Diversity-Based Reasoning in Children

One of the hallmarks of inductive reasoning by adults is the diversity effect, namely that people draw stronger inferences from a diverse set of evidence than from a more homogenous set of evidence. However, past developmental work has not found consistent diversity effects with children age 9 and younger. We report robust sensitivity to diversity in children as young as 5, using everyday stimuli such as pictures of objects with people. Experiment 1 showed the basic diversity effect in 5- to 9-year-olds. Experiment 2 showed that, like adults, children restrict their use of diversity information when making inferences about remote categories. Experiment 3 used other stimulus sets to overcome an alternate explanation in terms of sample size rather than diversity effects. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that children more readily draw on diversity when reasoning about objects and their relations with people than when reasoning about objects' internal, hidden properties, thus partially explaining the negative findings of previous work. Relations to cross-cultural work and models of induction are discussed.     

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS IN THE BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ

Religious texts and historical narratives are instrumental in defining appropriate emotions and moral reasoning in a culture. In the Bhagavad Gı tā, the warrior Arjuna is faced with a twofold dilemma: are his emotions appropriate and should emotions influence his actions? The Gı tā is thought to be a redacted text with three primary layers: the original verses, the Sāmkhya/Yoga layer, and the devotional bhakti layer. Cross‐cultural psychological theories of emotions are employed to analyze the layers of the Gı tā. It is argued that each of the three layers corresponds with one of three possible moral codes as proposed by R. A. Shweder and his colleagues (1997; 2000) : the Ethic of Autonomy (promoting personal well‐being and avoiding shame); the Ethic of Community (maintaining social order and emotional detachment); and the Ethic of Divinity (upholding cosmic order and endorsing emotional devotion). These three perspectives remain relevant for deciding emotionally laden moral dilemmas today.     

Two approaches to the formalisation of defeasible deontic reasoning

This paper compares two ways of formalising defeasible deontic reasoning, both based on the view that the issues of conflicting obligations and moral dilemmas should be dealt with from the perspective of nonmonotonic reasoning. The first way is developing a special nonmonotonic logic for deontic statements. This method turns out to have some limitations, for which reason another approach is recommended, viz. combining an already existing nonmonotonic logic with a deontic logic. As an example of this method the language of Reiter's default logic is extended to include modal expressions, after which the argumentation framework in default logic of [20, 22] is used to give a plausible logical analysis of moral dilemmas and prima facie obligations.An earlier version of this article was written while the author was working at the Department of Computing, Imperial College London, supported by ESRC/MRC/SERC Joint Council Initiative Project G9212036. Work on the present version was supported by a research fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, and by Esprit WG 8319 Modelage. I thank one of the referees for his interesting comments. Also, many thanks are due to Marek Sergot for valuable discussions on the topic of this paper.     

Prima facie and seeming duties

Sir David Ross introduced prima facie duties, or acts with a tendency to be duties proper. He also spoke of general prima facie principles, wwhich attribute to acts having some feature the tendency to be a duty proper. Like Utilitarians from Mill to Hare, he saw a role for such principles in the epistemology of duty: in the process by means of which, in any given situation, a moral code can help us to find out what we ought to do.After formalizing general prima facie principles as universally quantified conditionals I will show how seeming duties can be detached from them. There will be examples involving lies, burnt offerings and the question of whether to have a napkin on your lap while eating asparagus. They will illustrate the defeasibility of this detachment, how it can lead into dilemmas, and how general prima facie principles are overridden by more specific ones.I've been lucky to discuss parts of this project with among others Jeff Horty, Paul McNamara, Alasdair MacIntyre, Wlodek Rabinowicz and Michael Slote. Thanks, too, to Henry Prakken and the reviewers for Studia Logica     

Nonabsolute/relativistic thinking: A common factor underlying models of postformal reasoning?

Strong empirical evidence was obtained in support of the proposition that nonabsolute/relativistic (N/R) thinking is a unifying commonality underlying four postformal models of higher-order thinking, namely, problem finding, dialectical reasoning, relativistic operations, and reflective judgment. Within the construct of N/R thinking, two dimensions—the basic form and the epistemic view—and two levels—the formal form and the postformal form—were differentiated as hypothesized. The findings clarify logical relationships among the models as well as provide a common link unifying their diversity. Implications and suggestions for future research are provided.