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161.
Giacomo Bonanno 《Studia Logica》2007,86(3):375-401
The temporal updating of an agent’s beliefs in response to a flow of information is modeled in a simple modal logic that,
for every date t, contains a normal belief operator B
t
and a non-normal information operator I
t
which is analogous to the ‘only knowing’ operator discussed in the computer science literature. Soundness and completeness
of the logic are proved and the relationship between the proposed logic, the AGM theory of belief revision and the notion
of plausibility is discussed.
A first draft of this paper was presented at the Workshop on Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial
Intelligence, Philosophy and Economics, Dagstuhl (Germany), August 2005.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by
Branden Fitelson 相似文献
162.
Matthew McGrath 《Synthese》2007,157(1):1-24
Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory
beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology
of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach
and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim,
but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool
some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory. 相似文献
163.
Nick Bostrom 《Synthese》2007,157(1):59-78
The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self- locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reason
when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend
the “1/2 view” and those who advocate the “1/3 view”. I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a
new “hybrid” model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model
appears to violate Bayesian conditionalization, but I argue that this is not the case. By paying close attention to the details of
conditionalization in contexts where indexical information is relevant, we discover that the hybrid model is in fact consistent
with Bayesian kinematics. If the proposed model is correct, there are important lessons for the study of self-location, observation
selection theory, and anthropic reasoning. 相似文献
164.
Katie Steele 《Synthese》2007,158(2):189-205
I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief,
as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of
expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief (as opposed to “imprecise”
belief), such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the
story, however, the model does not explain how an agent may come to have unique preferences for each of the Ellsberg options.
Levi (1986, Hard choices: Decision making under unresolved conflict. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press) holds that the extra element amounts to innocuous secondary “risk” or security
considerations that are used to break ties when more than one option is rationally permissible. While I think a lexical choice
rule of this kind is very plausible, I argue that it involves a greater break with xpected utility theory than mere violation
of the ordering axiom. 相似文献
165.
普兰丁格的矛盾——普兰丁格的宗教排他论与有保证的基督教信念 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
该文针对美国当代宗教哲学家普兰丁格(Alvin Plantinga)“有保证的基督教信念”①的宗教真理认识论,指出,按照普兰丁格的排他论的宗教真理认识论,并不能保证基督教信念在面对其他宗教信念时具有优越性,因为其他宗教也可以宣称它们符合普兰丁格的宗教真理标准,从而它们的信念为真。因此普兰丁格的认识论是自相矛盾的、失效的。相比之下,普兰丁格的老师阿尔斯顿(William Alston)的实践的和生存论的宗教真理进路更为可取。 相似文献
166.
Melissa Barry 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):231-242
Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of
motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate
rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right,
either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the action. I argue that the realist who adopts a
Humean model for explaining rational action will have a difficult time giving a plausible account of the role that desire
plays in this explanation. I explore four interpretations of this role and argue that none allows a Humean theory to explain
rational action as convincingly as an anti-Humean theory does. The first two models, in different ways, make acting on a reason
impossible. The third allows this possibility, but only by positing a reason-sensitive desire that itself demands an explanation.
The fourth avoids this explanatory challenge only by retreating to an empty form of the Humean view. In contrast, an anti-Humean
theory can provide an intuitively plausible explanation of rational action. I conclude that the realist about reasons should
adopt an anti-Humean theory to explain rational action.
相似文献
Melissa BarryEmail: |
167.
168.
该文回顾了儿童对道义情景中心理状态推理的研究,包括儿童对行为者愿望、信念和情绪的推理以及对权威愿望的推理研究。总体来讲,道义规则的引入使得儿童过分根据道义规则来对行为者的行为和心理状态进行推理,但是不同的研究还存在诸多矛盾之处,这可能与以往的研究中所使用的道义规则属于不同的领域(如道德、习俗及防范等领域)以及实验任务(如行为预测和奖惩判断等)的差异有关。最后该文提出另外两个可能的影响因素:道义规则的形式和儿童的视角采择能力 相似文献
169.
To test the domain-specificity of "theory of mind" abilities we compared the performance of a case-series of 11 brain-lesioned patients on a recently developed test of false belief reasoning () and on a matched false photograph task, which did not require belief reasoning and which addressed problems with existing false photograph methods. A strikingly similar pattern of performance was shown across the false belief and false photograph tests. Patients who were selectively impaired on false belief tasks were also impaired on false photograph tasks; patients spared on false belief tasks also showed preserved performance with false photographs. In some cases the impairment on false belief and false photograph tasks coincided with good performance on control tasks matched for executive demands. We discuss whether the patients have a domain-specific deficit in reasoning about representations common to both false belief and false photograph tasks. 相似文献
170.
Paul O. Ingram 《Dialog》2007,46(4):344-354
Abstract : For those of us who are self‐consciously Lutheran, the reality of contemporary religious pluralism engenders important theological questions. The thesis of this essay is that “being Lutheran” within the context of contemporary religious pluralism requires the creation of “Lutheran identity” that is pluralistic in structure, while simultaneously avoiding either theological exclusivism or theological inclusivism. The implications of this thesis are that (1) dialogue with the religious traditions of the world is of primary importance for thinking Lutherans, and (2) the church's witness and mission needs to be reconfigured in light of the practice of interreligious dialogue. 相似文献