试论现象学的特征及其对心理学中人文主义的影响

现象学对于心理学家来说,它的意义是明显的：支持了意识的研究、内省方法的使用,并且为表象等内在心理现象的研究提供了理论基础;现象学的科学观是一种非实证主义的观点,为人文主义心理学家以非自然科学模式塑造心理学奠定了哲学基础;作为一种方法论,它与实证主义的方法论截然对立,它在心理学方法论上的特色是整体描述、问题中心、非还原论等原则。     

Postmodernist theory and the physician-patient relationship

The author discusses the postmodernist claim that the grand theories have lost credibility, even in the field of medical science and practice. Rather than representing a shared reality among physician and patient, illness represents two quite distinct realities — the meaning of one being significantly and distinctively different from the meaning of the other. However, existential clinical narratives can function as important bridges between the world of the patient and the world of the physician. Such narratives provide important information regarding the patient's biographical situation and, particularly, the personal and cultural meanings which are a function of the biographical situation. At the same time, these narratives provide physicians with useful information for the practice of medicine.     

Meaning, Truth, and Phenomenology

This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology.     

Facing Up to Hopelessness: A Dialogal Phenomenological Study

Hopelessness is a fundamental human experience, and yet is often considered evidence either of sin or of illness. This dialogal phenomenological study, based on in-depth interviews, takes a fresh look at despair as experienced by people across a variety of ages and contexts, and at the consequences and outcomes of these feelings. At the heart of despair is a sense of isolation, impotence, and an immutable future, and yet it may give rise to new purpose or a new understanding and acceptance of life with its possibilities and limitations. The therapeutic implications of this understanding of despair are discussed with a focus on how presence can be healing.     

Moral Perception and the Pursuit of Medical Philosophy

This paper begins by examining the claim that the practice of medicine is essentially a moral endeavor. According to this view, all clinical practice has moral content, and each clinical situation has a moral dimension. I suggest that in order to recognize this moral dimension, clinicians must engage in an interpretive process, and that they must be able to interpret clinical data in ethical terms. However, clinicians often lack the ‘moral perception’ required to appreciate this moral dimension. I will argue that physicians lack moral perception when the clinical data they are given do not offer sufficient opportunity for interpretation. This paper draws on the work of Merleau-Ponty to suggest that this loss of interpretation is, paradoxically, the result of the way that patients experience illness. This thesis may be productive, first, because it suggests opportunities to explore the process of moral perception. This thesis also suggests ways for ethicists and educators to enhance clinicians' perception of the ethical dimensions of clinical practice. Finally, the concept of moral perception, when grounded in the patient's experience of illness, creates a fruitful area of inquiry that warrants inclusion in what may someday be the philosophy of medicine's canon. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

FROM BELIEF TO UNBELIEF AND BACK TO BELIEF: A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL RUSE

Abstract. Michael Ruse's rejection of religious belief is questioned at two levels. First, on the metaethical level of analysis, evolutionary ethics cannot account for moral behavior that is based on a "strong version" of the Love Command. Second, agnosticism is discussed as a form of belief. Insights from religious forms of life that are inclusive, pluralistic, and expansive are contrasted with exclusivistic, closed, and fundamentalist forms of religion in order to develop criteria for "genuine religion." Theistic agnosticism is presented as a prolegomena to belief.     

COMPLEX IDENTITY: GENES TO GOD

Unraveling the complex notion of “self” and “other” necessitates a layered approach that explores biology, namely genetics; philosophy, namely event phenomenology; and culture, namely religion. This essay examines (1) the latest paradigm shift occurring in the genetic sciences due to the increased knowledge of epigenetic effects on gene expression and how our DNA functions in concert with the cellular apparatus, the body, and the environment; (2) the incorporation of relationality into a philosophical understanding of self; and (3) finally, what religion adds to this exploration of self. Thus, providing a glimpse at how these different approaches to identity help us understand the “self.”     

Surface Colour is not a Perceptual Content

In this paper, I consider a view that explains colour experience by the independent representation of surface and illumination. This view implies that surface colour is a phenomenal perceptual content. I argue from facts of colour phenomenology to the conclusion that surface colour is not a phenomenal perceptual content. I then argue from results of surface-matching experiments to the conclusion that surface colour is neither a perceptual content of any kind nor any sort of computational output of the perceptual system. These conclusions contradict widely accepted views in both the philosophy of perception and colour science. I finish by considering and rejecting a competing account of the surface-matching results, according to which surface colour is represented indeterminately in perception.     

生命伦理学的知识场域与现象学问题

目前,生命伦理学研究中最首要的是,对相关知识、基本概念、语词的统一。应该挖掘所有人类的理性遗产和文化资源,建立和构建生命伦理学理论框架和体系,从而解决对具体生命伦理问题和现象评价的困难。生命伦理学存在一个多维的知识场域,揭示、解释和勾绘这个场域,对生命伦理学的学科建设,具有重要意义。     

How experienced phenomena relate to things themselves: Kant,Husserl, Hoche,and reflexive monism

What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing itself is knowable as are the processes that construct conscious appearances. Conscious appearances (empirical evidence) and the theories derived from them can represent what the world is really like, even though such empirical knowledge is partial, approximate and uncertain, and conscious appearances are species-specific constructions of the human mind. Drawing on the writings of Husserl, Hoche suggests that problems of knowledge, mind and consciousness are better understood in terms of a “pure noematic” phenomenology that avoids any reference to a “thing itself.” I argue that avoiding reference to a knowable reality (behind appearances) leads to more complex explanations with less explanatory value and counterintuitive conclusions—for example Hoche’s conclusion that consciousness is not part of nature. The critical realism adopted by reflexive monism appears to be more useful, as well as being consistent with science and common sense.