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231.
《Journal of Religion, Spirituality & Aging》2013,25(3-4):31-41
SUMMARY The time has come to enlarge our understanding of what an ageing older person truly is. What is called for is an approach to ageing and its multiple processes that moves beyond an empirical research model, which is limited to a positivistic focus on the bio-medical and social conditions of ageing. The spiritual dimension of the individual as well as the physical and social need to be acknowledged and valued in any definition of human existence. A segmental approach to the ageing process can only result on a reductionistic, one-dimensional caricature of the older person. There is an imperative need for the inclusion of the spiritual dimension in the study of ageing and its meaning. By issuing a call for a new wholistic paradigm that moves beyond the bio-medical model, and understanding the personhood is affirmed which includes a person's capacity to find meaning in life, indeed, even in ageing, suffering and dying. 相似文献
232.
《Sport, Ethics and Philosophy》2013,7(2):271-282
Is phenomenology a method or a philosophy (of ‘ontological’ character)? This question is discussed here with a recent philosophical collection of articles about the phenomenology of sport at hand. However, one finds very few concrete phenomena in this volume, but much abstract talk about the authoritative philosophers of ontology and existentialism. This gives the ‘phenomenological school’ a somewhat sectarian character, which is not typical in recent contributions of phenomenology. This review essay broadens out from the current volume under consideration towards a history of phenomenology and a differential phenomenology of phenomenology. It is not clear how much value the volume itself, however, has for the understanding of sport as well as for the understanding of phenomenology. Nevertheless, it documents how phenomenological scholastics approach sport, which may serve as a warning at a time when positivist reductionism seems to have also become mainstream in human and social sciences. 相似文献
233.
234.
James Phillips 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):129-158
Two central strands in Arendt's thought are the reflection on the evil of Auschwitz and the rethinking in terms of politics of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics. Given Heidegger's taciturnity regarding Auschwitz and Arendt's own taciturnity regarding the philosophical implications of Heidegger's political engagement in 1933, to set out how these strands interrelate is to examine the coherence of Arendt's thought and its potential for a critique of Heidegger. By refusing to countenance a theological conception of the evil of Auschwitz, Arendt consolidates the break with theology that Heidegger attempts through his analysis of the essential finitude of Dasein. In the light of Arendt's account of evil, it is possible to see the theological vestiges in Heidegger's ontology. Heidegger's resumption of the question concerning the categorical interconnections of the ways of Being entails an abandonment of finitude: he accommodates and tacitly justifies that which can have no human justification. 相似文献
235.
Simon Truwant 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):696-715
AbstractBoth Kant and Levinas state that traditional ontology is a type of philosophy that illegitimately forces the structure of human reason onto other beings, thus making the subject the center and origin of all meaning. Kant’s critique of the ontology of his scholastic predecessors is well known. For Levinas, however, it does not suffice. He rejects what we could call an ‘existential ontology’: a self-centered way of living as a whole, of which all philosophical ontology is but a branch. Alternatively, he presents an ethical way of living centered on ‘the Other’. Kant also, however, eventually turns to ethics to uncover a more fundamental domain of meaning. Hence, both thinkers ultimately agree about the primacy of ethics over theory. Despite this concurrence, Levinas nevertheless criticizes all aspects of Kant’s turn towards ethics: his reason for making this turn, the kind of critique that he applies to this domain, and the outcome thereof. These three points reflect Levinas’ more general critique that Kant did not succeed in overcoming ontological discourse. This paper shows how Kant can reply to, and overcome, each of Levinas’ three critiques. In this way, I reveal certain commonalities between these two thinkers that commentators still often overlook. 相似文献
236.
Mari Mikkola 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(2):198-216
Brian Epstein’s The Ant Trap is a praiseworthy addition to literature on social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences. Its central aim is to challenge received views about the social world – views with which social scientists and philosophers have aimed to answer questions about the nature of social science and about those things that social sciences aim to model and explain, like social facts, objects and phenomena. The received views that Epstein critiques deal with these issues in an overly people-centered manner. After all, even though social facts and phenomena clearly involve individual people arranged in certain ways, we must still spell out how people are involved in social facts and phenomena. There are many metaphysical questions about social properties, relations, dependence, constitution, causation, and facts that cannot be answered (for instance) just be looking at individual people alone. In order to answer questions about (e.g.) how one social entity depends for its existence on another, we need different metaphysical tools. Epstein thus holds that social ontological explanations would greatly benefit from making use of the theoretical toolkit that contemporary analytical metaphysics has to offer. He focuses specifically on two metaphysical instruments: grounding and anchoring. This paper examines Epstein’s understanding and use of these tools. I contend that Epstein is exactly right to say that contemporary metaphysics contains many theoretical instruments that can be fruitfully applied to social ontological analyses. However, I am unconvinced that Epstein’s tools achieve what they set out to do. In particular, I will address two issues: (1) How is grounding for Epstein meant to work? (2) Is anchoring distinct from grounding, and a relation that we need in social ontology? 相似文献
237.
Whitney Bauman 《Zygon》2015,50(2):389-402
Using case studies from the Indonesian context, this article argues that the current truth regimes we now live by are always and already “hybrid” and that we need new methods for understanding meaning‐making practices in an era of globalization and climate change than comparative approaches allow. Following the works of such thinkers as physicist Karen Barad, political philosopher William Connolly, and eco‐critic Timothy Morton, this article develops the idea that an event‐oriented or object‐oriented approach better captures our hybrid meaning‐making practices. Not only that, but it also provides a lens through which to understand traditions as polydox (rather than orthodox) and the rise of “modern” science as itself a planetary (rather than a Western) phenomenon. 相似文献
238.
Markus Gabriel 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2014,(1):109-129
In this paper I argue first for a revisionary ontology, that is, for an understanding of "existence" as the property of a field not to be empty. In this context, I distinguish between "metaphysics" (the theory of totality or of fundamental reality) and "ontology" (the systematic investigation into the meaning of "existence"). In the second part, I provide a sketch for a corresponding revisionary theory of the modalities in light of the new ontology proposed. 相似文献
239.
Joshua Tepley 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2014,22(3):461-481
AbstractWhile it is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different ‘kinds of being’ and identifies various ‘structures’ that compose them, there has been little discussion about what these kinds and structures of being are. This paper defends the ‘Property Thesis’, the position that kinds of being (and their structures) are properties of the entities that have them. I give two arguments for this thesis. The first is grounded in the fact that Heidegger refers to kinds and structures of being as ‘characteristics’ and ‘determinations’, which are just two different words for ‘properties’, in the broadest senses of these terms. The second argument is based on the fact that kinds and structures of being play three roles that properties are supposed to play: they account for similarities between things, they are what predicates express, and they are what abstract nouns refer to. 相似文献
240.
Bryan Frances 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(3):479-488
I argue that, for all we know, there are perfectly ordinary actual entities that are temporal in the usual sense and yet never present, past, or future. This epistemic fact requires us to modify the theses of presentism and eternalism. More importantly, it generates three new and quite serious objections to presentism, which I formulate and partially evaluate in this paper. 相似文献