论中国古代儒家哲学的价值取向

儒家哲学是中国古代哲学的重要门派 ,其内容博大精深 ,影响广泛而久远 ,其基本精神和价值取向可归纳为“内圣外王之道”。对儒家“内圣外王”思想的阐释在古代和近代有所不同 ,涉及内修与外用、中学与西学等关系。“内圣外王”作为价值观 ,其本体论依据为天人关系论中的“天道”或“人道”本体论 ,其认识论依据为内在超越思路和“知行合一”观念。     

Religious Naturalism Today

Three questions are addressed. First, concerning the definition of naturalism, I accept the characterization by Rem Edwards (1972) but insist on a materialist or physicalist interpretation of these features. Second, the distinctive characteristic of my religious naturalism is an argument that although a theological position based on a physicalist ontology is constrained by physicalism, the ontology itself does not dictate theological content. Theological content can break free of ontology if this content is valuational rather than ontological. Such a valuational theism becomes possible when Rudolf Bultmann's and Fritz Buri's method of existentialist interpretation is wedded to Henry Nelson Wieman's naturalist conception of God. The knowledge of God in events of grace, therefore, is rooted in moments of creative transformation that are themselves always transformative. This approach makes possible a better approach to the problem of objectivity than Bultmann could achieve. Third, concerning the chief issues facing religious naturalism today, I argue that religious naturalists should more forthrightly confront the issue of ontological materialism and that the most pressing issue concerns thinking out more fully the religious or theological content to be ascribed to such a position after the nature of naturalism is resolved.     

A Return to Musical Idealism

In disputes about the ontology of music, musical idealism—that is, the view that musical compositions are ideas—has proven to be rather unpopular. We argue that, once we have a better grip on the ontology of ideas, we can formulate a version of musical idealism that is not only defensible, but plausible and attractive. We conclude that compositions are a particular kind of idea: they are completed ideas for musical manifestation.     

DANCING AROUND THE CAUSAL JOINT: CHALLENGING THE THEOLOGICAL TURN IN DIVINE ACTION THEORIES

Recent years have seen a shift in divine action debates. Turning from noninterventionist, incompatibilist causal joint models, representatives of a “theological turn” in divine action have questioned the metaphysical assumptions of approaches seeking indeterministic aspects of nature wherein God might act. Various versions of theistic naturalism (such as Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological naturalism) offer specific theological frameworks that reimagine the basic God–world relationship. But do these explicitly theological approaches to divine action take scientific knowledge and methodology seriously enough? And do such approaches adequately address the problem of how uncreated, immaterial realities could affect physical, material processes? This article examines various features of the theological turn in divine action—recognizing it as a welcome step in science and religion, while challenging its current adequacy.     

Pictorial depth: intensity and aesthetic surface

Philosophers seldom ask questions regarding how certain phenomena occur, because such questions tend to be the province of the sciences or of technology. However, the question how pictures have depth requires philosophical reflection because it takes place on the surface of pictorial objects and involves both physical and phenomenal, i.e. aesthetic, features of those surfaces. This essay examines how pictures have depth by first separating the aesthetic question from interpretive considerations, and thereby refining the question how pictures have depth. Next it explicates two sorts of conceptual tools required to understand the question: several complex concepts needed to understand surfaces, and the concept of intensity. These are then used to understand how pictures can have depth by showing how intensities produce both an aesthetic surface and depth within it.     

论《老子》道之本体论的和谐意蕴及现代指向

《老子》最早赋予“道”以完整和深刻的哲学本体论意义。道的哲学本体论具有三重基本内涵,即追寻作为世界统一性的终极存在、知识统一性的终极解释、意义统一性的终极价值。三重内涵的融通合一即是和谐的意义和旨趣所在,体现为天人和谐、人际和谐和群体和谐。《老子》认为道是万物的本原,德是万物分享形上之道而各自获得的本性,二者皆以和谐为内核,和谐是道的基本特征和存在状态。和谐的终极价值以人的意义统一性为逻辑基点,和谐的终极存在以道的世界统一性为生成维度,和谐的终极解释以道的知识统一性为治理向度。     

Dreamless Sleep and the Whole of Human Life: An Ontological Exposition

This paper explores the meaning of dreamless sleep. First, I consider four reasons why we commonly pass over sleep’s ontological significance. Second, I compare and contrast death and sleep to show how each is oriented to questions regarding the possibilities of “being-a-whole.” In the third and final part, I explore the meaning and implications of “being-toward-sleep,” arguing that human existence emerges atop naturally anonymous corporeality (i.e. living being). In sum, I try to show that we can recover an authentic – if somewhat ambiguous – sense of “being-a-whole” only by recognizing the ontological significance of dreamless sleep.     

Crimes and Punishments

Every criminal act ought to be matched by a corresponding punishment, or so we may suppose, and every punishment ought to reflect a criminal act. We know how to count punishments. But how do we count crimes? In particular, how does our notion of a criminal action depend on whether the prohibited action is an activity, an accomplishment, an achievement, or a state?     

What is a Thing?

“Thing” in the titular question of this paper should be construed as having the utmost generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent, a being. The present task is to say what a thing of any category is. This task is the primary one of any comprehensive and systematic metaphysics. Indeed, an answer provides the means for resolving perennial disputes concerning the integrity of the structure in reality—whether some of the relations among things are necessary merely given those relata themselves—and the intricacy of this structure—whether some things are more or less fundamental than others. After considering some reasons for thinking the generality of the titular question makes it unanswerable, the paper propounds the methodology, original inquiry, required to answer it. The key to this methodology is adopting a singular perspective; confronting the world as merely the impetus to inquiry, one can attain an account of what a thing must be. Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics—broadly Aristotelian, essentialist, and nonhierarchical—that develops the consequences of this account. With it, it is possible to move past stalemate in metaphysics by revealing the grounds of a principled choice between seemingly incommensurable worldviews.     

Questions for a Millennium: Religion and Science from the Perspective of a Scientist

This essay addresses a series of eight questions about what religion can do for science. It explores the secular role of religion in contemporary science and the need for greater synthesis between science and religion. It concludes that, for survival in the twenty-first century, religion cannot exist without acknowledging and using the enormous information pool of science, and science can no longer shun or ignore religion. Humankind will always need the large, synthetic explanations that religion provides of why we are here and what we ought to do and believe. The world needs to mark this new millennium with a sense of respect, cooperation, and even synthesis between science and religion.