全文获取类型
收费全文 | 392篇 |
免费 | 21篇 |
国内免费 | 3篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 2篇 |
2023年 | 6篇 |
2022年 | 2篇 |
2021年 | 5篇 |
2020年 | 18篇 |
2019年 | 23篇 |
2018年 | 25篇 |
2017年 | 38篇 |
2016年 | 37篇 |
2015年 | 6篇 |
2014年 | 15篇 |
2013年 | 84篇 |
2012年 | 7篇 |
2011年 | 1篇 |
2010年 | 3篇 |
2009年 | 8篇 |
2008年 | 21篇 |
2007年 | 15篇 |
2006年 | 12篇 |
2005年 | 22篇 |
2004年 | 13篇 |
2003年 | 11篇 |
2002年 | 11篇 |
2001年 | 5篇 |
2000年 | 5篇 |
1999年 | 5篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 3篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 2篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 2篇 |
1990年 | 2篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1984年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有416条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
181.
Axel Seemann 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):637-655
Abstract In this paper, I am concerned with persons’ capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching ‘We’‐intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe’s action theory and show how this alternative account can be applied to joint action. In so doing, I stress the importance of the phenomenal dimension of agency. 相似文献
182.
Elisa Magrì 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):625-629
AbstractMy discussion of Self and Other takes issue with two distinct theses defended by Zahavi. The first concerns Zahavi's argument for the first-personal character of experience and its related thought experiment. My second remark is about Zahavi’s restriction of empathy to direct perception. 相似文献
183.
Dermot Moran 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):491-514
AbstractIn this paper, I shall examine the evolution of Heidegger’s concept of ‘transcendence’ as it appears in Being and Time (1927), ‘On the Essence of Ground’ (1928) and related texts from the late 1920s in relation to his rethinking of subjectivity and intentionality. Heidegger defines Being as ‘transcendence’ in Being and Time and reinterprets intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. In the critical epistemological tradition of philosophy stemming from Kant, as in Husserl, transcendence and immanence are key notions (see Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907, and Ideas I, 1913). Indeed, ‘transcendence in immanence’ is a leitmotif of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl discusses transcendence in some detail in Cartesian Meditations §11 in a manner that is not dissimilar to Heidegger. Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s understanding of consciousness and intentionality and Heidegger deliberately chooses to discuss transcendence as an exceptional domain for the discussion of beings in his ‘On the Essence of Ground’, his submission to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Despite his championing of a new concept of transcendence in the late 1920s, Heidegger effectively abandons the term during the early 1930s. In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger’s articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl’s conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer what is at stake in Heidegger’s conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence. 相似文献
184.
Guillaume Frechette 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):654-679
AbstractPhenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irreducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these phenomenologists was not influenced as much by Husserl as by two important figures in the prehistory of phenomenology: their teacher Theodor Lipps, and – indirectly, through Lipps’ influence – Hermann Lotze. Second, I show that their account of self-consciousness takes the metaphysical realism underlying Lotze’s and Lipps’ views on the distinction between feeling and sensations seriously. I argue that this distinction played a central role in the development of many early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness. 相似文献
185.
Rudolf Lüthe 《Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology》2013,44(2):154-167
One long-running conundrum in Husserlian phenomenology revolves around the question of the identity of what Husserl calls the transcendental ego, a mysterious figure that he identifies as the subject of a genuinely transcendental phenomenology. In dialogue with both Husserl and his assistant and collaborator Eugen Fink (as well as recent commentary), I attempt in this article to give a solid account of the identity of this transcendental ego, and in particular to explain the connection between this figure and the empirical ego of the individual phenomenologist. I make particular reference to Fink's depiction of a "personal union" between these two egos in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation and to certain unclear hints in Husserl's 1923/1924 lectures on First Philosophy. Ultimately, I develop my own account of such a union, which explains the transcendental ego as a certain mode in which the phenomenologist might investigate his own experiences. On this basis, I argue, the status of phenomenology as a transcendental discipline can be understood without subjecting that discipline to certain criticisms that have been levelled against it. 相似文献
186.
187.
Illness appraisals are central to understanding how individuals cope with chronic illness. An interpretive phenomenological approach to the analysis of two years of bimonthly stressful event narratives in a sample of 57 HIV?+?gay men revealed five groups that differed on how they appraised HIV and one group of individuals who changed from one type of appraisal to another over the course of the 2-year study. The ways of appraising HIV revealed in this analysis have implications for interventions and for the study of coping with HIV as a chronic illness. The repeated assessment of specific HIV-associated stressful events and a qualitative analytic approach allowed for a more in-depth understanding of the meaning of HIV for the participants. This study suggests that coping interventions may be more powerful if they are tailored to individual appraisals of HIV because different forms of coping are likely to be differentially effective depending on the meaning of HIV in the individual's life. 相似文献
188.
189.
190.
《Theology & Sexuality》2013,19(3):283-295
AbstractOne of the last taboos in the public representation of sexuality seems to be the sexuality of elderly people, notwithstanding considerable changes in their actual levels of sexual activity. Dresen's film Cloud 9 breaks this taboo telling the story of a passionate relationship between two people in their sixties/seventies. The protagonists' differing perceptions of how to live the time that remains to them, and how to acknowledge and realize their desires and the passion of their bodies marked by time and experience, shows the ethical issues implied in the story without providing easy answers. Viewers are left to struggle with these questions, not least because identification with the protagonists is disrupted at the same time as it is encouraged by the film. 相似文献