政策执行偏差严重程度对公众地方政府 责任判断的影响:多重中介模型的检验

为探讨地方政府政策执行偏差严重程度对公众地方政府责任判断的影响机制。采用问卷法对678名社会公众进行调查,结果显示:(1)地方政府政策执行偏差情境下,公众地方政府愿望判断和公众地方政府信念判断在政策执行偏差严重程度和公众地方政府责任判断之间起多重中介作用。(2)公众地方政府信念判断在政策执行偏差严重程度和公众地方政府责任判断之间的中介效应量大于公众地方政府愿望判断的中介效应量。     

Relationship between pathogenic beliefs and interpersonal problems: a cross-sectional study of Thai patients with depression

Pathogenic beliefs (PBs) are a key construct within control-mastery theory, a dynamic cognitive-relational psychotherapy approach. It is common for these beliefs to trigger interpersonal problems. The present study explored the relationship between PBs and interpersonal problems. Sixty-eight patients with depressive disorder were assessed using a 54-item Pathogenic Belief Scale (PBS), and the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP-32). Eight sub scales of the IIP-32 were analysed, along with the interpersonal circumplex (IPC) dominance and love dimensions. The PBS was significantly associated with the IIP-32 total score (r?=?.608, p?r?=??.285, p?相似文献   

Trauma event autobiographies: An exploratory multiple case study

This multiple case study explored trauma event memories of three individuals to characterise underlying meanings important for their recovery. The three participants were women in the age range of 43 to 54 years old, who shared their own memories of a trauma-laden event four to five years post-occurrence. Thematic analysis of the autobiographical narratives indicated underlying memories across cases of silence imposed on trauma victims by their social environments and communities. Differences in trauma autobiographical memories were in meaning making within the context of the participants’ own culture, society, and community. Autobiographical memory studies appear to have value for understanding likely pathways to recovery from trauma     

Theory of mind: The state of the art*

Abstract

In this article, I reflect on theory of mind as a field (ToM), how it has developed over the years, and focally on the state of current research and theory. Having begun with preschoolers’ understanding of beliefs and desires, the field now includes research from infancy through late life, contributions and contributors from around the world, research on behavior, conversation, neural correlates, gene-environment contributions, evolution, and the social-behavioral antecedents and consequences of the unfolding trajectories of ToM understanding. Several topics in particular portray the current state of the art and my sense of where theory-of-mind research is likely to head in the near future: progressions of theory of mind achievement; cultural experiences plus experiential influences that shape developmental trajectories; developmental cognitive neuroscience; infant ToM insights; research on ToM developments beyond preschool, including children’s increasing interest in and wrestling with extraordinary minds, such as those of God and super-heroes.     

Relationship between implicit false belief understanding and role play: Longitudinal study

Pretend play is one of the earliest forms of children’s imagination. While social pretend play (role play) may facilitate the development of theory of mind – including false belief understanding – theoretically, the reverse may be true; theory of mind may facilitate the development of role play. To clarify this relationship, the present longitudinal study examined whether toddler’s implicit understanding of false beliefs predicted their role play during preschool years. We examined 18-month-old toddlers’ looking time in an implicit false-belief task (Time 1). When the children were 4/5 years old (Time 2), children’s parents answered a questionnaire on their child’s engagement in role play, such as playing with an imaginary companion and impersonating an imagined character. Toddlers’ looking time in the false-belief task at Time 1 predicted impersonation scores at Time 2. The results suggest that early theory of mind skills can facilitate children’s role play.     

My point is valid,yours is not: myside bias in reasoning about abortion

The study explores whether people are more inclined to accept a conclusion that confirms their prior beliefs and reject one they personally object to even when both follow the same logic. Most of the prior research in this area has relied on the informal reasoning paradigm; in this study, however, we applied a formal reasoning paradigm to distinguish between cognitive and motivational mechanisms leading to myside bias in reasoning on value-laden topics (in this case abortions). Slovak and Polish (N?=?387) participants indicated their attitudes toward abortion and then evaluated logical syllogisms with neutral, pro-choice, or pro-life content. We analysed whether participants’ prior attitudes influenced their ability to solve these logically identical reasoning tasks and found that prior attitudes were the strongest predictor of myside bias in evaluating both valid and invalid syllogisms, even after controlling for logical validity (the ability to solve neutral syllogisms) and previous experience of logic.     

On the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency

The sense of agency is the experience of being the origin of a sensory consequence. This study investigates whether contextual beliefs modulate low-level sensorimotor processes which contribute to the emergence of the sense of agency. We looked at the influence of causal beliefs on ‘intentional binding’, a phenomenon which accompanies self-agency. Participants judged the onset-time of either an action or a sound which followed the action. They were induced to believe that the tone was either triggered by themselves or by somebody else, although, in reality, the sound was always triggered by the participants. We found that intentional binding was stronger when participants believed that they triggered the tone, compared to when they believed that another person triggered the tone. These results suggest that high-level contextual information influences sensorimotor processes responsible for generating intentional binding.     

Why are there limits on theory of mind use? Evidence from adults' ability to follow instructions from an ignorant speaker

Keysar et al. (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000 Keysar, B., Barr, D. J., Balin, J. A. and Brauner, J. S. 2000. Taking perspective in conversation: The role of mutual knowledge in comprehension. Psychological Sciences, 11: 32–38. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003 Keysar, B., Lin, S. H. and Barr, D. J. 2003. Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89(1): 25–41. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) report that adults frequently failed to use their conceptual competence for theory of mind (ToM) in an online communication game where they needed to take account of a speaker's perspective. The current research reports 3 experiments investigating the cognitive processes contributing to adults' errors. In Experiments 1 and 2 the frequency of adults' failure to use ToM was unaffected by perspective switching. In Experiment 3 adults made more errors when interpreting instructions according to the speaker's perspective than according to an arbitrary rule. We suggest that adults are efficient at switching perspectives, but that actually using what another person knows to interpret what they say is relatively inefficient, giving rise to egocentric errors during communication.     

What is “theory of mind”? Concepts,cognitive processes and individual differences

Research on “theory of mind” has traditionally focused on a narrow participant group (preschool children) using a narrow range of experimental tasks (most notably, false-belief tasks). Recent work has greatly expanded the age range of human participants tested to include human infants, older children, and adults, has devised new tasks, and has adopted methods from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, theoretical work has not kept pace with these changes, with the result that studies using one kind of method or participant group often inherit assumptions about the nature of theory of mind from other research, with little regard for whether these assumptions are appropriate. I argue that three distinct approaches to thinking about theory of mind are already implicit in research practice, and that future work, whether with infants, children, or adults, will benefit from articulating these approaches more clearly and following their different implications for what theory of mind is and how it should be studied.