Temporalities

The notion of time is traced both in Philosophy and in Physics (Newtonian Mechanics, Relativity, Cosmology, Quantum Theory). Distinct temporalities emerge and time appears as the essential condition for the realization of being, in accordance with ideas and theories developed by Peirce, Whitehead, and Heidegger.     

Constructs,inferences, and mental measurement

The ‘construct’ concept occupies a significant place in psychology and, yet its role is misunderstood. Psychologists think that theorising in the area of psychological testing involves conjuring constructs, which are operationally defined and measured via psychometric tests. However, the ‘construct’ concept is unworkable and laden with confused philosophical baggage accrued under the hegemony of logical empiricism, and its real function in psychology is obscured. Via an analysis of its history and logic, I expose its flawed conception of the relation between theoretical and observable concepts and the way in which it serves the myth of mental measurement. Finally, it is shown how the actual logic of theorising in science, which entails that theories are best inferred from relevant phenomena, not imaginatively constructed, oppugns this myth and promises to coordinate theoretical concepts with the phenomena to be explained.     

What Counts as Behavior? The Molar Multiscale View

Because the definition of behavior changes as our understanding of behavior changes, giving a final definition is impossible. One can, however, rule out some possibilities and propose some others based on what we currently know. Behavior is not simply movement, but must be defined by its function. Also, our understanding of behavior must agree with evolutionary theory. I suggest 4 basic principles: (a) only whole organisms behave; (b) behavior is purposive; (c) behavior takes time; and (d) behavior is choice. Saying that parts of an organism behave is nonsense, and, moreover, evolutionary theory explains the existence of organisms mainly through their adaptive behavior. Behavior is purposive in that behavior is shaped by its consequences, through an organism''s lifetime or through interactions with the environment across many generations of natural selection. Behavior takes time in that behavior is interaction with the environment that cannot take place at a moment. Moreover, at a moment in time, one cannot definitely identify the function of behavior. Identification of an activity requires a span of time. Behavior is choice in the sense that a suitable span of time always includes time spent in more than 1 activity. Activities include parts that are themselves activities on a smaller time scale and compete for time. Thus, behavior constitutes time allocation. An accounting problem arises whenever any behavior is attributed to multiple consequences. In the molar multiscale view, this raises the question of whether 2 activities can occur at the same time. The question remains open.     

The Consequences and Correction of Inflation in Personal Savings Estimates in Specific Future Time Frames

We examined the consequences of personal savings estimate inflation that occurs when decision makers provide savings estimates for specific future months when compared with the next month or the next year time frames, along with a method to attenuate this bias. The results of three experiments showed that the savings estimate inflation leads to significantly larger estimates of desired nest egg size (Experiment 1) and preference for riskier choices in other financial domains such as investment and employment decisions (Experiment 2). An attempt to attenuate this bias revealed that it is corrected when individuals provide a budgeting estimate prior to giving a savings estimate (Experiment 3). The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hilbert's Inferno: Time Travel for the Damned

Combining time travel with certain kinds of supertask, this paper proposes a novel model for Hell. Temporally‐closed spacetimes allow otherwise impossible opportunities for material kinds of damnation and reveal surprising limitations on metaphysical objections to Hell. Prima facie, eternal damnation requires either infinite amounts of time or time for the damned to speed‐up arbitrarily. However, spatiotemporally finite ‘time travel’ universes can host unending personal torment for infinitely many physical beings, while keeping fixed finite limits on rates of temporal passage. Such ‘Hilbert's Inferno’ spacetimes suggest neither materialism nor the finitude of time and space need forbid Hell. A material Hell can be spatiotemporally finite yet eternal for its inhabitants. Hilbert's Inferno also sheds light on Hell's location and accessibility, and shows that some spacetimes are intrinsically better suited to punishment than reward.     

