they oppose myth to reality. Their view of myth is by no means unfamiliar or unwarranted, but they need to recognize other views of myth and to defend their own. Above all, they need to appreciate the grip that any belief aptly labelled myth has—a grip that holds at least as much for a false belief as for a true one.