LOGICAL ANALYSES OF VIPASSANĀ MEDITATION

ABSTRACT

In this paper we propose logical analyses of Vipassanā Meditation as modus ponens or universal instantiation, as based upon identification, analysis, and interpretation of the meditation as a (spiritual) thought experiment (STE like e.g. huàtóus and kōans in Chan and Zen).*

The analyses consist in completing the unfinished enthymematic argument of the Sutta-nipāta by explication of hidden major. We speculate the thought experiment inference might be brought about by a faculty like mindfulness. The thought experiment analyses link the meditation to global cross-cultural theories and arguments in philosophy as Ibn Sīnā’s Flying Man and, notably, René Descartes’s Cogito. Last, we will give some indications how Vipassanā Meditation may be explained with help of western theories of consciousness.     

Examining Personal Control Beliefs as a Mediating Variable in the Health-Damaging Behavior of Substance Use: An Alternative Approach

Substance use continues to be a concern for researchers and health professionals alike. One of the most extensive areas of research on health-related behaviors such as smoking and drug use has been on personal control beliefs. Since many health actions (both facilitative and deleterious) depend on voluntary behaviors, and many health-related prevention and intervention programs are predicted on an assumption of controllability, this is an important area to consider. This article is a review of some of the literature and presents an alternative approach that entails using area-specific and domain-specific methods to examine the role that control beliefs play in the health-damaging behavior of substance use.     

Correspondence

Dorothy Judd: Give Sorrow Words: working with a dying child. Published by Free Association Books, 1989. £12.95.

Clifford Yorke, Stanley Wiseberg, Thomas Freeman: Development and Psychopathology — Studies in Psychoanalytic Psychiatry. Published by Yale University Press. £22.50.

Otto Weininger: Children's Phantasies. The Shaping of Relationships. Published by Karnac Books, 1989. £14.95.

Lynn Barnett: Enriching Day Care, 1989. Anna Freud Nursery, 1988. Buddle Lane, 1987. Available from Concorde Video Films Council Ltd., 201 Felixstowe Road, Ipswich, IP3 9BJ. Price £10 to hire, £30 + p.p. &; V.A.T. to buy.     

A Wild West of the Mind

§258 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is often seen as the core of his private language argument. While its role is certainly overinflated and it is a mistake to think that there is anything that could be called the private language argument, §258 is an important part of the private language sections of the Philosophical Investigations. As with so much of Wittgenstein's work, there are widely diverse interpretations of why exactly the private diarist's attempted ostensive definition fails. I argue for a version of the no-stage-setting interpretation of the failure of private ostension. On this interpretation, the reason why the diarist cannot establish a meaning for ‘S’ is that she lacks the conceptual-linguistic stage-setting needed to disambiguate the concentration of her attention (the private analogue of an ostensive definition). Thus, the problem with any subsequent use of ‘S’ is not that there is no criterion of correctness for remembering the meaning of ‘S’ correctly, or for re-identifying S correctly in the future. Rather, it is because of the initial failure to define ‘S’ that there is nothing that could count as a criterion of correctness for the future use of ‘S’; there is nothing to remember or re-identify. My argument for the no-stage-setting interpretation consists in showing how well it fits into the rest of the Philosophical Investigations and in defending it against objections from Robert J. Fogelin, Anthony Kenny, and most recently John V. Canfield. Kenny's and Canfield's objections are found to suffer from problems regarding memory scepticism.     

Religion,moral thought–action fusion,and obsessive–compulsive features in Israeli Muslims and Jews

Previous studies suggest that the link between obsessive–compulsive (OC) symptoms and moral thought–action fusion (TAF) depends on religion; however, no study has compared Muslim and Jewish samples. We examined the relationships between OC symptoms, scrupulosity, religiosity, and moral TAF in Israeli Muslims and Jews. Religiosity was not associated with elevations in OC symptoms, although religiosity correlated with scrupulosity across the entire sample after controlling for depression and anxiety. Moral TAF was related to scrupulosity across the entire sample. The Muslim group had higher levels of OC symptoms, scrupulosity, and depressive symptoms than did the Jewish group, but the groups were equally religious. In addition, Muslims scored higher than did Jews on moral TAF even after controlling for symptoms; however, moral TAF was not related to scrupulosity within the Muslim group. In combination, these results imply that moral TAF depends on cultural and religious factors and does not necessarily indicate pathology.     

Intrusive thoughts in patients with obsessive compulsive disorder and non-clinical participants: a comparison using the International Intrusive Thought Interview Schedule

The International Intrusive Thought Interview Schedule (IITIS) was used to assess and compare the unwanted intrusive thoughts (UITs) reported in a group of patients with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and a non-clinical group. Although all participants reported at least one type of intrusion, OCD patients experienced more intrusive thoughts than non-clinical participants, and this difference was statistically significant. In the OCD group, intrusive thoughts were more frequent, interfered more with daily life, were considered to be more important to get out of the mind, and were more difficult to stop than in non-clinical participants. The two groups did not differ significantly in terms of five appraisals of the most distressing intrusive thought. One appraisal (importance) was used far more by the OCD group than the non-clinical group. For three appraisals (intolerance of anxiety, need to control, and intolerance of uncertainty), the difference was smaller. Only two of the strategies for controlling the most upsetting intrusive thought (ritual and avoidance) were of value in differentiating between the two groups. The IITIS (an instrument used to assess intrusions in non-clinical samples) appears to be of value for the assessment of patients with OCD.     

Do English and Mandarin speakers think about time differently?

Time is a fundamental domain of experience. In this paper we ask whether aspects of language and culture affect how people think about this domain. Specifically, we consider whether English and Mandarin speakers think about time differently. We review all of the available evidence both for and against this hypothesis, and report new data that further support and refine it. The results demonstrate that English and Mandarin speakers do think about time differently. As predicted by patterns in language, Mandarin speakers are more likely than English speakers to think about time vertically (with earlier time-points above and later time-points below).     

Fanciful Examples

This article defends the use of fanciful examples within the method of wide reflective equilibrium. First, it characterizes the general persuasive role of described cases within that method. Second, it suggests three criteria any example must meet in order to succeed in this persuasive role; fancifulness has little or nothing to do with whether an example is able to meet these criteria. Third, it discusses several general objections to fanciful examples and concludes that they are objections to the abuse of described cases; they identify no special problem with fanciful examples.     

Desire satisfaction,death, and time

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.     

Adorno’s View of Life

The aim of this article is to reflect on the dialectic of the individual’s life and death in terms of Adorno’s moral philosophy, specifically through a thorough reading of his Negative Dialectics and other key works on the subject. I hold that there are two aspects of the dialectic of life within the context of Adorno’s “nonidentity”: one involves exploring the false identification, due to the reification of modern society, of the individual’s life experience with her or his death experience, while the other involves preserving the dialectical and irreducible tension between the theoretical contemplation of life and of historical conditions, as well as specific social systems. Heidegger’s ontological philosophy concerning Dasein and Kant’s categorical imperative will also be discussed in order to fully understand Adorno’s moral philosophy and his idea of nonidentity. From my point of view, Adorno’s moral philosophy is the prime motivator of his unique concept of nonidentity, and has influenced contemporary political philosophical concepts such as biopolitics (cf. G. Agamben).