Emotional reactivity to daily events in youth with anxiety disorders

Background: Although research supports associations between anxiety and emotional reactivity in adults (Cisler, J. M., Olatunji, B. O., Feldner, M. T., &; Forsyth, J. P. (2010). Emotion regulation and the anxiety disorders: an integrative review. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 32(1), 68–82.), few studies have examined emotional reactivity in anxious youth (e.g., Carthy et al., 2010; Tan, P. Z., Forbes, E. E., Dahl, R. E., Ryan, N. D., Siegle, G. J., Ladouceur, C. D., &; Silk, J. S. (2012). Emotional reactivity and regulation in anxious and nonanxious youth: a cell-phone ecological momentary assessment study. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 53(2), 197–206.). Methods: Using daily diary methodology, this study examined both negative affect (NA) and positive affect (PA) reactivity to daily events in youth diagnosed with anxiety (N?=?68; 60% female; 78% non-Hispanic White; M age?=?11.18 years, SD?=?3.17). We also examined whether parent-reported emotion regulation would predict emotional reactivity. Results: Participants reported more NA on days they experienced more negative parent and teacher events and less PA on days that they experienced more negative peer events. Additionally, better emotion regulation was associated with less NA reactivity to negative teacher events and to both negative and positive academic events. Conclusions: Interpersonal events have a salient effect on daily affect for anxious youth. Youth anxiety therapists should target emotion regulation associated with negative events involving adults and address barriers to developing and maintaining positive peer relationships.     

Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

Effects of analytical (abstract) versus experiential (concrete) induced rumination of negative self defining memories on schizotypic symptoms

Repetitive thought may have adaptive and functional consequences, depending on, among other things, the interpretation of the content: analytical or abstract (general and decontextualized) and experiential or concrete (specific, contextual and incidental). Studies experimentally manipulating repetitive thought have shown both the constructive consequences of the experiential mode and the dysfunctional consequences of the analytical mode. The aim of the current study is to observe the effect of analytical and experiential rumination of negative self‐defining memories on schizotypic symptoms. A sample of 111 university students were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions of induced rumination, “analytical” or “experimental.” The participants completed a series of questionnaires (anomalous perception of reality, preoccupation and depression) and a negative self‐defining memory was obtained to be used as the content of the induced rumination. Following the rumination induction, participants in the experiential condition significantly decreased their scores on anomalous perception of reality compared with those in the analytical condition. We also observed that post‐induction scores on self‐reported sadness significantly increased in both experimental conditions while scores on self‐reported happiness decreased. Our results show that the concrete/experiential rumination, focused here on negative self‐defining memories, have positive consequences on schizotypic symptoms, such as decreased anomalous perception of reality.     

Our Followers Are Lions,Theirs Are Sheep: How Social Identity Shapes Theories About Followership and Social Influence

Two studies examine how self‐categorization theory can be used to refine our understanding of people's implicit theories about followership and social influence. Results from Study 1 show that perceivers regard followers of a group they themselves identify strongly with (rather than not at all) to be more representative of the prototype of effective followers (displaying enthusiasm, industry, good citizenship) and to be less representative of the antiprototype of effective followers (displaying conformity, incompetence, and insubordination). Results are replicated in a second experiment in which we compare the views of those self‐categorizing as either Republican or Democrat responding to followers of the Republican and Democratic Party. Results of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1 and also reveal qualitative differences in the preferred influence strategy for dealing with followers. Specifically, respondents seek to engage in persuasion when trying to change the behavior of ingroup followers, while resorting to coercion when trying to change the behavior of outgroup followers. Our results are the first to provide evidence that perceivers' theories about what followers are like and how they are influenced most effectively are structured by perceivers' identification (and dis‐identification) with the particular groups that leaders are championing.     

Problem Clarity as a Moderator between Trait Affect and Self‐Perceived Creativity

Empirical studies on the relationship between affect and creativity often produce conflicting results. This inconsistency has led us to believe that the relationship between affect and creativity may be better understood by looking at potential moderators. Our study looked specifically at trait affect and self‐perceived creativity. Using the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) theory with problem clarity as the potential moderator, we hypothesized that when individuals are faced with problems that lack clarity, trait affect has greater sway over their self‐perceived creativity. Our results provided evidence that problem clarity moderated the relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity; the positive relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity is stronger when problem clarity is low and weaker when problem clarity is high. No moderating effect was found in the relationship between negative trait affect and self‐perceived creativity.