证据顺序和证词自信度对学前末期儿童因果推理的影响

开展两个实验探究证据顺序和证词自信水平对5岁儿童因果推理的影响机制。132名和127名5岁儿童分别参与实验1和实验2。实验1发现证据顺序对儿童因果推理的影响表现为近因效应,但证词的自信水平差异不影响儿童的因果推理;实验2发现如果儿童注意到证词的自信水平信息,他们更倾向于在自信证词条件依据证词推断因果关系,证据顺序的影响力被削弱。研究结果说明证据顺序变化导致易受影响的近因效应。     

Multiplicatively interacting factors selectively influencing parameters in multiple response class processing and rate trees

Evidence in many experiments indicates that the processes involved in producing responses are arranged in a tree structure. Evidence often indicates further that an experimental factor, such as item similarity, changes a single parameter, leaving others invariant. In typical studies, a few tree structures are hypothesized a priori, and tested by goodness of fit. With the method of Tree Inference, a tree is constructed by examining the data to see if patterns occur that are predicted when two factors selectively influence different processes (Schweickert & Chen, 2008). The patterns can reveal, for example, whether selectively influenced processes are executed in order, and what the order is. If the patterns do not occur, one can conclude that no tree is possible in which the factors selectively influence processes. In earlier work, three restrictions were imposed on the trees considered: There were two classes of responses; parameters were probabilities, bounded above by 1; and factors were assumed to change parameters associated with children of a single vertex. More general results are derived here, removing these restrictions. Results on representation, uniqueness of parameters, uniqueness of tree structure, and mixtures of trees are presented.     

Children's imitation of causal action sequences is influenced by statistical and pedagogical evidence

Children are ubiquitous imitators, but how do they decide which actions to imitate? One possibility is that children rationally combine multiple sources of information about which actions are necessary to cause a particular outcome. For instance, children might learn from contingencies between action sequences and outcomes across repeated demonstrations, and they might also use information about the actor’s knowledge state and pedagogical intentions. We define a Bayesian model that predicts children will decide whether to imitate part or all of an action sequence based on both the pattern of statistical evidence and the demonstrator’s pedagogical stance. To test this prediction, we conducted an experiment in which preschool children watched an experimenter repeatedly perform sequences of varying actions followed by an outcome. Children’s imitation of sequences that produced the outcome increased, in some cases resulting in production of shorter sequences of actions that the children had never seen performed in isolation. A second experiment established that children interpret the same statistical evidence differently when it comes from a knowledgeable teacher versus a naïve demonstrator. In particular, in the pedagogical case children are more likely to “overimitate” by reproducing the entire demonstrated sequence. This behavior is consistent with our model’s predictions, and suggests that children attend to both statistical and pedagogical evidence in deciding which actions to imitate, rather than obligately imitating successful action sequences.     

Inference making and linking both require thinking: Spontaneous trait inference and spontaneous trait transference both rely on working memory capacity

Past research suggests that spontaneous trait inference (STI) and spontaneous trait transference (STT) may reflect different cognitive processes, the former being inferential and the latter associational. The present research was designed to explore whether either or both of these processes involve thinking that occupies cognitive capacity. Four studies suggest that reductions in available cognitive capacity reduce both STI and STT effects, both on measures of savings in relearning (which reflect the strength of trait associations with a person) and on trait ratings measures (which reflect the strength of trait inferences made about a person). Similar results were obtained using an individual difference measure of cognitive capacity. Although these results suggest that STI and STT are similar, in that both exhibit interference from reductions in cognitive capacity, other results, such as halo effects in trait ratings, support previous assertions that their underlying processes are distinct.     

Rewarding performance feedback alters reported time of action

Past studies have shown that the perceived time of actions is retrospectively influenced by post-action events. The current study examined whether rewarding performance feedback (even when false) altered the reported time of action. In Experiment 1, participants performed a speeded button press task and received monetary reward for a presumed “fast,” or a monetary punishment for a presumed “slow” response. Rewarded trials resulted in the false perception that the response action occurred earlier than punished trials. In Experiments 2 and 3, the need for a speeded response and reward were independently manipulated in order to decouple the cognitive and reward components in the feedback signal. When tested independently, neither variable affected the judged time of action. We conclude that meaningful feedback (fast or slow) is only used when made salient by reward, to modulate the judged time of an action.     

Personality and behavioral outcomes associated with risk-taking are accurately inferred from faces

Growing evidence suggests that people are able to accurately infer some personality traits and behavioral outcomes from facial photographs. However, little research has examined whether people are able to accurately infer personality traits or behavioral outcomes associated with risk-taking. In this study, we examined whether people were able to accurately infer, on average, others’ personality traits associated with risk-taking from facial photographs. We further examined whether such first impressions were associated with relevant and important behavioral outcomes—specifically, future discounting and gambling and problem gambling tendencies. Results suggest that people are able to accurately infer, on average, some personality traits and behavioral outcomes associated with risk-taking from faces.     

Speaker reliability guides children's inductive inferences about novel properties

Prior work shows that children can make inductive inferences about objects based on their labels rather than their appearance (Gelman, 2003). A separate line of research shows that children's trust in a speaker's label is selective. Children accept labels from a reliable speaker over an unreliable speaker (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). In the current paper, we tested whether 3- and 5-year-old children attend to speaker reliability when they make inductive inferences about a non-obvious property of a novel artifact based on its label. Children were more likely to use a reliable speaker's label than an unreliable speaker's label when making inductive inferences. Thus, children not only prefer to learn from reliable speakers, they are also more likely to use information from reliable speakers as the basis for future inferences. The findings are discussed in light of the debate between a similarity-driven and a label-driven approach to inductive inferences.     

When promoting a charity can hurt charitable giving: A metacognitive analysis

Charities need to come to mind to enter a potential donor's consideration set. However, feeling familiar with a charity and its cause can facilitate or impair giving. In most cases, perceived good memory for details of the cause fosters the impression of personal importance, which increases giving (Studies 1 and 3). But when the charity aims to increase awareness of a cause, good memory for the cause suggests that awareness is already high, which impairs giving (Studies 2 and 3). Hence, promotions for awareness-raising charities can actually have negative consequences, confirming the predictions of a metacognitive analysis.     

How Chinese people infer helpers' ambiguous intentions: Helper effort and interpersonal relationships

Previous researchers have tried to understand in what situations people feel gratitude and indebtedness in response to other people helping them, and have found that benefit value, helper effort, helper obligation, and helper intention were all important. However, helper intentions are not always clear. We gave Chinese participants helping vignettes and tested how they inferred helpers' ambiguous intentions. Study 1 found that helper effort significantly influenced how they infer intentions, but benefit value and helper obligation did not. Study 2 replicated the effect of helper effort and found that more effort led participants to infer that the helper was more motivated by utilitarian interests. Study 3 focused on what type of relationship the helper had with the participants, and found that closeness led participants to infer more benevolent intentions and less utilitarian intentions.