Pictorial depth: intensity and aesthetic surface

Philosophers seldom ask questions regarding how certain phenomena occur, because such questions tend to be the province of the sciences or of technology. However, the question how pictures have depth requires philosophical reflection because it takes place on the surface of pictorial objects and involves both physical and phenomenal, i.e. aesthetic, features of those surfaces. This essay examines how pictures have depth by first separating the aesthetic question from interpretive considerations, and thereby refining the question how pictures have depth. Next it explicates two sorts of conceptual tools required to understand the question: several complex concepts needed to understand surfaces, and the concept of intensity. These are then used to understand how pictures can have depth by showing how intensities produce both an aesthetic surface and depth within it.     

Dreamless Sleep and the Whole of Human Life: An Ontological Exposition

This paper explores the meaning of dreamless sleep. First, I consider four reasons why we commonly pass over sleep’s ontological significance. Second, I compare and contrast death and sleep to show how each is oriented to questions regarding the possibilities of “being-a-whole.” In the third and final part, I explore the meaning and implications of “being-toward-sleep,” arguing that human existence emerges atop naturally anonymous corporeality (i.e. living being). In sum, I try to show that we can recover an authentic – if somewhat ambiguous – sense of “being-a-whole” only by recognizing the ontological significance of dreamless sleep.     

Crimes and Punishments

Every criminal act ought to be matched by a corresponding punishment, or so we may suppose, and every punishment ought to reflect a criminal act. We know how to count punishments. But how do we count crimes? In particular, how does our notion of a criminal action depend on whether the prohibited action is an activity, an accomplishment, an achievement, or a state?     

What is a Thing?

“Thing” in the titular question of this paper should be construed as having the utmost generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent, a being. The present task is to say what a thing of any category is. This task is the primary one of any comprehensive and systematic metaphysics. Indeed, an answer provides the means for resolving perennial disputes concerning the integrity of the structure in reality—whether some of the relations among things are necessary merely given those relata themselves—and the intricacy of this structure—whether some things are more or less fundamental than others. After considering some reasons for thinking the generality of the titular question makes it unanswerable, the paper propounds the methodology, original inquiry, required to answer it. The key to this methodology is adopting a singular perspective; confronting the world as merely the impetus to inquiry, one can attain an account of what a thing must be. Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics—broadly Aristotelian, essentialist, and nonhierarchical—that develops the consequences of this account. With it, it is possible to move past stalemate in metaphysics by revealing the grounds of a principled choice between seemingly incommensurable worldviews.     

Questions for a Millennium: Religion and Science from the Perspective of a Scientist

This essay addresses a series of eight questions about what religion can do for science. It explores the secular role of religion in contemporary science and the need for greater synthesis between science and religion. It concludes that, for survival in the twenty-first century, religion cannot exist without acknowledging and using the enormous information pool of science, and science can no longer shun or ignore religion. Humankind will always need the large, synthetic explanations that religion provides of why we are here and what we ought to do and believe. The world needs to mark this new millennium with a sense of respect, cooperation, and even synthesis between science and religion.     

Subsumption and Relative Identity

This paper is a modification of Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty's conception of the subsumption relation. Guarino and Welty require that that whether one property may subsume the other should depend on the modal metaproperties of those properties. I argue that the part of their account that concerns the metaproperty carrying a criterion of identity is essentially flawed. Subsequently, I propose to constrain the subsumption relation not, as Guarino and Welty require, by means of incompatible criteria of absolute identity but by means of incompatible criteria of relative identity. After discussing the benefits of applying relative identity in ontological investigations I provide a formal framework in which to prove a counterpart of the identity criteria constraint.This revised version was published online in October 2005 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Margolis Looks at the Arts

This paper examines the early aesthetic writings of Joseph Margolis from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s in order to argue for the relevance of these works in understanding Margolis’s later, more well-known views in the philosophy of art. Specifically, the paper addresses Margolis’s early essays on the definition and ontology of art and aesthetic perception. These essays not only show Margolis engaged in the most significant debates in mid-century analytic aesthetics but also provide important indications of the limitations of that approach to thinking about the arts that informs the development of Margolis’s later cultural realism.     

The multiple realization book

In this review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book I look at the positive account, Modest Identity Theory, that Polger and Shapiro advance. In §2 of this review, I outline P&S’s arguments against multiple realization and summarize the view they defend, Modest Identity Theory. In §3, I consider what consequences the adoption of Modest Identity Theory might have on the ontology of psychological or mental kinds. In particular, I highlight the ontological pluralism and anti-reductionism that Polger and Shapiro endorse. Modest Identity Theory tolerates multiple taxonomies of psychological kinds, which represents an important departure from earlier versions of Identity Theory. I conclude in §4 by arguing that the way Modest Identity Theory individuates psychological kinds very closely resembles the way that those kinds are individuated by functionalism. I argue that the causal properties individuative of psychological kinds can be used to group together distinct neuroanatomical characteristics. I illustrate this by describing research into the functional connectivity of the reading network. I conclude by emphasizing the value of using empirical evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science to inform the new pluralistic ontology of psychological and mental kinds with which Modest Identity Theory is compatible.     

The enduring significance of Christos Yannaras: some further works in translation

The Greek philosopher and theologian Christos Yannaras is becoming better known in the English-speaking world with the publication of an increasing number of his works in English translation. With the help of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, Yannaras articulates an ontological (as opposed to an ontic) version of Being based on relation. Beings exist not as ontic entities but only with reference to the person. Relation actually constitutes existents. Our fulfilment as human beings lies in our ascending from the mode of nature, which is bound by necessity, to a mode of existence characterised by self-transcending referentiality or love. Two obstacles are considered: the problem of evil and the ‘religionisation’ of Christianity. The fundamental problem of evil is that it renders human life without meaning. There are, however, no rational explanations of evil. The only reply lies beyond language, in faith/trust, self-transcendence and self-offering. A religionised version of Christianity transforms faith into an ideology which holds out salvation as a reward for the individual. The Church – the ecclesial event – is not a collection of individuals seeking their own salvation but a community of people called to struggle together to attain true existence, to pass from the finite mode of nature to that mode which knows no limitations of decay and death. An intellectualist approach to philosophy does not help us to achieve this goal. For philosophy is not simply an exercise in thinking but the struggle to attain existential freedom. Such freedom is transformatory, referential and ek-static.     

Quality and Quantifiers

I examine three ‘anti-object’ metaphysical views: nihilism (there are no objects at all), generalism (reality is ultimately qualitative), and anti-quantificationalism (quantification over objects does not perspicuously represent the world). After setting aside nihilism, I argue that generalists should be anti-quantificationalists. Along the way, I attempt to articulate what a ‘metaphysically perspicuous’ language might even be.