True self-alienation positively predicts reports of mindwandering

Two studies assessed the relationship between feelings of uncertainty about who one truly is (i.e., true self-alienation) and self-reported task-unrelated thoughts (i.e., mindwandering) during performance tasks. Because true self-alienation is conceptualized as the subjective disconnect between conscious awareness and actual experience, we hypothesized that greater feelings of true self-alienation would positively relate to subjective reports of mindwandering. Two convergent studies supported this hypothesis. Moreover, this relationship could not consistently be accounted for by the independent influence of other aspects of authenticity, negative mood, mindfulness, or broad personality dimensions. These findings suggest that individual differences in true self-alienation are reliably associated with subjective reports of mindwandering. The implications of these findings for the true self-alienation construct, the ways that personality relates to mindwandering, and future research directions focused on curtailing mindwandering and improving performance and achievement are discussed.     

无意识思维:理论、质疑与回应

Dijksterhuis等人发现在解决复杂问题时,无意识思维的加工结果优于有意识思维,并据此提出了无意识思维理论。本文介绍了支持无意识思维理论的基本实验证据,质疑无意识思维的相关研究及对质疑的回应研究。未来研究应重点关注改进无意识思维研究范式和寻找更多影响无意识思维效应的中介变量,无意识思维加工结果如何上升到有意识层面,无意识思维的加工方式以及其在真实和高风险任务情境中的应用。     

The arms of the chimeras

This article seeks to compare the approach developed in 1974 by Michel de M'Uzan to the concept of the ‘chimera’ with Thomas Ogden's ( 1995 , 2005 ) reflections on ‘the analytic third’. This comparison shows that in spite of the different theoretical approaches, unconscious to unconscious communication – a subject of interest in contemporary psychoanalytic research – makes it possible to grasp the intersubjective data deployed in the field of the session. After reviewing M. de M'Uzan's conception of the ‘chimera’ – a product of the unconsciouses of patient and analyst alike, and which emerges during a process of depersonalization in the analyst – the author proposes her hypothesis of the chimera as a particular intersubjective third whose creation, in a hallucinatory state, makes it possible to gain access to the bodily and emotional basis of the trauma. The author describes the chimera as a mental ‘squiggle’ between the two members of the pair which finds expression in different forms; further, she considers that the chimera that seizes the analyst is underpinned by the unconscious affinities of traumatic zones in both protagonists, which permit the grounding, configuration and sharing of the territories of suffering, as apprehended in this paper.     

The Effect of Positive Emotions with Different Arousal Levels on Thought–Action Repertoires1,2

This study examined whether the induction of different states of arousal via positive emotions broadens thought–action repertoires. Sixty-two Japanese undergraduate and graduate students were randomly assigned to (a) high-arousal positive emotion, (b) low-arousal positive emotion, and (c) neutral groups, after which they watched a 3-min film clip. Participants completed the Affect Grid to confirm their mood state before and after watching the film. Following this, they completed the Twenty Statements Test, which measures thought–action repertoires. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted on the Twenty Statements Test score. The results showed that high-arousal positive emotion broadened thought–action repertoires to a greater extent than did low-arousal positive emotion and the neutral state, while low-arousal positive emotion broadened such repertoires to a greater extent than did the neutral state. We discuss the different effects of high- and low-arousal positive emotions on thought–action repertoires.     

The experimental critique and philosophical practice

Some experimental philosophers have criticized the standard intuition-based methodology in philosophy. One worry about this criticism is that it is just another version of the general skepticism toward the evidential efficacy of intuition, and is thereby subject to the same difficulties. In response, Weinberg provides a more nuanced version of the criticism by targeting merely the philosophical use of intuition. I contend that, though Weinberg’s approach differs from general skepticism about intuition, its focus on philosophical practices gives rise to a new difficulty. Most extant experimental surveys investigate intuitions about particular cases through vignettes giving little contextual information. However, philosophical practices crucially depend on intuitions about general claims and typically provide more contextual background. I argue that, due to these two differences between surveys’ and philosophers’ appeals to intuition, Weinberg’s critique lacks enough support from current experimental data. I conclude that experimental philosophers who engage in the negative program should pay more attention on testing philosophers’ use of general intuitions and context-rich intuitions.     

