Plural Action Sentences and Logical Form: Reply to Himmelreich

This paper replies to Himmelreich's ‘The Paraphrase Argument Against Collective Actions’ [2017], which presents three putative counterexamples to the multiple agents analysis of plural action sentences. The paper shows that the argument from the first example, the discursive dilemma, fails because it relies crucially on a simplification of the target analysis, and that the others don't bear on the question because they turn out on examination to be about individual rather than group action sentences.     

The Paraphrase Argument Against Collective Actions

This paper is about the status of collective actions. According to one view, collective actions metaphysically reduce to individual actions because sentences about collective actions are merely a shorthand for sentences about individual actions. I reconstruct an argument for this view and show via counterexamples that it is not sound. The argument relies on a paraphrase procedure to unpack alleged shorthand sentences about collective actions into sentences about individual actions. I argue that the best paraphrase procedure that has been put forward so far fails to produce adequate results.     

The (impossible) Future of Hermeneutics

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the negativity of hermeneutic experience is revelatory for the following reasons. Hermeneutic failure is not the equivalent of making an erroneous step in a closed circuit of reasoning. Neither is it a refutation. It concerns becoming conscious of an omission, an oversight, an unjustifiable claim to completeness and even the displacement of one interpretation by another more suggestive. The negative dimension of hermeneutic failure is incontrovertibly connected with becoming progressively aware of how, contrary to expectations, a different way of seeing is possible: something comes to light which displaces one’s former judgement. Consciousness of failure is, then, indissociable from an emergent awareness of overlooked and unremarked ways of thinking: “I should have been alert to this” or “I failed to take account of that”. Consciousness of failure is revelatory precisely because something else and something other than my expectation has shown itself to be decisive and in so doing has displaced my former understanding. This is the basis of the claim that the educative and spiritual importance of hermeneutics lies precisely in the practical pursuit of the impossible. It is a key contention of the paper that hermeneutic understanding expands and extends itself as a consequence of its impossible quest for completion.     

Reception of Analogy of Being in Contemporary Eastern Orthodox Theology

This article examines the relationship between the analogy of being (which is a fundamental principle of Catholic theology and metaphysics) and the most significant contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologians. This question of analogy touches upon the fundamental theological problem of the conceptualization of the relationship between God and creation. Even though there is no analogy in Eastern Orthodox theology, it has two polar positions regarding Western analogy of being—pro and con.     

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane,Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.     

Toward a Philosophy of Blockchain: A Symposium: Introduction

This article introduces the symposium “Toward a Philosophy of Blockchain,” which provides a philosophical contemplation of blockchain technology, the digital ledger software underlying cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, for the secure transfer of money, assets, and information via the Internet without needing a third‐party intermediary. The symposium offers philosophical scholarship on a new topic, blockchain technology, from a variety of perspectives. The philosophical themes discussed include mathematical models of reality, signification, and the sociopolitical institutions that structure human life and interaction. The symposium also investigates the metaphilosophical theme of how to create a philosophy of anything, specifically a new topic such as blockchain technology. Repeated themes are identified, in all areas of philosophical inquiry (ontology, epistemology, and axiology), and conceptual resources are elaborated to contribute to a philosophical understanding of blockchain technology. Thus, philosophy as a metaphilosophical approach is shown to be able to provide an understanding of the conceptual, theoretical, and foundational dimensions of novelty and emergence in the world, with a particular focus on blockchain technology.     

Autonomy and Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau’s General Will

Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have seen Rousseau’s ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism.     

Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy

This paper begins with a critique of the uses of the term "bentilun 體論 (ontology)" in modem Chinese scholarship by tracing their claim to being theoretical paradigms for understanding Chinese philosophy as a philosophical tradition.It is supplemented by a contrastive discussion of bentilun and its original ancient Greek counterpart,i.e.ontology,to show that the object of discourse in bentilun does not match up with that of ontology,namely "being qua being." This comparative study also demonstrates that bentilun finds its philosophical significance in connection with the theory of xinxing心性(heart-mind).In the second section of this paper,a comparative study of "xingershangxue形而上學 (metaphysics)" and "metaphysics" highlights the central tenet that the dao essentially transcends language.Daoist philosophy is used as an example that identifies a unique predilection toward philosophical concepts that transcend the realm of nameable thoughts and objects in Chinese philosophy.Textual evidence is provided to show that the conceptual possibility of xingershangxue is based upon a fundamental difference between you (being) and wu無 (not-being),in a way that is similar to philosophical developments in other early civilizations.Nonetheless,in addition to a philosophical interest in principles and values that transcend the material world,Daoist xingershangxue exhibits an idiosyncratic attention to notions and theories whose object of discourse is essentially unnameable.This characteristic philosophical interest is identified with the aim of locating essential disciplines within Chinese philosophy,including the theory of xinxing,practical wisdom,and the theory of jingjie境界 (state-of-attainment) in a wider framework of east and west philosophical traditions.     

拓扑几何在知觉组织与空间概念形成中的运用

陈霖的拓扑知觉理论运用几何性质解释知觉组织,并强调拓扑性质的优先性——拓扑知觉是其他几何知觉的基础,拓扑知觉先于其他几何知觉发生。皮亚杰的拓扑首位理论认为儿童的空间概念发展顺序为先发展拓扑几何概念,之后再发展射影与欧式几何概念。两大理论都运用拓扑性质来解释心理现象,其研究对象、研究方法存在很大不同,但它们在理论结构上具有高度一致性,对几何学在心理学上的运用有非常重要的启示意义。     

The interactivist model

A shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of process enables an integrated account of the emergence of normative phenomena. I show how substance assumptions block genuine ontological emergence, especially the emergence of normativity, and how a process framework permits a thermodynamic-based account of normative emergence. The focus is on two foundational forms of normativity, that of normative function and of representation as emergent in a particular kind of function. This process model of representation, called interactivism, compels changes in many related domains. The discussion ends with brief attention to three domains in which changes are induced by the representational model: perception, learning, and language.