Evaluating Medical Marijuana Dispensary Policies: Spatial Methods for the Study of Environmentally-Based Interventions

In 1996, California was the first state to pass a Compassionate Use Act allowing for the legal use of marijuana for medical purposes. Here we review several current policy and land use environmental interventions designed to limit problems related to the influx of medical marijuana dispensaries across California cities. Then we discuss the special challenges, solutions, and techniques used for studying the effects of these place-based policies. Finally, we present some of the advanced spatial analytic techniques that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of environmental interventions, such as those related to reducing problems associated with the proliferation of medical marijuana dispensaries. Further, using data from a premise survey of all the dispensaries in Sacramento, this study will examine what characteristics and practices of these dispensaries are related to crime within varying distances from the dispensaries (e.g., 100, 250, 500, and 1,000 feet). We find that some security measures, such as security cameras and having a door man outside, implemented by medical marijuana dispensary owners might be effective at reducing crime within the immediate vicinity of the dispensaries.     

Inter-hemispheric remapping between arm proprioception and vision of the hand is disrupted by single pulse TMS on the left parietal cortex

Parietal cortical areas are involved in sensori-motor transformations for their respective contralateral hemifield/body. When arms of the subjects are crossed while their gaze is fixed straight ahead, vision of the hand is processed by the hemisphere ipsilateral to the arm position and proprioception of the arm by the contralateral hemisphere. It induces interhemispheric transfer and remapping. Our objective was to investigate whether a single pulse TMS applied to the left parietal cortical area would disturb interhemispheric remapping in a similar case, and would increase a simple reaction time (RT) with respect to a control single pulse TMS applied to the frontal cortical area. Two LED were superimposed and located in front of the subjects on the saggital axis. Subjects were asked to carefully fixate on these LED during each trial. The lighting of the red LED was used as a warning signal. Following the green one was illuminated after a variable delay and served as a go-signal. The hand for the response was determined before the start of each trial. TMS was applied to the left parietal, the left frontal cortical areas, or not applied to the subject. Results revealed that: (1) Irrespective of its location, single pulse TMS induced a non-specific effect similar to a startle reflex and reduced RT substantially (15 ms on average) with respect to a control condition without TMS (mean value = 153 ms). (2) Irrespective of TMS, RT were shorter when the right or the left hand was positioned in the right visual hemi-field (i.e. normal and crossed positions respectively). (3) Finally, RT increased when single pulse TMS was applied to the left parietal area and when hands were crossed irrespective of which hand was used. We concluded that interhemispheric sensori-motor remapping was disrupted by a single pulse TMS that was applied to the left parietal cortex. This effect was also combined with some visual attention directed towards the hand located on the right visual hemi-field.     

Prospective and retrospective time perception are related to mental time travel: Evidence from Alzheimer’s disease

Unlike prospective time perception paradigms, in which participants are aware that they have to estimate forthcoming time, little is known about retrospective time perception in normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Our paper addresses this shortcoming by comparing prospective and retrospective time estimation in younger adults, older adults, and AD patients. In four prospective tasks (lasting 30 s, 60 s, 90 s, or 120 s) participants were asked to read a series of numbers and to provide a verbal estimation of the reading time. In four other retrospective tasks, they were not informed about time judgment until they were asked to provide a verbal estimation of four elapsed time intervals (lasting 30 s, 60 s, 90 s, or 120 s). AD participants gave shorter verbal time estimations than older adults and younger participants did, suggesting that time is perceived to pass quickly in these patients. For all participants, the duration of the retrospective tasks was underestimated as compared to the prospective tasks and both estimations were shorter than the real time interval. Prospective time estimation was further correlated with mental time travel, as measured with the Remember/Know paradigm. Mental time travel was even higher correlated with retrospective time estimation. Our findings shed light on the relationship between time perception and the ability to mentally project oneself into time, two skills contributing to human memory functioning. Finally, time perception deficits, as observed in AD patients, can be interpreted in terms of dramatic changes occurring in frontal lobes and hippocampus.