Schopenhauer on the aimlessness of the will

Schopenhauer asserts that ‘the will, which is objectified in human life as it is in every appearance, is a striving without aim and without end’. The article rejects some recent readings of this claim, and offers the following positive interpretation: however many specific aims of my specific desires I manage to attain, none is a final aim, in the sense that none terminates my ‘willing as a whole’, none turns me into a non-willing being. To understand Schopenhauer’s claim we must recognize his central contrast between happiness and will-lessness. Happiness is the satisfaction of individual desire, but no act of will that succeeds in satisfying individual desire is the attainment of a final aim, in that none brings about a conscious state in which the subject experiences no more unfulfilled desires. Such a state is the ultimate goal of existence, in Schopenhauer’s view, but happiness does not provide a route along which it can be attained.     

创造性思维的酝酿效应

酝酿效应是指当人们遭遇无法解决的难题时, 暂时将其搁置, 转而去完成其他无关任务, 反而有利于原有问题解决的现象。近年来, 研究者对创造性问题解决过程中的酝酿效应及其影响因素进行了广泛的研究, 同时提出了较多理论试图进一步解释酝酿效应。酝酿效应的代表性理论可分为“选择性遗忘理论”、“激活扩散和线索同化理论”、“无意识加工理论”等, 它们从不同角度解释了酝酿效应的机制, 并对其影响因素和有关现象各有预测。对心智游移和睡眠这些特殊形式的酝酿的研究进一步揭示了酝酿效应的机制。认知神经研究表明, 酝酿期的基本认知成分, 即表征重构和激活扩散, 涉及到前额叶、纹状体、海马体等多个脑区的协同合作。未来研究需要以深化理论建设为基础, 利用认知神经方法进一步揭示酝酿效应的机制, 从而更为深刻地认识创造性酝酿的本质。     

儿童语言和认知（思维）发展的关系

在对幼儿从出生到３岁语言发展追踪研究和有关实验研究结果的基础上,比较、分析儿童语言和认知（思维）发展的各阶段及起作用的因素,探讨语言发展和认知发展的关系,提出以下几点看法：（１）儿童在１岁前（前语言期）的具体思维阶段有认知（有感知、记忆、表象和思维）,但还没有真正的语言。这说明语言不是先于思维,也不是所有的思维都与语言相联系。但是,人类特有的抽象思维却与语言有着密切的联系。（２）认知（思维）发展是语言发展的基础。（３）认知（思维）发展和语言发展的关系是双向的,辩证的,是复杂地交互作用的。（４）应以辩证的唯物主义的观点来看语言和认知（思维）的产生。人类所以有语言,有高度抽象概括的思维,都源于人类的实践活动。     

Does Suppressing the Thought of a Self-Relevant Stigma Affect Interpersonal Interaction?

ABSTRACT

In the current study, we examined the effects of women's suppressing negative gender stereotypes while interacting with a male confederate. Compared with control participants, those who suppressed negative thoughts about women's ability experienced less self-confidence, lower self-esteem, and were more nonverbally submissive during the interaction, particularly if they were high in stigma consciousness (Pinel, 1999 Pinel, E. C. 1999. Stigma consciousness: The psychological legacy of social stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76: 114–128. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). These findings illustrate the negative intra- and interpersonal consequences of stigma suppression.     

The inertness of reason and Hume's legacy

Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful objects on their own can produce the desires that move us to action. First, I show that this reading puts Hume at odds with Humeans, since the latter are committed, not only to the view that beliefs and desires are both necessary to action, but also to the view that beliefs do not produce desires. Second, I review textual, philosophical and historical grounds for my interpretation of Hume's argument for the inertness of reason. I argue that the new line on Hume, while consistent with a certain reading of the Treatise, is not supported by the Dissertation on the Passions and the second Enquiry, where Hume argues that all motivation has an origin in “taste”, which I take to be different from belief. Thus, Hume's arguments do support the contemporary Humean theory of motivation.