The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.

Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative

The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons. I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response. I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’ phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.

交互分析理论对改善人际交往困惑的应用

在心理咨询中,会遇到很多"老好人"来访者,这些老好人因不会拒绝别人而有苦难言。为更好地解决"老好人"式来访者的心理困惑,作者在交互分析理论的"人间游戏"基础上,发展并诠释了一个新的游戏——"老好人游戏"。通过对这一游戏模式的剖析,帮助咨询师充分了解"老好人"的行为模式及其背后的内心状态,对症咨询,真正实现心理咨询"助人自助"的目的。     

Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms?

According to Putnam the reference of natural kind terms is fixed by the world, at least partly; whether two things belong to the same kind depends on whether they obey the same objective laws. We show that Putnam's criterion of substance identity only “works” if we read “objective laws” as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. Moreover, at least some of the laws of some of the special sciences have to be included. But what we consider to be good special sciences and what not depends upon our values. Hence, “objective laws” cannot be read as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. It follows that the reference of natural kind terms cannot be fixed by the world, not even partly. The final conclusion applies to a variety of realisms. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The identity impact of witnessing selective incivility: A study of minority ethnic professionals

We examine how minority ethnic employees account for witnessing selective incivility to ethnically similar others. Our study is based on qualitative interviews with British Asian employees – the majority who witnessed incivility directed towards migrant Asian employees working for the same company. Our findings indicate that, for those whose minority ethnic identity was of central importance, witnessing selective incivility towards others from a similar ethnic background can be perceived as an identity threat. We provide insights into three identity work strategies undertaken by witnesses of selective incivility, while illuminating how minority ethnic identity shapes the way witnesses' respond to selective incivility in the workplace.     

A Developmental Approach to Social Science: A Model for Analyzing Charles Alexander's Scientific Contributions

A seven-paradigm developmental model of social science is presented (behaviorism, gestalt sociologism, empirical positivism, multi-method eclecticism, postmodern interpretivism, cooperative ecological inquiry, and developmental action inquiry). Charles Alexander's research is interpreted as bridging aspects of several paradigms, using third-person empirical positivist experiments to demonstrate the effects of a first-person research/practice called Transcendental Meditiation. The author suggests the possibility of complementing current research on TM with explicit double- and triple-loop research on the second- and third-person practices within the TM movement.     

Are Parents Accurate Reporters of Their Child's Cognitive Abilities?

Examined parent's ability to accurately report their child's cognitive functioning. Participants were 145 children and their parents referred to an outpatient mental health clinic for cognitive testing. Parent reports were measured using Likert ratings designed for research and clinical purposes. Children's cognitive abilities were measured using the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery—Revised (Woodcock, 1989) and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Third Edition (Wechsler, 1991). For boys, parental reports of general cognitive ability, fluid reasoning, comprehension-knowledge, visual processing, auditory processing, and acquisition and retrieval were significantly related to performance-based measurements of these same traits, and parental report of boys' fluid reasoning and visual processing ability evidenced specificity. For girls, parental report of general cognitive ability, fluid reasoning, visual processing, and auditory processing were significantly related to performance-based measurements of these same traits, and parental reports of girls visual processing and auditory processing evidenced specificity. These findings suggest areas where clinicians can be more confident of parental report of children's cognitive abilities and other areas where clinicians should be wary of parental report.     

Object individuation using property/kind information in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Around 1 year of age, infants develop the ability to individuate objects in the absence of spatiotemporal information. Some have proposed that this capacity relies on the emergence of language and, in particular, that comprehending an object's label is required to individuate it as a particular kind. One approach to testing this hypothesis is to conduct experiments on pre-linguistic human infants. A second is to test non-linguistic animals. We followed the second approach, exploring whether semi-free-ranging rhesus macaques can individuate objects using property/kind information. To make the results most directly comparable, we adapted a reaching paradigm used to examine property/kind individuation in infants. Results from three experiments demonstrate that, like 12-month-old infants, adult rhesus macaques can use both spatiotemporal and property/kind information to individuate food objects. In a fourth experiment designed to examine which properties are used to individuate food objects, results revealed that rhesus use color, but not shape. These results, together with experiments involving different procedures, provide support for the conclusion that in the absence of linguistic abilities, some non-human primates spontaneously use property/kind information to individuate objects.